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Although private foundations are assumed to be beneficial, their impact on grantee 
organizations is not well understood. This quantitative research explored how private, 
nonoperating foundations influence grantees’ financial capacity to pursue their missions. 
Principal-agent theory was applied to rationalize foundations’ social good purpose, along 
with subsidy theory of public charities’ need for capital accumulation, thus comprising a 
unique framework for identifying pathways of relationships amongst influencer variables 
of foundations’ operating characteristics; the outcome of grantees’ months of 
unrestricted, liquid net assets (MULNA); and the mediator of foundations’ payout rate. 
Multiple regression and indirect effects analyses of data on 612 cases from NCCS and tax 
returns revealed that the sector focus and characteristics of certain types of funders (i.e., 
oldest, largest, smallest, volunteer and professionally staffed, aggressive and average 
charitable spenders, and arts-focused foundations) affected payout behavior. In addition, 
large foundations’ payout rate influenced MULNA, especially among financially strong 
grantees. Finally, payout mediated the association between age and MULNA among the 
largest foundations, and between sector focus and MULNA among the oldest 
foundations. This research contributes to the discourse on foundations’ effectiveness in 
three ways: (a) associations were significant among segmented data, thus affirming the 
usefulness of examining specific types of foundations; (b) wealth distribution by the 
largest and oldest foundations was of tangible importance to their grantees, knowledge of 
which can be used in grant decision making and in informing policies on payout; and (c) 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
In the United States, nonprofit organizations comprise a third sector, outside of 
government or proprietary spheres, for individuals to produce social benefits voluntarily. 
Salamon (2002) described this sector as “private initiative for the common good” (p. 4). 
Since the 1980s, the importance of this third sector has increased, as indicated by the 
concomitant growth in number of degree-conferring studies and research on nonprofit 
entities (Jackson, Guerrero, & Appe, 2014; Mirabella, 2007; Shier & Handy, 2014). 
Despite the growth of this sector, not all types of nonprofit organizations have 
been subjected equally to in-depth scholarly scrutiny: Grant-seeking public charities have 
received considerably more attention than grant-funding private foundations. This 
relative lack of scholarship masks private foundations’ importance to the functioning of 
the nonprofit sector and influence in society. Foundations powerfully shape and 
determine social welfare activities in the United States through their support of public 
charities. 
Private foundations’ funding is supposed to help charitable organizations achieve 
their missions, a point made by the president of the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation: 
“Foundations, we reasoned, succeed when their grantees grow stronger, achieve more, 
and gain stature for leadership” (Bailin, 2003, p. 636). Consequently, the performance of 
foundations is intertwined with that of their grantees. McIlnay (1998) described this 
relationship between foundations and public charities as one of interdependence: “In a 
way, then, grantees are not merely recipients of foundations but donors to them because 




is foundations’ grantmaking: Giving financial support to public charities helps fulfill 
foundations’ own charitable missions, while receiving foundations’ financial support 
supposedly helps public charities pursue their social purposes. 
The focus of this dissertation is the nature of this financial relationship between 
funders and grantees. I explored if private, nonoperating foundation funding, holding 
other foundation operating characteristics constant, plays a significant role in grantee 
organizations’ financial capacity. I used quantitative-based models to discern the 
determinants of their yearly rate of charitable distributions and the pathways by which 
foundations impact their grantee organizations’ financial state. One possible route is that 
certain types of foundations and giving behavior directly impact grantees. Another 
possible pathway is an indirect one wherein foundations’ payout is the mechanism 
connecting foundations to grantees’ financial condition. 
Foundations’ charitable spending is popularly assumed to help their grantees 
succeed. The purpose of this study was to press on this assumption by illuminating how 
and to what extent foundations’ payout rates affect public charities. This research tested 
foundations’ payout rates for tangible impacts on grantees’ financial health, and explored 
the role of payouts in mediating the connection between foundations and public charities. 
Understanding the effectiveness of payout as a mechanism intended to help beneficiaries 
has policy implications in assessing the social value of foundations’ charitable spending 
against the private benefits these institutions accrue as a tax-subsidized entity. 
Chapter 1 begins with background information on private foundations and a 




study’s theoretical framework. Chapter 3 describes the research design, methodology, 
study variables, and steps for statistical analyses. Chapter 4 provides the results of the 
analyses. Chapter 5 concludes with interpretations of the findings and recommendations 
for future studies. 
Background 
Although diverse expressions of private philanthropy exist throughout the world, 
this research focused on private foundations that are officially incorporated in the United 
States. Private foundations were recognized legally with the passage of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969. The Act came about through the leadership of Congressman Wright Patman 
of Texas who began in 1961 a “personal crusade to make foundations accountable to the 
public” by questioning their “legitimacy and performance” (Frumkin, 1995, p. 591). 
Foundation legal expert Troyer (2000) recalled that estate lawyers and financial advisors 
used to recommend to wealthy clients that they establish endowed nonprofits as a way to 
avoid taxes and as an instrument to maintain control of their wealth. This form of tax 
avoidance continued until government stepped in to regulate endowed nonprofits. On 
signing the Tax Reform Act of 1969 into law, President Richard Nixon (1969) declared, 
“Tax-free foundations were brought under much closer Federal scrutiny. . . . [as] 
congressional consideration of this matter reflected a deep and wholly legitimate concern 
about the role of foundations in our national life” (para. 14). Passage of the Act 
effectively ended using endowed nonprofits as a tax shelter and established the private 




Private foundations became a new type of nonprofit organization. Both private 
foundations and public charities are nonprofits, but the former is not publicly reliant for 
funding (i.e., self-endowed) whereas the latter must demonstrate that a majority of 
income comes from public, external sources (i.e., passing the public support test; 
Arnsberger, Ludlum, Riley, & Stanton, 2008). In short, both are tax exempt for a 
charitable purpose, but private foundations are wealth-distributing, whereas public 
charities are resource-seeking entities. 
Beyond delineating and defining private foundations, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 
also imposed regulations on private foundations, specifically concerning self-dealing, 
payout, business income, and lobbying activities (Byrnes, 2004; Troyer, 1999, 2000). 
Henceforth, private foundations must be used for public, charitable purposes and not for 
privately benefiting their own institutional owners (i.e., inuring benefits to founders, 
donors, trustees, and directors); must distribute annually a minimum percentage of their 
investment assets for charitable purpose; must limit the extent to which businesses may 
be controlled by foundations; and must not lobby (Bittker & Rahdert, 1976; Byrnes, 
2004; Troyer, 2000). Although some components of the rules have been relaxed over the 
years (most notably lowering the payout requirement to today’s 5% annual distribution 
rate), these regulatory domains remain unchanged (Frumkin, 1995; Troyer, 1999). 
History has revealed that the worst-case scenarios about the new federal 
regulations were unfounded. Critics of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 worried that these 
rules would either discourage establishing new private foundations or deplete 




wrong, a remarkable number of new foundations have been established since passage of 
the Act, and great wealth accumulated by foundations since that time. To demonstrate the 
sector’s tremendous growth, in 1975 there were only 21,877 foundations incorporated in 
the United States with assets totaling $30 billion (Foundation Center, 2012a). As of 2012, 
there were 86,192 private foundations with assets totaling $715 billion (Foundation 
Center, 2014), which is nearly a 300% increase in the number of foundations and a 
2283% increase in aggregate asset size since 1975. 
Problem Statement 
Each year, private foundations give away more than $50 billion, which accounts 
for approximately 15% of all charitable giving in the United States (Indiana University 
Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2014; Foundation Center, 2014). Foundation giving 
may account for roughly 3% of the nonprofit sector’s revenues (Foster & Ditkoff, 2011, 
p. 143). Although foundation giving may not represent the largest source of nonprofit 
income, it is substantial enough to merit scrutiny. In particular, there should be 
knowledge of how and to what extent foundations’ charitable spending has a measurable 
impact on nonprofits’ capacity to pursue their missions. Yet, since the time of 
foundations’ establishment nearly 50 years ago with the Tax Reform Act of 1969, there 
has been no study on the effects of foundations’ charitable spending behavior on their 
beneficiaries. Perhaps this line of inquiry has been overlooked because charitable giving 
is presumed to be useful; however, the premise of this study is that the very existence of 
foundations’ grantmaking cannot be assumed to help their grantees pursue their missions. 




unaccountable by this measure with much taken for granted about the social value of their 
giving. Continuing to overlook this topic is too costly when the ability to address social 
needs relies on effective deployment of limited financial resources. Pursuing questions 
about foundations’ impact is relevant given that private foundations hold $715 billion in 
tax-exempt assets. Moreover, questioning the value of enabling foundations to possess 
and expend such largess is even more pressing at a time when the federal government has 
contracted out social welfare responsibilities: Nonprofit organizations have become the 
primary source for direct service delivery and private foundations are coinvestors with 
government in underwriting public priorities. 
Hence, the purpose of this research was to address a long-neglected question of 
private foundations’ value, which has proven elusive thus far. Private foundations do not 
pay federal income taxes (although they pay a nominal excise tax to cover federal 
oversight costs) in return for the promise of benefits to society. Beneficiaries of tax 
exemptions need to justify how well they serve the needs that government does not meet 
(Hansmann, 1981, p. 66). Studying foundations’ value and impact is too large an 
enterprise for a single study, but this effort charts new territory in proposing a theoretical 
framework that holds foundations accountable to public interest and contributes new 
knowledge on the mechanism and pathways by which foundations impact grantees. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to understand foundations’ charitable 
spending as a percentage of noncharitable-use assets (also referred to as payout rate) and 




indicator of their financial capacity to pursue their missions. Through this study, I 
investigated determinants of foundations’ payout and how payout acts as a mechanism 
for redistributing wealth from funders to grantees. I examined two theoretical pathways 
to explain how foundations affect public charities. Grantees may be affected directly by 
foundations’ operating characteristics of asset size, age, degree of professionalization, 
and sector focus. Alternatively, foundations’ charitable spending, as captured by the 
payout ratio of spending relative to size, may mediate the relationship between 
foundation characteristics and grantees’ financial condition. In sum, I tested the 
effectiveness of foundations’ charitable spending as a primary mechanism by which 
foundations realize charitable purpose. 
Multiple regressions and testing of indirect effects revealed the various possible 
pathways of relationships amongst three sets of variables. The mediating variable was the 
percentage share of annual noncharitable-use assets that a foundation spends charitably 
(i.e., payout rate). The influencer variables were foundations’ structural characteristics of 
asset size, age, staffing level, and sector focus—key traits that constitute a foundation’s 
character. The outcome variable of grantees’ financial health was operationalized by their 
number of months of unrestricted, liquid net assets (MULNA), which is considered to be 
an indication of an organization’s financial stability (Bowman, 2011a, 2011b). 
Significance 
This research was conducted at a critical moment. The demand for social services 
has been growing at a time when responsibility for providing public goods has been 




(Salamon, 2002), and private foundations shoulder increasingly greater responsibility for 
serving the public good (Quinn, Tompkins-Stange, & Meyerson, 2014). Consequently, 
public charities have become a societal necessity for producing and delivering social 
goods and services and, as their financiers, today’s private foundations wield great 
influence. Private foundations are a backbone of the nonprofit infrastructure shaping the 
functioning of this sector’s economy and informing the priorities and direction of public 
policies. Unbeknownst to the general public by and large, private foundations have 
become instrumental in influencing this nation’s social welfare policies, infrastructure, 
capacity, and economy (Parmar, 2012). 
Although greater expectations have fallen on private foundations for addressing 
social needs and advancing social issues, there is a lack of evidence that private 
foundations should be entrusted with such responsibilities. On the contrary, research has 
shown that the private philanthropic sector and their charitable giving reinforce social 
class divisions, exacerbate disadvantages stemming from income inequities, and 
ultimately serve the interests of the wealthy elite (Arnove, 1982; Arnove & Pinede, 2007; 
Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University & Google, 2007; Core & Donaldson, 2010; 
Dasgupta & Kanbur, 2011; Odendahl, 1990; Ostrander, 1984; Ostrower, 1995; Parmar, 
2012; Silver, 2007). Enough reasons exist to question not only the value, but also the 
legitimacy, of the private foundation institution (Prewitt, Dogan, Heydemann, & Toepler, 
2006). Despite all the attention paid to questioning foundations’ redistributive actions, 




organizations’ capacity to do good work. Too much has been assumed with too little 
known regarding how and to what extent foundations’ grantmaking helps public charities. 
The social problem motivating this research was the lack of knowledge about the 
value of private foundations in supporting the public good efforts of the nonprofit sector: 
In other words, are foundations effective in supporting grantees’ ability to function? In 
order to address this question of foundations’ value, my research inquiry centered on 
exploring how private foundations influence grantee organizations’ financial health, 
particularly through payout, which is the legislatively-mandated mechanism for 
foundations to behave for the public good. In order to explore this question, I posited a 
unique theoretical framework for holding foundations accountable to how well they help 
grantees achieve financial capacity to perform charitably. 
This study cannot definitively answer the degree to which foundations affect 
social change (for that, much more research is called for). On the other hand, this 
research addresses a gap in knowledge about the financial relationship between funders 
and grantees. This findings of this study provide new insight on the pathways by which 
foundations impact private charities’ financial condition and the kinds of foundations that 
have a measurable impact on grantees’ financial capacity. 
Contributions to Scholars and Practitioners 
The study fills gaps in knowledge about foundations and will be of interest to four 
key groups: social scientists working in the nonprofit sector, foundation decision-makers, 




governing the nonprofit sector (of which private foundations are an integral part), and 
advocates of public charities’ need for adequate levels of investment and capital. 
Of interest to nonprofit researchers, I introduce a theoretical framework that 
makes it possible to scientifically question and test the impact of foundations. I apply 
principal-agent theory wherein foundations are positioned as agents of government—a 
proxy for public interest. Perceiving foundations as agent and not as principal enables the 
questioning of foundations’ characteristics, behavior, activities, and performance against 
an expectation that foundations should have a public benefit. By modeling how principal-
agent theory can be applied to understand the phenomena of foundations’ impact on 
grantee organizations through grantmaking, this study contributes to a need in the 
research field for an accountability framework for understanding and assessing 
foundations’ spending behavior and its impacts. 
Also of interest to nonprofit scholars—as well as practitioners in the field and 
legislators—is the application of principal-agent theory, which contributes to gaps in 
knowledge about the mechanism and pathways of how foundations affect grantee 
organizations. Isolated attention has been paid to how much money foundations have 
distributed to public charities, but little is known about the determinants of foundations’ 
giving and of payouts’ importance to grantees. Knowing more about payout has practical 
importance: The findings may inform public policy debates about how to regulate 
foundations. Furthermore, the findings may also inform foundation executives’ decisions 




This study should also be of interest to nonprofit professionals who have 
advocated for improvements to philanthropic practices in order to give public charities 
greater levels of financial support to achieve social objectives (Blackwood & Pollak, 
2009; Curtis, 2010; Grantmakers for Effective Organizations, 2011; Gregory & Howard, 
2009; Hager, Pollak, Wing, & Rooney, 2004; Miller, 2003, 2010; Moyers, 2011; Nelson, 
Crump, & Koo, 2009; Nelson & Koo, 2014; Nonprofit Finance Fund [NFF], 2001; 
Nonprofit Operating Reserves Initiative Workgroup [NORI], 2010; Ryan, 2001; Starr, 
2011; Taylor, Harold, & Berger, 2013; Thomas, Christopher, & Sidford, 2011). 
Incorporating Hansmann’s (1981) notion that public charities need to be able to raise and 
retain profit as a key part of my research framework may mark the first time that the 
concept of adequate capitalization is used as an outcome indicator for assessing 
foundation performance. By making grantees’ capitalization position the outcome 
variable, I assign funders responsibility for bringing about or diminishing grantee 
organizations’ financial capacity to achieve a charitable purpose. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
What has remained unclear are the pathways of relationships between private, 
nonoperating foundations’ firm-level characteristics (i.e., size, age, professionalization, 
and sector focus) and charitable spending behavior and grantee organizations’ financial 
state. In other words, do certain types of foundations directly influence their grantees’ 
financial capacity to pursue mission, and is foundation payout—the legally intended 
mechanism by which foundations support public charities—effective in redistributing 




determinants of payout and how payout affects grantees have remained unclear. Given 
foundations’ primary purpose as a wealth-distributing charity, I explored determinants of 
foundations’ payout rate and the role charitable spending plays in affecting grantees’ 
financial health. 
The research questions and hypotheses are as follows: 
Research Question 1:  Do private, nonoperating foundations’ firm-level traits of asset 
size, age, professionalization, or sector focus influence their 
charitable spending behavior? 
Hypothesis 1: Private, nonoperating foundations’ firm-level traits 
influence their payout rate. 
Null Hypothesis 1: Private, nonoperating foundations’ firm-level traits do not 
predict their payout rate. 
Research Question 2:  By what pathways do foundations’ firm-level traits and payout 
behavior affect grantee organizations’ MULNA? 
Hypothesis 2: Foundations’ traits and payout behavior directly influence 
MULNA. 
Null Hypothesis 2: Foundations’ traits and payout behavior do not influence 
MULNA. 
Hypothesis 3: Foundations’ traits influence MULNA through the 




Null Hypothesis 3: Foundations’ payout rate does not mediate the relationship 
between foundations’ firm-level traits and grantees’ 
MULNA. 
Theoretical Framework 
I applied a research framework comprised of two separate theories: (a) principal-
agent theory, wherein federal government is the principal and private foundations are the 
agent, and (b) the theory of capital subsidy, which explains that public charities need tax 
exemption in order to build a level of financial reserves that will afford them the capacity 
to pursue their missions. Applying principal-agent theory frames private foundations as 
accountable to the public good via the conditions imposed on them by federal regulations. 
Capital subsidy theory is also normative in its expectation that financiers of the nonprofit 
economy should help nonprofits be well capitalized. The combination of these two 
theories creates a framework for empirically questioning how foundations’ grantmaking 
impacts public charities’ financial capacity. I will describe the framework further in 
Chapter 2. 
This approach of applying foundation accountability and financial health theories 
together has not been tried before. As such, this study will be testing new models for 
understanding how foundations’ payout relates to public charities’ financial reserves. 
Furthermore, the study will extend the concept of principal-agent relationships to the 
foundation sector as an explanatory theory that holds foundations accountable to public 
interest. Such an application creates new opportunities for assessing foundations’ 




Nature of the Study 
Private, nonoperating foundations are legally required to expend a portion of their 
wealth charitably. Hence, payout can be understood as the mandated vehicle by which 
foundations help public charities in order to perform a public good. Despite the 
importance of payout, little is understood about the determinants of the rate of payout 
and, more importantly, of how payout affects grantees’ financial capacity. I employ 
quantitative research methodology to understand the pathways of relationships among 
foundations’ traits, giving behavior, and grantees’ financial condition. 
Foundations’ payout rate may be predicted by certain firm-level characteristics. 
Using ordinary least squares regressions, I tested the relationship between foundations’ 
firm-level characteristics and their payout rate to identify the operating characteristics 
that are significantly associated with giving behavior. I also used ordinary least squares 
regressions to identify if grantees’ financial condition can be determined by foundation 
firm-level or spending characteristics. Finally, I used indirect effects analysis to test the 
significance of foundations’ payout rate in explaining the relationship between 
foundations’ traits and the outcome variable of grantees’ MULNA. By using this form of 
mediating path analysis to isolate the role of foundations’ payout rate in affecting 
MULNA, private foundations’ primary function as a grantmaker becomes the locus of 
scientific scrutiny. 
Definition of Terms 
501(c)(3): Refers to organizations that are tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of 




not for private financial gain of its owners (founders, donors, trustees, and anyone 
overseeing the organization). 501(c)(3) organizations are loosely called nonprofits, but 
that term may also broadly encompass the 29 other types of 501(c) organizations, such as 
501(c)(7) country clubs and 501(c)(6) trade unions. The language of this code, U.S.C., 
Title 26, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter F, Part I, §501(c)(3), is as follows: 
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, 
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur 
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of 
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or 
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying 
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as 
otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or 
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office. (Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, 2010) 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS, 2013) synthesized the code as follows: 
The exempt purposes set forth in section 501(c)(3) are charitable, religious, 
educational, scientific, literary, testing for public safety, fostering national or 
international amateur sports competition, and preventing cruelty to children or 




includes relief of the poor, the distressed, or the underprivileged; advancement of 
religion; advancement of education or science; erecting or maintaining public 
buildings, monuments, or works; lessening the burdens of government; lessening 
neighborhood tensions; eliminating prejudice and discrimination; defending 
human and civil rights secured by law; and combating community deterioration 
and juvenile delinquency. (para. 1) 
There are two types of 501(c)(3) organizations: public charities and private foundations. 
To be clear about this distinction, I use the term public charity when referring to grant-
seeking 501(c)(3) nonprofits and foundations or private foundations when referring to 
501(c)(3) grantmaking nonprofits that are endowed privately. 
509(a): This is the U.S. Code that defined private foundations as a new type of 
nonprofit business entity as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. The following is the 
language of the code, which can be found in U.S.C., Title 26, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, 
Subchapter F, Part II, § 509, excerpted to highlight the defining characteristics of this 
new type of charitable organization: 
For purposes of this title, the term “private foundation” means a domestic or 
foreign organization described in section 501 (c)(3) other than . . . an organization 
which normally receives more than one-third of its support in each taxable year 
from any combination of—(i) gifts, grants, contributions, or membership fees, and 
(ii) gross receipts from admissions, sales of merchandise, performance of 
services, or furnishing of facilities, in an activity which is not an unrelated trade 




each taxable year from the sum of—(i) gross investment income . . . and (ii) the 
excess (if any) of the amount of the unrelated business taxable income[; and] . . . 
is organized, and at all times thereafter is operated, exclusively for the benefit of, 
to perform the functions of, or to carry out the purposes of one or more specified 
organizations; [and] . . . is not controlled directly or indirectly by one or more 
disqualified persons . . . other than foundation managers and other than one or 
more organizations . . . [; and] an organization which is organized and operated 
exclusively for testing for public safety. (Tax Reform Act of 1969, 2010) 
This “other than” clause means that all 501(c)(3) organizations are private foundations 
unless an organization receives more than one-third of its support from external revenue 
sources (this threshold is termed the public support test). An organization that passes this 
test (i.e., one-third or more of its revenues is generated from grants, gifts, membership) is 
a public charity. Conversely, an organization that fails the public support test (i.e., less 
than one-third of its revenues are from external sources and more than one-third comes 
from a single source or investments) is a private foundation. 
Capitalization: This term refers to a nonprofit’s financial ability to achieve its 
mission by having accumulated enough of financial surplus to weather emergencies or 
afford new opportunities (Curtis, 2010, p. 2; see also Miller, 2003 for an early explication 
of an organization’s capital components). An indicator of capitalization is a public 
charity’s reserve of unrestricted, liquid net assets (Blackwood & Pollak, 2009; Bowman, 
2011a, 2011b; Curtis, 2010; Lam & McDougle, 2012; Nelson & Koo, 2014; NFF, 2001; 




End of year, fair market value of private foundations: These data can be found on 
the 2006 Form 990-PF, p. 1, line I (IRS, 2006a). It is the proxy of a foundation’s size. 
Financial capacity: Researchers have defined this term in various ways, such as 
Bowman (2011a) who described it as the ability of an organization to “seize opportunities 
and respond to threats” (p. 174). But, unlike Bowman whose definition alludes to 
institutional survivability, my use of this term is rooted in the parlance of private 
foundation professionals who refer to capacity as the ability of their grantees to pursue 
their charitable objectives effectively (Grantmakers for Effective Organizations, 2004). 
Hence, in using this term herein, I am referring to a public charity’s financial ability to 
pursue and accomplish its charitable mission. 
Form 990: Public charities must file tax return Form 990 annually with the IRS, 
unless they are small enough in budget size or amount of contributions to file simpler, 
abbreviated 990-N or 990-EZ forms. The purpose of the Form 990 is to enable the 
regulatory government body—the IRS—to review a public charity's finances and 
activities, such as assets, donations, and grants received. Completed Form 990 returns are 
made available for public review (Foundation Center, 2012b). 
Form 990-PF: The “PF” is the acronym for private foundations, and U. S. tax 
return Form 990-PF must be filed each year by all private foundations. According to the 
IRS (2015b), the Form 990-PF is “an annual information return that includes data on 
excise tax liability, charitable distributions, administrative expenditures, as well as 
income statement and balance sheet information” (para. 1). Completed Form 990-PFs are 




Foundation effectiveness: This term is used so casually in the foundation field that 
it merits an explanation of how it will be used in this study. Foundations do many 
things—set social change priorities, support public charities, deploy intellectual and 
financial capital, and manage the balance of asset accumulation and wealth distribution. 
In all of these domains, each foundation’s leadership has set their own objectives and 
expectations for what constitutes effectiveness. In this study, the notion of foundation 
effectiveness is tied to the impact that foundations have on their grantees through their 
primary function as wealth distributors (see also Anheier & Hammack, 2010, p. 6). 
Hence, for the purposes of this study, effectiveness is the tangible and measurable 
association between foundations’ charitable spending and their grantees’ financial state. 
Limited life foundations: Also called sunsetting foundations, these are foundations 
that expend more charitably than the rate of financial return on investments. Limited life 
foundations often reflect a deliberate governance decision to give away more now to 
solve a pressing social problem than over the course of an indefinite future (Atlantic 
Philanthropies, 2010; Ostrower, 2011). Deciding to be a limited life or perpetual 
foundation affects the decision on how much to expend charitably or to save. The other 
option is foundations that are perpetual (see perpetuity). 
Minimum distribution requirement (also referred to as annual distribution 
requirement or minimum payout requirement): By U. S. federal law, private, 
nonoperating foundations must spend some of its assets charitably each year (see private 
foundations). This rule is known as the minimum distribution requirement, which is the 




(including grants and, within certain limits, the administrative cost of making grants)” 
(Foundation Center, 2015, p. Glossary of Terms). This amount must “meet or exceed an 
annual payout requirement of five percent of the average market value of its total assets” 
(Foundation Center, 2015, p. Glossary of Terms). What qualifies toward fulfilling a 
charitable purpose are considered qualifying distributions. Payout refers to the actual 
dollar value of how much a foundation distributed charitably, versus payout rate that is 
the percentage of a foundation’s market value of its noncharitable-use assets (i.e., 
investment earnings in stocks, bonds, or real estate that are not used in service of 
mission-related activities) that was spent toward meeting this minimum amount (Boris, 
Renz, Hager, Elias, & Somashekhar, 2008; Ludlum, 2005; Renz, 2012). A foundation’s 
minimum distribution amount is calculated based on its prior year’s average market value 
of noncharitable-use, investment assets, and foundations have a full year to pay out 
(Cambridge Associates, 2000). 
The federal government encourages foundations to meet this payout minimum 
with a two-tier excise tax structure. Foundations that meet the 5% minimum distribution 
requirement averaged over a period of five years pay only a nominal 1% excise tax on 
their net investment income—a cost of paying for government oversight (Council on 
Foundations, 2006). Any foundation that makes qualifying distributions of more than the 
5% minimum can disperse proportionally less in future years but cannot distribute less 
than the distribution requirement floor over that five-year period (Cambridge Associates, 
2000). Those that fail to meet the minimum payout rate of 5% averaged over a five-year 




undistributed amount (Cambridge Associates, 2000; Council on Foundations, 2006; 
Renz, 2012; Yoder, Addy, & McAllister, 2011). (See also payout rate and qualifying 
distributions.) 
Months of unrestricted, liquid net assets: This term refers to the study’s outcome 
variable. Also known by its acronym MULNA, it is the financial proxy of a public 
charity’s capitalization position and can be measured by accumulated surplus. The more 
MULNA there is, the better able a public charity can access readily available cash to use 
toward both emergencies and opportunities (Blackwood & Pollak, 2009; Curtis, 2010; 
Lam & McDougle, 2012; Nelson & Koo, 2014; NFF, 2001; NORI, 2010; Thomas, et al., 
2011). As such, MULNA is a good measure of a nonprofit’s financial stability—a key 
indicator of financial health (Bowman, 2011a, 2011b). 
Nonprofit: This is a broadly encompassing term for tax-exempt charitable 
organizations, of which the IRS recognizes more than 25 types. A nonprofit can be public 
serving, such as 501(c)(3) organizations that provide goods or services for public benefit; 
or it can be member serving, such as 501(c)(6) trade unions that do not benefit from tax-
deductible contributions (Salamon, 2012). This term is a bit of a misnomer as any well-
functioning organization with expenses and income must retain some degree of profit in 
order to survive (Miller, 2003). The distinguishing feature of the nonprofit entity is their 
nondistribution constraint—their “prohibition on the distribution of ‘net earnings’ [i.e., 
‘pure profits’]. . . . to individuals who exercise control over [the nonprofit],” such as 
“members, officers, directors, or trustees” (Hansmann, 1980, p. 838). The constraint of 




what allows nonprofits to be a viable enterprise (Hansmann, 1980, p. 847). Hansmann’s 
concept of nondistribution constraint is based on U.S.C. §501(c)(3): “no part of the net 
earnings [i.e., profit] of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual” (Tax Reform Act of 1986, 2010). 
Payout rate: This amount is the percentage of a foundation’s market value of its 
noncharitable-use assets (i.e., investment earnings in stocks, bonds, or real estate that are 
not used in service of mission-related activities) that was spent toward meeting the 
mandatory minimum distribution amount (Boris et al., 2008; Ludlum, 2005; Renz, 2012). 
(See also minimum distribution requirement and qualifying distributions). 
Perpetuity: Perpetual foundations are ones that manage their assets so that they 
can exist forever. Perpetual foundations are meant to enable future generations to act 
charitably as did their founders—a notion termed intergenerational equity (Mehrling, 
2004)—as well as address unforeseeable problems of the future (Deep & Frumkin, 2001). 
Operating as a perpetual foundation necessitates managing financial assets so that returns 
on investments exceed charitable spending and prioritizes keeping foundation payout as 
low as legally possible. The other option is foundations that are limited life or sunsetting 
(see limited life foundations). 
Private foundations: (See also U.S. Code 509(a) for the federal regulatory 
definition of a private foundation.) The Tax Reform Act of 1969 established a new class 
of public charity called private foundations. Unlike a public charity that depends on 
raising income from external sources, private foundations often have a single source of 




private, nonoperating foundations and private, operating foundations. The former 
provides support through grants to public charities and must meet a minimum distribution 
requirement enforced by the IRS. The latter directly conducts charitable activities to a 
degree that it does not need to meet the minimum distribution requirement (Ludlum, 
2005). The focus of this research is on private, nonoperating foundations, herein referred 
to as private foundations or simply foundations or funders. 
Public charities: 501(c)(3) organizations are divided into two types: public 
charities and private foundations. Unlike private foundations, public charities 
demonstrate to the IRS that a majority of their income is generated from external sources. 
Qualifying distributions: This is the amount that a foundation actually expended 
toward a charitable purpose in order to satisfy the minimum distribution requirement. 
Expenditures that qualify must be for charitable purposes and can include grants and 
related operational and administrative costs, program-related investments, monies used to 
acquire assets toward tax-exempt purposes, and amounts for future charitable projects 
(Boris et al., 2008; Cambridge Associates, 2000; Foundation Center, 2015; Ludlum, 
2005; Renz, 2012). The IRS regulates what gets counted toward foundations’ annual 
qualifying distributions, and the majority is in the form of grants to public charities (Boris 
et al., 2008). The amount of qualifying distributions reported on a foundation’s 990-PF is 
based on the fair market value of cash receipts. (See also minimum distribution 
requirement and payout rate.) 
Ruling date: This is the year and month when the IRS made its determination of 




Tax exemption: Nonprofits that are organized as a 501(c)(3) are exempt from 
federal income tax and are eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions. However, at 
localized levels of states and municipalities, there may be different rules governing 
nonprofits’ tax exemptions on income, sales, or property. 
Assumptions 
Three key assumptions underlie this research and each one helps to explain the 
centrality of money in holding foundations accountable to public interests. The first 
premise is that private foundations are meant to realize a public good. According to 
Bowman (2011a), an important basis for foundations’ “public acceptance and legitimacy” 
is the assumption that their “spending policies [will] address human needs and social 
change” (p. 123). This assumption is the basis for applying principal-agent theory 
wherein foundations exist to advance the public good and thus should be held 
accountable to public interest. As evidence of the validity of this assumption, the 
mandatory minimum distribution requirement ensures that private foundations act 
philanthropically, “existing strictly to advance their stated missions rather than serving as 
a tax shelter to perpetuate the accumulation of private wealth or other non-philanthropic 
purposes” (Astro & Ilkiw, 2003, p. 63). Assuming that foundations exist for a public, not 
a private, purpose, their distribution of wealth should help public charities and, by 
extension, the overall viability and capacity of the nonprofit sector. To those who do not 
agree with this assumption—instead prioritizing foundations’ role as fulfilling privately 




intergenerationally, or honoring the memory of foundation founders (Brody, 1998; 
Brody, 2010; Brody & Tyler, 2012; Kristol, 1980)—this study may seem problematic. 
The second assumption is that of the many priorities that foundations hold (i.e., 
social mission, operational efficiency, intergenerational transfer of philanthropic 
opportunities, service to grantees), there should be a way to hold foundations’ activities 
accountable. There are different opinions on the most important aspects of foundations 
that should be assessed. Some perceive the top foundation priority to be the ambition of 
their social change objectives (Fleishman, 2009), while others exhort the primacy of 
effective management in bringing about social change (Frumkin, 2006b). There is also 
the opinion that foundations must be as or more effective than government in using tax-
subsidized assets (see, for example, Toepler, 2004), or the perspective that foundations 
should strive to be unlike and autonomous from government in using their freedom from 
democratic accountability to unfetter their potential impact (Anheier & Hammack, 2010). 
Of all these different perspectives of foundations, this study reflects Porter and Kramer’s 
(1999) view that foundations’ value and effectiveness should be measured by the 
outcomes of their activities. Their perspective influenced my search for a theoretical 
framework and analytic model that would explain and test the effectiveness of 
foundations’ actual wealth distribution output. 
The third premise concerns the centrality of money in the relationship between 
foundations and public charities. One justifiable concern is that too much emphasis is 
placed on money in gauging the value that funders have to grantees. Such a focus may be 




principle that values-based work trumps a desire for money. The nonprofit sector’s stance 
toward money is in stark contrast to the proprietary marketplace, in which accumulation 
of money signifies winning; hence, raising the most revenue or the biggest endowment 
are not good metrics for determining the best nonprofits. As such, money has been 
described as a “poor proxy” for studying nonprofit impact (Palmer & Randall, 2001, p. 
135). Yet, money is of central importance in the nonprofit sector as “[money] is an 
economic means to non-economic ends” (Zuidervaart, n.d., para. 24). Hence, even though 
money may not be a measure of success, it is important symbolically and practically in 
affording the existence and activities of the charitable sector. 
For public charities, their “survival is as concrete an issue as profits” (Kanter & 
Summers, 1987, p. 157). Hence, public charities equate “cash with power” (McLaughlin, 
2000, para. 1), because having money enables them to realize their social purpose. For 
foundations, “wealth is an instrument for achieving human ends” (Lindeman, 1988, p. 1), 
and so the balance between accumulating and distributing money is an expression of a 
foundation’s character—its priorities, values, and ambitions. Consequently, foundations’ 
payout as a ratio of assets is a powerful marker of how they balance self-interested 
desires to accumulate wealth and outward-facing priorities to meet social needs. 
Although the nonprofit sector does not aggrandize money, it is central to 
reflecting priorities, enabling activities, and conferring power. Hence, the transfer of 
money between funders and grantees is no small act: Such redistribution of wealth is 
about transferring the power of resources in service of need. Economic research enables 




these reasons, this study specifically attends to money because of all that it represents 
practically and symbolically—its role in the functioning of the nonprofit economy, its 
capacity to afford charitable work, and its transferring of opportunity from funders to 
grantees. 
Scope of Study 
This research centers on domestic, private, nonoperating foundations of all asset 
and giving sizes. These foundations adhere to U. S. regulations regarding minimum 
distributions of assets and are required to file a U. S. tax return. Grantee organizations are 
identified by sampled foundations’ grants lists and thus public charities reflect grantees 
and not the overall population of public charities. 
Delimitations 
There are many contributing factors to a public charity’s financial condition, 
including other sources of funding beyond private foundations, economic conditions, 
competition for funding, and the level of demands on services. However, this research is 
restricted to asking how and how much of foundations’ mandated wealth distribution can 
be accounted for in grantees’ financial condition. In other words, the research focus is not 
about understanding the various determinants of public charity’s financial health, but 
rather is concerned with exploring how foundations’ charitable spending influences the 
amount of grantees’ financial reserves. 
Another delimitation is that the condition of a public charity’s financial reserves 
has much to do with internal management capabilities and governance policies (Herman 




research cannot account for the many ways that grantees may suppress growing financial 
reserves. According to Brooks’s (2005) research on nonprofit managers’ decision 
making, public charities are more focused on expending charitably than in retaining 
earnings. Also, board and staff enact internal policies that limit or outright prohibit 
accumulating reserves and intentionally maintain low reserve levels in order to appear 
needy enough to qualify for government and philanthropic funding (Calabrese, 2012). 
Furthermore, employees of public charities prioritize meeting short-term objectives over 
planning for the long term and therefore generally lack knowledge and management skills 
to save resources. Hence, no matter how much foundation funding may provide 
opportunities to build grantees’ MULNA, this study did not account for grantees’ own 
fiscal policy and management behaviors. 
In addition, the years covered by this study (2006 and 2007 tax years) may not 
reflect other periods. Since the mid-2000s, public charities have continued to engage in 
increasingly complicated and innovative methods of raising, spending, and investing in 
social change efforts. Public charities are developing new resource-generating practices 
and foundations are experimenting with market-driven spending strategies (for examples 
of foundation’s impact investing methods, see Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, 2013). 
Also, this period precedes the Great Recession that affected foundations’ investments 
beginning in late 2007. Therefore, this study may not adequately reflect more recent 





Through an act of Congress, foundations were established to behave 
philanthropically by distributing their wealth to benefit charitable organizations acting in 
service for the public good. Today, there is enough foundation activity to raise 
expectations that foundations should have some measurable effect on their beneficiaries. 
This study isolates and tests the significance of private, nonoperating foundations’ annual 
distribution rate on grantee organizations’ financial health in order to fill a gap in 
knowledge about the value of foundations’ charitable spending in serving the public 
good. The next chapter provides an in-depth explication of key concepts, such as 
foundation effectiveness and nonprofit financial health; an explanation of key theories 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
This research contributes new knowledge on and a testable theoretical framework 
for understanding private foundations’ financial impact on beneficiaries—a topic that has 
received no direct scientific attention previously. In this chapter, I establish why relating 
the financial health of grantee organizations to foundations’ charitable spending is 
important to the larger discourse on the effectiveness and value of private foundations. 
The literature review has the following main parts. I begin with the rationale for a 
scientific study of foundations. Then I present a literature review of foundations’ 
effectiveness, thereby providing the context for the research questions on how 
foundations enable grantees’ capacity financially. In tracing efforts to define and capture 
the concept of foundation effectiveness, I report on the state of research on this topic, 
explain why its study is important, and describe why foundations’ effectiveness has been 
so problematic to address. The third part of this chapter centers on the study’s theoretical 
framework, which integrates the concept of foundations’ public accountability through 
principal-agent theory and the concept of financial health via capital subsidy theory. In 
addition, I give an overview of the variables of study: the outcome variable of grantee 
organizations’ MULNA as an indicator of financial health; the influencer variables of 
foundations’ characteristics of asset size, age, professionalization, and sector focus; and 




The Case for Studying Private Foundations 
Foundations have been underresearched relative to public charities. Furthermore, 
the amount of scholarly attention paid to foundations has not kept pace with the sector’s 
rapid growth in numbers and wealth. The lack of scientific research should not be taken 
to mean that this subject matter lacks scholarly merit; rather, there are many reasons why 
foundation research is of pressing importance and yet has been overlooked for research. 
Growth of Private Foundation Industry 
As the voluntary sector has taken on a greater role in shaping civic life and 
providing social services, private foundations, too, have become a more important part of 
society. The private foundation entity was formally recognized and codified by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 and, since then, there has been tremendous growth in their numbers, 
asset size, and giving, especially in the past 3 decades. 
To demonstrate the sector’s tremendous growth, in 1975, there were 21,877 
foundations incorporated in the United States with assets totaling $30 billion and giving 
totaling $1.94 billion (Foundation Center, 2012a). As of 2012, there were 86,192 private 
foundations with assets totaling $715 billion that were expending $52 billion in charitable 
giving (Foundation Center, 2014). In the span of a little more than a generation, the 
number of foundations increased nearly 300%, foundation asset sizes increased 2283%, 
and charitable giving increased by 2580%. 
Foundations’ Influential Rise 
There is no other country that has the kind of wealth and influence that 




first-world nations, United States-incorporated foundations are considered the worldwide 
leaders in philanthropic contributions (Lew & Wójcik, 2010). The blueprint for their 
uniqueness was set in the early 20th century by philanthropic charitable trusts established 
by the fortunes of Andrew Carnegie, Henry Ford, Russell Sage, and John D. Rockefeller. 
The early 20th century was a period of unprecedented meteoric rise of disposable wealth. 
The newly wealthy were of a new type: They were modern businessmen who used a 
scientific approach in their decision making and represented a culture of a powerful elite 
who shared a homogenous worldview shaped by their Protestant upbringing and the same 
academic connections and social networks (Beer, 2015; Parmar, 2012). 
Not only were they wealthy but also they were influential. Philanthropists were 
able to exert a great deal of influence because the federal government was relatively weak 
in being able to raise revenue and public will favored allowing private actors, rather than 
the church or state, to shape the trajectory of the modern reform movement (Karl & Katz, 
1981; Parmar, 2012). “Americans had found a way of doing ‘privately’ what 
governments in other advanced industrial societies were beginning to do” socially and 
politically (Karl & Katz, 1981, p. 260). In the leadership vacuum left by a weak state, 
these early philanthropists were credited with “[shaping a] national policy for American 
society” (Karl & Katz, 1981, p. 247). Although their private wealth was never as great as 
that of the federal government, philanthropists influenced how and to which causes 
government spent its resources (Immerwahr, 2012). In short, this “power elite” acted as 




shaping policies that led to a more progressive government that addressed issues of 
inequality and poverty (Parmar, 2012). 
The characteristics of these modern private charitable trusts became the prototype 
for today’s leading private foundations: They were “top-down” and “elitist,” employed a 
business-minded approach to giving, and prioritized empiricism and scientific knowledge 
in decision making (Beer, 2015; Parmar, 2012). In this way, they distinguished their 
approach as philanthropic—using science to address the root causes of social problems—
and not charitable, which is considered emotionally based and makes no distinction 
between causes or effects of a problem. 
In the interim of the mid-twentieth century, the public-good role of philanthropists 
shifted. Private philanthropists and their institutions continued to be active but were not 
as influential as the modernist progenitors of foundations. In the 1970s, the federal 
government greatly expanded, and nonprofit organizations received twice as much public 
than private charitable support. In other words, when government expanded, private 
philanthropy exerted less of an influence. This dynamic changed, however, when public 
sentiment shifted yet again in the 1980s in favor of shrinking the federal government, 
with more responsibilities for public welfare placed on the private nonprofit sector 
(Eikenberry & Nickel, 2006; Karl, 1987). Beginning in the 1980s, public support was 
reduced by 25% in real dollars and did not return to previous levels until the late 1990s, 
by which time the state had been effectively weakened (Salamon, 2002; see also 




Today, in the wake of an again diminished federal state, private foundations are 
exerting a degree of influence similar to that of the early twentieth century charitable 
trusts in their leadership of social reforms and sway in national spending priorities. The 
conditions that have enabled private foundations to be influential once again are similar 
to that of a century ago—the proliferation of extraordinary wealth among a relatively few 
private citizens concurrent with a weakened federal state. Yet the terms of foundations’ 
engagement are different from that of a century ago. 
The nature of what distinguishes private foundations’ influence today has much to 
do with the shifting relationship between the private voluntary sector and government. 
When the state reduced direct public spending on nonprofits beginning in the early 1980s 
(Grønbjerg, 2001; Liebschutz, 1992), it began to favor contracting for, instead of directly 
providing or funding, social services (Abramson & Salamon, 1997; Lipsky & Smith, 
1989; Ryan, 1999; Salamon, 2002; Smith & Lipsky, 2009). Governmental contracting-
out is considered to be a hallmark of privatization, a term that was introduced in the early 
1980s (Seidenstat, 1996). The reduction of direct public support reflected not only an 
antigovernment ideology but also was due to having less money as a result of declining 
tax bases (Anheier, 2009; Golden, Longhofer, & Winchester, 2009). A succession of 
economic crises beginning in the 1970s, including the more recent Great Recession that 
began in 2007, has resulted in less revenue for the federal government. Also, September 
11, 2001 not only transformed Americans’ psyche, it pitted social welfare spending 




Although reductions in public spending rendered nonprofits financially 
vulnerable, government outsourcing actually expanded the nonprofit sector through a 
diffusion of public contracting at all levels and sectors of government (Grønbjerg, 2001; 
Liebschutz, 1992; Lipsky & Smith, 1989; Smith & Lipsky, 2009). In other words, with 
state responsibilities and functions dispersed to private parties, the nonprofit sector has 
emerged as more essential and important to the country’s social welfare. 
Rather than depend as they had on government grants, charities now compete for 
and manage public contracts procured from various levels and departments of 
government; they also tap growing sources of private philanthropic support and behave 
like businesses in generating earned revenues (Grønbjerg, 2001; Liebschutz, 1992; 
Lipsky & Smith, 1989; Ryan, 1999; Salamon, 1999). Consequently, today’s public 
charities are more complex financially and use a business-like approach to manage varied 
obligations of diversified funding sources (Ryan, 1999; Salamon, 1999, 2002). Rather 
than depend on government grants, today’s nonprofits greatly depend on the private 
sector of individuals, corporations, and private foundations for support; compete for 
government contracts; and generate earned revenues (Salamon, 1999). 
According to the literature on new public management (McLaughlin, Osborne, & 
Ferlie, 2002) and Kettl’s (2002) influential text on the changing nature of public 
administration, government can no longer be thought of as a centralized body; instead the 
state should be understood as a decentralized network of governance dependent on 




system relies on lower levels of government and a wide array of nongovernmental actors 
to enact policies and provide services. 
According to this shifting view of governance, foundations, too, can no longer be 
considered a wholly independent body separate from public responsibilities and public-
interest agendas. Consequently, private foundations should be perceived as having an 
essential and important role in enacting this state of decentralized governance. At first 
glance, the idea that foundations are so essential to U. S. political and social welfare 
systems may seem unfounded, as foundations can never expend charitably as much as the 
federal government spends annually (Barton & Di Mento, 2012; Morino, 2011; Salamon, 
2002). Private foundations’ $50 billion in public benefit support (Indiana University Lilly 
Family School of Philanthropy, 2014; Salamon, 2012) seems negligible compared to 
federal government’s roughly $2 trillion in social security, health insurance, and safety 
net spending (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2015). Yet, even the federal 
government designs programs in ways that rely on private foundations’ participation. 
Today’s private foundations are asked to be co-financiers of social welfare infrastructure 
and its programs. Applicants to the White House Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative, 
for example, must match federal dollars with private philanthropic support (The White 
House, n.d.). This public dependence on private philanthropic support is unlike the role 
that 19th century foundations played in funding activities that the federal government 
would not have funded (Hammack & Anheier, 2013, p. 41). 
Besides contributing financially in public-private partnerships, foundations exert 




intellectual resources, their elite networks, and the combination of their charitable 
missions and scientific approach to decision making that garners public trust. In addition, 
the meritocracy through which philanthropists earned their wealth and privilege has 
legitimized their leadership in social welfare arenas. 
Private foundations are so influential that they are credited as “carriers of 
modernity in the nonprofit field, rendering a heterogeneous mix of organizations more 
similar” (Hwang & Powell, 2009, p. 293). Foundations’ unique and powerful 
combination of financial, social, intellectual, and reputational assets has enabled these 
institutions to be agents of social change (Quinn et al., 2014) and to shape entire social 
movements (Bartley, 2007). Foundations are such a powerful platform for activating 
ideas that they are used deliberately as platforms for influencing public opinions and laws 
(Teles, 2008). 
In the past, the big foundations “sought above all technocratic order: a strong 
federal government, a class of experts ready to guide it, and a docile public eager to 
follow” (Immerwahr, 2012, para. 6). Today, private foundations’ wealth, influence, 
intellectual resources, and even their lack of transparency, make them a powerful part of 
the governance infrastructure upon which so many rely for everything from arts and 
cultural experiences to social welfare opportunities. But this change did not happen 
without foundations’ influence: In other words, foundations have been complicit in the 
trend to privatize government responsibilities. Something as seemingly benign as a 
foundation matching grant, which the Ford Foundation introduced in 1957, resulted in 




private citizens into socially active philanthropists with a platform to advance issues of 
their concern (Kreidler, 1996). Writing in The Nation, Amy Schiller (2013) argued: 
“Philanthropy is an under-recognized player in the trends that led to the [Federal 
government budgetary] shutdown in the first place: erosion of legitimacy and trust in 
public institutions, just as mega philanthropy became an ascendant political force. . . . 
The most visible example is the . . . efforts by [large foundations] in relentlessly pursuing 
disruptive, top-down corporate education reform” (para. 5). Schiller (2013) questioned 
foundation owners’ propensity to favor a free market unencumbered by government 
oversight and criticized their imposition of business-minded, empirical approaches to 
education reform (see also Bartley, 2007, for how foundations blunted environmental 
activists’ revolutionary fervor; Parry, Field, & Supiano, 2013, for criticism of Gates 
Foundation’s private enterprise approach and disproportionate influence in public 
education reform; Barkan, 2013, for similar critiques of foundation leaders instigating 
education reform; and Quinn et al., 2014, for a scientific analysis of foundations’ 
influence in establishing a deregulated charter school management system). There are 
enough private philanthropists today decrying government as an enemy of the free market 
and of the privilege of wealthy individual’s freedom of charitable expression that their 
perspective engendered a national organization, Philanthropy Roundtable 
(http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org). The mission of this association is to defend the 
freedom of private philanthropy from regulations and public accountability that hamper 




Unlike elected officials whose decisions are held accountable by voters, there are 
no structures or explanatory frameworks for holding private foundations’ actions and 
behavior accountable to a greater good. Foundations are popularly perceived to be of 
harmless benevolence, but this is a naïve impression that does not reflect the extent to 
which private foundations are a part of America’s decentralized governance infrastructure 
and the degree to which their influence shapes today’s welfare state. 
Implications of Tax-Subsidized Status 
The most obvious reason for holding private foundations publicly accountable is 
that these institutions “receive privileged treatment [emphasis added] by governments in 
exchange for an obligation . . . to use those assets for the public good” (Heydemann & 
Toepler, 2006, p. 4). This privileged treatment is in the form of tax exemptions: “Some of 
the money that foundations give away belongs, in a sense, to all of us. That is why we 
look to foundations to achieve. . . . real value for society” (Porter & Kramer, 1999, p. 
122; see also Barkan, 2013; Bertelsmann Foundation, 1999; Heydemann & Toepler, 
2006; Lammi, Madoff, Smith, & Tyler, 2009; Reich, 2005). Because they are subsidized 
by taxpayers, foundations should achieve the most public good by giving in ways that 
effectively help grantee organizations, which, in turn, benefits the greater good. 
There is a practical aspect as to why tax-exempt status raises expectations that 
foundations need to demonstrate a public value: The federal government must forgo 
approximately $50 billion in revenues when exempting foundations from income taxation 
(Reich, 2013a, p. 525). Taxpayers bear this loss of revenue because they trust that 




concept called treasury efficiency (Toepler, 2004). “The discussion suggests that the 
primary purpose of regulating foundation spending policies is to ensure that the foregone 
[sic] tax revenues, comprised in the endowments of foundations, will be put to public 
uses” (Toepler, 2004, p. 736). In short, foundations need to spend their tax-exempt 
money in ways that are as or more beneficial to society than if government had been able 
to use those funds. 
The crux of the treasury efficiency argument rests on the minimum distribution 
requirement that requires foundations to pay out 5% or more of their assets each year. Yet 
research has shown that foundations do not prioritize charitable spending, particularly 
among large foundations that are not receiving a new infusion of capital; instead, 
foundations tend to expend as little in charitable distributions and taxes as possible in 
order to maintain the value of their corpus (Deep & Frumkin, 2001; Ostrower, 2009; 
Renz, 2012; Sansing, 2010; Sansing & Yetman, 2006; Yoder et al., 2011; Yoder & 
McAllister, 2012). Given the nature of foundations to save rather than to spend, 
foundations should be thought of less as “significant agents of redistribution” and more 
as “devices for holding, investing, and dispensing charitable and religious funds over 
time” (Anheier & Hammack, 2010, p. 390). In other words, foundations should be 
understood as protectors of elite wealth rather than as financiers of social change. 
Foundations tend to conserve their assets by paying out at a steady rate over time 
and as close to the minimum payout as possible making the 5% rule seem more like a 
ceiling than a floor (Deep & Frumkin, 2001; Sansing & Yetman, 2006; Yoder et al., 




their assets but society benefits from only the roughly 5% of foundations’ corpus that is 
distributed annually, Porter and Kramer (1999) argued that lost tax revenues are more 
expensive than the amount of social benefits taxpayers receive from foundations (see also 
Shakely, 2011; Strom, 2007). Government’s loss of taxable revenue and foundations’ 
tendency to accumulate rather than spend wealth lends weight to the argument that 
foundations should be more accountable to public interest (Bertelsmann Foundation, 
1999; Heydemann & Toepler, 2006; Porter & Kramer, 1999; Reich, 2005; Salamon, 
2002; Toepler, 2004). 
Private Action for Public Good 
Foundations are institutions wherein relatively few individuals make decisions on 
behalf of many. These few foundation owners are not democratically elected and, thus, 
do not reflect popularly held priorities or values. Furthermore, foundations reflect the 
demographics and interests of the elite, not the general public, making them 
undemocratic and plutocratic in nature (Reich, 2013b, para. 5). Given the unchecked 
power that so few wield in social matters that affect so many people, this imbalance is 
another reason why foundations’ charitable activities merit scrutiny and attention. “The 
fact . . . that philanthropy is public in its intentions and seeks to enact a private vision of 
the common good raises accountability issues precisely because the act of giving projects 
private values and commitments into the public sphere” (Frumkin, 2006a, p. 100). The 
imposition of values, ideas, and priorities by this tax-subsidized, private entity is why a 




Effectiveness of Charitable Giving Is Unregulated 
All private foundations are subject to oversight by the IRS, which is the federal 
regulatory body overseeing the nonprofit sector; but the scope of what the IRS reviews is 
limited to financial and governance matters (Simon, 1999). Private foundations are 
required to complete annually the 990-PF tax return, pay a nominal excise tax to cover 
federal government’s cost of oversight, and distribute at least 5% of its assets each year 
toward charitable purposes (IRS, 2015a). The IRS reviews tax returns to make sure 
foundations’ owners are not personally benefiting and that foundations are distributing 
wealth at the minimum distribution rate. Although foundations’ tax-exempt status raises 
expectations for their effectiveness in addressing social problems, foundations’ charitable 
objectives and performance are neither regulated nor reviewed. 
Although private foundations must adhere to more fiduciary rules compared to 
other types of nonprofit entities (Hopkins & Blazek, 2003), their grantmaking is without 
constraints. Foundation boards are autonomous to decide to whom, to what cause, and 
how much to give as long as they do not benefit financially (Anheier & Hammack, 2010). 
Their charitable decisions are not reviewed by government regulators, are unchecked by 
market forces, and are unaccountable to their nonprofit beneficiaries (Anheier & 
Hammack, 2010; Frumkin, 1995). As a result, outside the court of public opinion, there 
are no formal, systematic checks or balances to assess the merits of foundations’ 
grantmaking and if their giving is having any meaningful impact. 
Foundations’ grantmaking freedom is an advantage that enables them to behave 




foundations are liberated from market forces, a freedom that allows them to pursue 
unpopular and untested ideas (Anheier & Hammack, 2010; Frumkin 1995). They are also 
free from public input in their decision making, thus giving them greater latitude to take 
risks that government cannot afford to take with taxpayers’ dollars (Anheier & 
Hammack, 2010). 
On the other hand, foundations’ decision-making freedom has also been 
acknowledged to be their characteristic flaw. Federal judge Richard Posner (2006) 
described foundations’ wide latitude to address social problems as problematic given 
their use of taxpayer-subsidized funds. 
A perpetual charitable foundation, however, is a completely irresponsible 
institution, answerable to nobody. It competes neither in capital markets nor in 
product markets (in both respects differing from universities), and, unlike a 
hereditary monarch whom such a foundation otherwise resembles, it is subject to 
no political controls either. It is not even subject to benchmark competition‚ that 
is, evaluation by comparison with similar enterprises‚ except with regard to the 
percentage of its expenditures that go to administration (staff salaries and the like) 
rather than to donees. The puzzle for economics is why these foundations are not 
total scandals. (para. 1) 
In short, foundations’ freedom to make charitable spending decisions should be 
considered a privilege that must have demonstrable benefits to the interests of a greater 
good. The lack of accountability frameworks and structural mechanisms is a shortcoming 




benefit from the ability to assess, benchmark, and improve their externally motivated 
activities. 
Foundations Are Assumed To Be Beneficial 
Given foundations’ influence in social change efforts, the lack of critical scrutiny 
is a glaring omission. One reason for the lack of public accountability measures is that 
foundations’ charitable spending elicits an unquestioned reverence of their positive role 
in society (Parmar, 2012). In researching foundations’ influence on foreign policies, 
Parmar (2012) declared: “It is difficult to believe that philanthropy—literally, ‘love of all 
mankind’—could possibly be malignant” (pp. 1–2), but he concluded that foundations are 
“[anything but] benign, progressive, nonpolitical, and nonbusiness” (p. 5).  
The inability to see any downsides in foundation giving is evidenced by the lack 
of criticism by those best poised to see the failings of private foundations—media and 
nonprofit organizations. But these two entities are beneficiaries of foundation support and 
are therefore blinded by foundations’ “benevolent fog” (Edmonds, 2002, para. 8; see also 
Fasenfest, 2007; Feldman, 2007; Parmar, 2012). In actuality, those who directly benefit 
from foundations’ financial largess—media, public charities, academia, and independent 
research institutions—are apt to overlook foundations’ shortcomings (Cuninggim, 1972; 
Jenkins, 2011). Even when scandals of foundation wrongdoing come to light (see for 
example Healy, Latour, Pfeiffer, Rezendes, & Robinson, 2003), positive impressions of 
foundations prevail to such a degree that such activities largely escape public notice 




Foundation executives have a well-intentioned reason for wanting to deflect 
attention. Frumkin (1998) explained foundations’ “defensive orientation” as a reaction to 
real and perceived political and public scrutiny (p. 282). The pressure of scrutiny distracts 
foundation resources away from mission-related work and makes foundations that are 
worried about needing to justify their grantmaking more conservative in their ambitions 
(Frumkin, 1995). Foundation leaders deflect attention by commissioning assessments, 
evaluations, and seemingly critical research that give the impression of self-monitoring. 
Consequently, they suffer from a blind spot of their own making: By portraying current 
practices in foundation effectiveness research as the best they can do, they have 
discouraged opportunities that would develop the sector’s critical studies replete with 
testable theoretical frameworks and scientific scrutiny (Karl, 1987; Salamon, 1987b; Van 
Til, 1990). Ultimately, assuming that foundations are effective and deflecting critical 
attention as too distracting actually becomes counterproductive to improving 
foundations’ effectiveness in serving the public good. 
Foundations Reinforce Elitist Social Structures 
Not wanting to call attention to the foundation sector could be an end unto itself, 
but there are also self-interested reasons why foundation leaders discourage efforts to 
assess the industry’s effectiveness. Foundation owners have an interest in tempering, 
controlling, or subverting activities that would potentially upset the existing social order, 
especially threats to class divisions, wealth-conferring capitalist markets, and institutions 
that confer power and privilege to wealthy elites (Arnove, 1982; Bartley, 2007; Beer, 




2007; Roelofs, 2003). Carl Schramm (2006), president of the Ewing Marian Kauffman 
Foundation, believed that private foundations’ responsibilities were to “strengthen and 
facilitate . . . a free-market economy,” and in no way “work to subvert democratic 
capitalism” (pp. 357–358). Strengthening a capitalist, free-market system is self-serving 
in sustaining the very system by which philanthropists benefited. 
Evidence exists of how foundation funding is not redistributive of wealth and 
opportunity. Core and Donaldson (2010) demonstrated that the wealthy give to non-poor 
causes more than to causes that benefit the poor. Their finding confirmed a collaborative 
study on giving by the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University and Google (2007) 
that showed that charitable giving is not redistributive to the poor. In addition, Dasgupta 
and Kanbur’s (2011) research yielded empirical evidence that philanthropic giving 
aggravates rather than reduces inequities. By not redistributing wealth to the poor, 
foundation giving perpetuates unequal access to opportunities and primarily benefits the 
interests of wealthy elites (Leat, 2009). 
Not only are causes of the poor under supported, but there is also evidence that 
foundations prioritize serving their own elite interests. Ostrower’s (2002) qualitative 
study of nonprofit cultural boards revealed that trustees made decisions in ways that 
conferred prestige to their own standing within elite networks (see also Odendahl, 1990; 
Ostrander, 1984; Ostrower, 1995; Silver, 2007). They supported institutions and 
programs that “create and perpetuate elite networks of academics, think tanks, publicity 
organizations, emerging mass media, and public officials [which are] powerful in 




late 1970s through late 1990s when private giving grew by 90% (adjusted for inflation), a 
large amount of it funded endowments of elite universities and established new private 
foundations (Salamon, 2002). In effect, when foundation owners fund and volunteer at 
museums, universities, and medical centers, which are all closed networks where the poor 
are but visitors, they reinforce structural inequities in ways that benefit their own 
socioeconomic class (Odendahl, 1990; Ostrander, 1984; Ostrower, 1995, 2002). 
Another way that foundations reinforce elitist social structures is by silencing 
dissent. During the House Committee on Ways and Means’s Hearing on Tax Reform in 
1969, Ford Foundation President, McGeorge Bundy, testified that foundations can 
mitigate “disruption, discord, and even violence” by appeasing the discontent with 
foundation support (as cited in Roelofs, 2003, p. 125). Foundations also silence discord 
by employing or financing the very intellectuals who could have fought against structural 
and social inequality by leading civil unrest (Arnove, 1982; Friedman & McGarvie, 
2004). As employers and funders of activists, foundations are “prime constructors of 
hegemony by promoting consent and discouraging dissent against capitalist democracy” 
(Roelofs, 2007, p. 479). Essentially, foundations “engage in ameliorative practices to 
maintain social and economic systems that generate the very inequalities and injustices 
they wish to correct” (Arnove & Pinede, 2007, p. 393; see also Arnove, 1982; Bartley, 
2007; Incite, 2009). The precedence for placating opposition was established early: Ford, 
Carnegie, and Rockefeller foundations and their networks of policy makers, academics, 
and intellectuals advanced their own elite interests by managing, rather than solving, 




Foundation Grantmaking Practices Can Cause Harm 
Foundations can actually undermine grantees by undermining their financial 
capacity. Many have documented how foundation grantmaking practices are 
counterproductive to helping grantee organizations (Buechel, Keating, & Miller, 2007; 
Burd, 2009; Curtis, Nelson, & Engel, 2010; Foster, 2008; Hager et al., 2004; 
Grantmakers for Effective Organizations & Harder+Company Community Research, 
2008; Grantmakers for Effective Organizations & TCC Group, 2011; Gregory & 
Howard, 2009; Miller, 2003; NORI, 2010; Overholser, 2006; Starr, 2011; Thomas, et al., 
2011; Woodwell & Bartczak, 2008). In an article titled “The Nonprofit Starvation 
Cycle,” Gregory and Howard (2009) described foundations as “perpetuating a vicious 
cycle [that] is leaving nonprofits so hungry for decent infrastructure that they can barely 
function as organizations—let alone serve their beneficiaries” (para. 1). They blamed 
foundations’ “unrealistic expectations” of what grantees need as instigating the cycle 
(Gregory & Howard, 2009, para. 1; see also Curtis et al., 2010; Miller, 2003). 
Foundations can undermine grantees’ capacity to realize their missions in several 
ways. They can starve financially an organization by not covering the actual costs of a 
project, most notably overhead expenses—salaries, rent, mortgage, utilities—that are the 
backbone to every endeavor (Froelich, 1999; Gregory & Howard, 2009; Hager et al., 
2004; Woodwell & Bartczak, 2008). Also, foundations place restrictions on grants, 
disallowing funding to be used toward necessary operating expenses or accumulating as 
an unrestricted, liquid asset (Hager et al., 2004; Grantmakers for Effective Organizations 




Organizations & TCC Group, 2011; Miller, 2003). Or, foundations make grants that are 
too small relative to the ambitions of a project, thereby forcing grantees to expend 
precious time fundraising (Grantmakers for Effective Organizations & TCC Group, 
2011) or to use their own reserves to cover the costs of foundation-supported projects 
(Froelich, 1999). The average grant size of the 100 largest foundations was $200,000, 
but, most were multiyear grants meaning that this amount was spread over more than a 
single year (Foster, 2008). Moreover, a survey of all foundations—not just the largest—
found that the median grant size was only $20,000 (Grantmakers for Effective 
Organizations & TCC Group, 2011). Most foundations do not follow grantmaking 
practices that they themselves acknowledge would be helpful to grantees—multi-year 
grants, grants of sufficient size, and unrestricted support. In short, “walk trails talk” 
(Woodwell & Bartczak, 2008, p. 1; see also Grantmakers for Effective Organizations & 
Harder+Company Community Research, 2008; Grantmakers for Effective Organizations 
& TCC Group, 2011) with foundations eroding grantee organizations’ capacity to meet 
their social objectives. 
Given the prevalence of literature on the negative impact that foundations’ 
grantmaking practices can have on grantees’ financial capacity (Buechel et al., 2007; 
Burd, 2009; Curtis et al., 2010; Foster, 2008; Grantmakers for Effective Organizations & 
Harder+Company Community Research, 2008; Grantmakers for Effective Organizations 
& TCC Group, 2011; Gregory & Howard, 2009; Miller, 2003; NORI, 2010; Overholser, 
2006; Starr, 2011; Thomas et al., 2011; Woodwell & Bartczak, 2008), and the knowledge 




2010; Deep & Frumkin, 2001; Porter & Kramer, 1999; Sansing & Yetman, 2006; 
Worthy, 1975; Yoder et al., 2011; Yoder & McAllister, 2012), it would be too easy to 
assume that foundations’ charitable spending does not have a role in contributing to 
grantee organizations’ MULNA. But, the answer to this question remains unknown. 
Many of the harmful effects of foundations’ grantmaking practices seem to be inadvertent 
with grantmakers surely wanting grantees to succeed. Given grantmakers’ motivation to 
make effective grants, it is worth noting that foundations’ funding is not the sole 
contributing reason for grantee organizations’ generally precarious financial state. 
Researchers discerned that organizations with less than a three-month threshold for 
reserves relied primarily on government grants, which is not surprising because 
government grants are highly restricted to projects. In other words, organizations that 
depended on government grants had a higher percentage of lacking operating reserves 
compared to those that relied on private contributions (Blackwood & Pollak, 2009, p. 4; 
see also Lam & McDougle, 2012). 
Given the conflicting picture this information paints of whether or not foundations 
harm or help public charities, this study does not hypothesize a direction in the 
relationship between foundations and grantees’ MULNA. Foundation grantmaking may 
or may not grow public charities’ financial stability. The lack of clarity on this issue 
affirms the importance and timeliness of this study. 
State of Literature on Foundation Effectiveness 
I conducted an extensive and broad literature search for studies on private 




being of the nonprofit sector, and grantees’ capacity). I used various combinations of 
keywords—private foundation, grantmaker, grantmaking, charitable distributions, and 
payout—along with the terms effectiveness, effect, evaluation, outcome, impact, 
assessment, change, theory of change, and tracking. I employed a multipronged and 
layered approach of (a) reviewing the bibliographic references of seminal publications on 
private foundations; (b) searching the ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database; (c) 
searching online peer-reviewed, full text collections of academic databases, including 
EBSCOhost (Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, SocINDEX with 
Full Text, Political Science Complete, eBook Collection EBSCOhost), Expanded 
Academic ASAP, and ProQuest Central; (d) identifying relevant works cited in journal 
articles; (e) using keyword searches within the four leading and relevant peer-reviewed 
periodicals—The Foundation Review, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 
Voluntas, and Nonprofit Management and Leadership; and (f) reviewing articles in field-
relevant publications, such as Stanford Social Innovation Review, Chronicle of 
Philanthropy, and the Nonprofit Quarterly, publications of leading industry 
organizations, such as by Foundation Center, Aspen Institute’s Program on Philanthropy 
and Social Innovation, Grantmakers for Effective Organizations (GEO, 
www.geofunders.org) Center for Effective Philanthropy (CEP, 
www.effectivephilanthropy.org), and NFF (www.nonprofitfinancefund.org), and 
nonserial reports published by private foundations and nonprofit academic centers. The 




1980s) and included both peer-reviewed academic studies as well as practitioner-
published literature. 
A review of the literature revealed that the infrastructure for generating 
knowledge regarding nonprofits is robust and expanding (Jackson et al., 2014; Shier & 
Handy, 2014). At the time of this writing, the Census of Nonprofit Management 
Programs identified 292 colleges and universities offering courses on nonprofit or 
philanthropic studies (Mirabella, n.d.; see also Katz, 1999; Mirabella, 2007; Salamon, 
2012). This growth has been mirrored by increased numbers of articles in peer-reviewed 
journals: A search of nonprofit and philanthropic keywords identified 1,500 articles 
published in 2000 and over 2,500 published in 2011 (Jackson et al., 2014, p. 804). 
Similarly, there was a substantial increase in the number of nonprofit-related dissertation 
topics, from approximately 60 published in 2000 to over 100 published in 2011 (Jackson 
et al., 2014, p. 805). When including both master’s degree theses and doctoral 
dissertations on nonprofits and voluntary sector activities, the number begins at fewer 
than 50 published in 1986 and jumps to more than 350 published in 2010 (Shier & 
Handy, 2014, p. 817). 
There is also an “overwhelming body of knowledge” (Bekkers & Wiepking, 
2011, p. 924) on philanthropy, such as on individual donor behavior and charitable giving 
motivations. What has remained relatively underresearched given their influence and 
size, however, is private foundations and their giving behavior. Private foundations 
cannot be lumped together with research on private donors: Foundation decision makers 




program assessments, and strategic plans, that result in unique behaviors (Ashley & 
Faulk, 2010). Moreover, foundation heads must decide on perpetuity versus sunsetting 
policies that influence how they choose to save or spend financial resources. 
Of the few studies on private foundations, the literature is mostly devoted to the 
grant contractual relationship between foundations and grantees, public charities’ 
accountability to foundations, practices in distribution of wealth, balancing financial 
investment returns with pursuit of charitable mission, capacity-building funding, and 
support of underserved populations. Of the studies on foundations’ grantmaking 
behavior, they are primarily focused on discerning the foundation characteristics that 
correlate with various levels of payout rate (Deep & Frumkin, 2001; Ostrower, 2009; 
Renz, 2012; Sansing, 2010; Sansing & Yetman, 2006; Yoder et al., 2011; Yoder & 
McAllister, 2012) or with foundations’ criteria in determining grant decisions (e.g., 
Botetzagias & Koutiva, 2014, found that a nonprofit’s legitimacy and reputation was a 
key grantmaking criterion). 
Overall, there is a lack of scientific research on the social, redistributive value of 
foundation grantmaking or foundations’ effectiveness in helping grantees realize their 
social objectives. Such was the case in 1999 when Porter and Kramer were unable to 
unearth any scientific studies concerning foundation effectiveness and remains so today 
(see also Daniels, 1996). A library search yielded only a few scholarly studies on 
foundation effectiveness that appeared to be free of funding or commissioning by private 
foundations. These tested an instrument to gauge foundations’ effectiveness (Whitman, 




assessed foundations’ evaluation efforts (Carman, 2010). In their focus on developing 
evaluation instruments for use by individual foundations, none offered a useable 
theoretical framework with workable variables for studying and testing foundations’ 
aggregate, field-wide impact. 
The lack of scientific study about foundations may be because of a lack of critical 
interest by academics or not knowing where to start when so little has been done: “[A] 
consequence—or perhaps cause—of the diffidence and invisibility of foundations is the 
sparseness of empirical literature and analysis on foundations in America” (Fleishman, 
2009, p. 225). Unlike public charities that are more open to researchers, private 
foundations are less accessible, thus making them difficult to research. Although there are 
now academic degree-conferring programs on philanthropy, a lack of insider knowledge 
of how foundations operate has resulted in research questions and findings not 
particularly useful to the field of practice. 
An obstacle to researching foundations is that there is “no compelling strategic 
framework for analyzing the field of philanthropy” (Eilinghoff, 2005, p. 8; see also Flynn 
& Hodgkinson, 2001). The lack of frameworks may be because of the sheer diversity of 
the field. A common adage in the field is “if you’ve seen one foundation, you’ve seen one 
foundation.” Foundations’ different aims, values, intentions, and practices have thwarted 
attempts to develop uniform, testable theories of their effectiveness (Anheier & 
Hammack, 2010; DiMaggio, 2001; Harris, Mainelli, Grant, & Harrow, 2006; Orosz, 
Phillips, & Knowlton, 2003; Prewitt, 2006). Their individuality has also stymied the 




benchmark foundation performance (Carman, 2010; Eilinghoff, 2005; Harris et al., 
2006). 
Although social scientists have tended to overlook the topic of foundations and 
their effectiveness, this topic has been popular among private foundation executives and 
their membership association leaders. Perhaps feeling the need to justify their privileged 
tax-exempt status, foundations attempt to be transparent by publishing annual reports to 
demonstrate their accomplishments and social value (Leat, 2009). There is also copious 
research on the topic of effectiveness commissioned by private foundations, published by 
their employees or consultants, or produced by foundation-funded research centers 
(Andrews, Buchanan, & Huang, 2003; Center for Effective Philanthropy, 2002; Buteau & 
Buchanan, 2011; Cutler, 2009; Eilinghoff, 2005; Harris et al., 2006; Kramer, Parkhurst, 
& Vaidyanathan, 2009; Lim, 2010; McNelis & Bickel, 1996; Orosz et al., 2003; 
Ostrower, 2004, 2006; Peterson & Fujii, 2012; Ross, 2009; Walker & Grossman, 1998).  
Reports commissioned and produced by the field, however, have been criticized 
for being more akin to marketing than critical scrutiny. “The use of the term ‘research’ as 
an umbrella that would cover the various aspects of advocacy without drawing critical 
attention to the process has been a stroke of genius” (Karl, 1987, para. 7). In addition, 
self-chronicled accounts provide “a false façade behind which trustees and foundation 
officers and staff could feel securely proud of their apparently altruistic . . . 
contributions” (Lagemann, 1999, pp. ix–x). Foundation-commissioned reports can be 
self-serving by presenting a positive image that distracts critical attention. Even reports 




problematic as they may reflect client bias, lack scientific rigor, and be absent meaningful 
theoretical frameworks (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2010; Hall, 2004). 
Given that the state of empirical studies on philanthropy is considered such a 
“patched landscape” (Lew & Wójcik, 2010, p. 153), this literature review of extant 
knowledge pertaining to this topic includes both scholarly and field-generated resources. 
The combination of the two allows for a comprehensive background of the kinds of 
questions, issues, and discourses that concern the topic of foundations’ effects. Of 
practitioner-produced literature, I prioritized reports by leading research institutions, 
foundations, and foundations leaders. In addition, I prioritized writings and studies that 
were published in peer-reviewed journals or demonstrated use of scientific methodology. 
In general though, nearly all research on foundations may be inherently 
problematic. Not only are reports unable to be perceived as free from self-interested 
motivations, but so too the work of academics who have benefited from funding by and 
access to elite professional networks of private foundation executives. 
It is merely the fact that a fund is within reach which permeates everything and 
alters everything. . . . [F]oundations do not control, simply because, in the direct 
and simple sense of the word, there is no need for them to do so. They have only 
to indicate the immediate direction of their minds for the whole university world 
to discover that it always meant to gravitate swiftly to that angle of the intellectual 
compass. (Economist and academic Harold Laski’s 1930 publication as cited in 




Public policy professor and former editor of the nonprofit sector’s leading peer-reviewed 
journal Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly Jon Van Til (1990) concluded that 
research on foundations has inadvertently served as a promotional vehicle “enhancing 
philanthropy’s public character and obscuring its ties to private interests” (p. 254). In 
short, there are not many channels for researching and publishing studies on foundations 
that are outside foundations’ sphere of influence. 
Tools for Assessing Foundation Effectiveness 
The lack of scientific research on foundations’ effectiveness belies the multitude 
of efforts underway at private foundations across the country trying to assess the impact 
of their funding (Mulgan, 2010). One would never know from searching library resources 
that so many private foundation boards and staff are assessing the impact of their 
grantmaking efforts. But, caution must be taken to avoid assuming that evaluations 
undertaken by foundations meet scientific standards of reliability or validity. What counts 
as evaluation encompasses many different types of efforts and range greatly in quality 
(McNelis & Bickel, 1996). 
Foundation managers’ interest in assessment has spurred a subindustry devoted 
entirely to foundation assessment and evaluation. In the past decade, a great quantity of 
tools and guides, some widely available and some proprietary, have emerged to help 
philanthropists—including foundation managers, individual donors, social impact 
investors, and micro-finance lenders—establish a baseline for, conduct research on, track, 
and assess their impact. Using Foundation Center’s Tools and Resources for Assessing 




150 such resources. A search of the TRASI database for foundation-related assessment 
yielded the following items, which appear to be the most relevant to private foundation 
managers seeking ways to improve their management effectiveness and calculate their 
social change footprint: Abt Associates’s Benefit-Cost Analysis; ActKnowledge’s Theory 
of Change Community; Acumen Fund’s Pulse; Ashoka’s Measuring Effectiveness 
Questionnaire; AtKisson’s Compass Index Sustainability Assessment; Center for Disease 
Control & Prevention’s Framework for Program Evaluation; Coalition for Evidence-
Based Policy’s Checklist for Reviewing a Randomized Controlled Trial or a Social 
Program or Project; Cúnamh ICT’s Social Impact Tracker; Foundations of Success’s 
Guideline for Effective Evaluation; Global Impact Investing Network’s (GIIN) Impact 
Reporting and Investment Standards (IRIS); Global Reporting Initiative’s GRI Reporting 
Framework; Hunter Consulting’s Social Investment Risk Assessment; Innovation 
Network’s Evaluation Plan Builder; Keystone Accountability’s Comparative 
Constituency Feedback; New Profit’s Balanced Scorecard; Organizational Research 
Services’s Outcome-Based Evaluation; Rockefeller Foundation and Goldman Sachs 
Foundation’s Social Impact Assessment; Root Capital’s Social Value Metrics; Social 
Evaluator’s social e-valuator; Social Solutions’s Efforts to Outcomes (ETO); Venture 
Philanthropy Partners’s Assessment and Improvement Indicators; as well as a number of 
research and assessment tools promoted by Annie E. Casey’s Organizational Research 
Services, Center for Effective Philanthropy, FSG, W.K. Kellogg Foundation; Wallace 
Foundation, Women’s Funding Network, and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation; 




rating or benchmarking agencies with unique sets of performance indexes such as Better 
Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance, Charity Navigator, Charity Watch, GiveWell, 
GreatNonprofits, Guidestar, Philanthropedia, and Root Cause Social Impact Research. In 
general, these tools can be grouped into three types of assessment objectives: evaluating 
internal priorities for operational decision making, understanding social outcomes, and 
tracking economic impact. 
Gauging Effectiveness at the Operational Level 
A popular use of evaluations is to gauge a foundation’s operational effectiveness, 
such as investment performance, administrative and staffing costs, and board 
performance (Buteau & Buchanan, 2011). As an example, the Center for Effective 
Philanthropy sells private foundations a popularly used tool, the Grantee Perception 
Report, to collect grantee feedback on how well their funders respond to and serve their 
needs. Besides using evaluations for customer service considerations, most foundation 
managers perceive evaluations as a means to learning if grant objectives were fulfilled 
(Grantmakers for Effective Organizations, 2014; Ostrower, 2004; see also Ridzi, 2012; 
Thompson & Patrizi, n.d.). Another, albeit less popular, reason (only 54% of foundations) 
for conducting an evaluation is to improve grantmaking practices (Grantmakers for 
Effective Organizations, 2014; Ostrower, 2004; see also McNelis & Bickel, 1996; Orosz 
et al., 2003). 
The primary audience for evaluations is the foundation board (82% of 
foundations), followed by foundation staff (79% of foundations; Ostrower, 2004). 




studies of evaluation practices revealed that these patterns have remained consistent over 
time: Their studies, too, found that approximately 90% of foundations surveyed used 
evaluation to account to their boards. In short, the primary way that foundations use 
evaluations is for internal purposes—reporting progress to the board, tracking the 
efficiency and effectiveness of internal operations, and improving relations with key 
constituents. 
Gauging Effectiveness of Social Change Efforts 
If foundations’ uniqueness has posed a challenge thus far for creating an 
evaluative framework for assessing their performance, then trying to discern their social 
impact has been no easier (Mulgan, 2010). Efforts to assess foundations’ social change 
efforts have not only been thwarted by the sheer diversity of foundations’ objectives 
(Anheier & Hammack, 2010; Carman, 2010; Eilinghoff, 2005; Harris et al., 2006; Orosz 
et al., 2003) but also foiled by the difficulty in attributing causality to foundations (Center 
for Effective Philanthropy, 2002; DiMaggio, 2001; Ebrahim, 2010; Fleishman, 2009). 
“The complexity of social phenomena renders it virtually impossible to prove a causal 
connection between the foundation’s grant and the social outcome” (Center for Effective 
Philanthropy, 2002, p. 10). To date, there are no approaches or instruments for capturing 
the foundation sector’s causal effects. 
Despite the inability to attribute causality to foundations, foundation leaders have 
a history of turning to scientific approaches for their social change efforts (Tierney & 
Fleishman, 2011, p. 10). The prototypical modern foundations of John D. Rockefeller, 




charitable trusts by applying a scientific lens to diagnosing and treating the root causes of 
social ills (Karl & Katz, 1981; O’Connor, 2007; Schambra, 2004; see also Sealander, 
2003). The desire to achieve tangible impacts distinguished philanthropy from charitable 
giving, with the former considered a means to solving social problems and the latter 
characterized as emotionally based and effective for ameliorating suffering but 
ineffective in solving problems (for research on donor motivation, see Oppenheimer & 
Olivola, 2011). 
Given the emphasis on solving social ills, foundation managers demanded 
measurable outcomes of their grantmaking, which led them to scientific methods and 
practices. The popularity of scientific methodology in private foundation work is 
attributable not only to demand among foundation heads for practical approaches and 
evidence of impact but also to the growing supply of social scientific knowledge. When 
evaluation research “had moved from the margins of applied social science to full 
institutionalization. . . . [this approach] began to attract the attention of foundation 
executives” (Hall, 2004, p. 37). Many of today’s largest foundations incorporate 
scientific approaches throughout all stages of grantmaking: identifying needs in the field, 
setting mission-related objectives, grant decision making, and impact assessment. 
Innovations in the social sciences were being made in all sectors working in social 
change, and private foundation leaders have borrowed from all. From the scientific 
community, foundation program officers learned about designing for and tracking 
measurable results. Influenced by scientific research design and methods, foundation 




brought together strategy, program design, and evaluation, as well as turned to 
randomized control trials to inform grantmaking (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011; Carman, 
2010; Chen, 1990; Coryn, Noakes, Westine, & Schroter, 2010; Funnell & Rogers, 2011; 
Rosenberg & Posner, 1979). 
Foundation staff also borrowed scientific approaches innovated in the public and 
proprietary sectors (Hall, 2004; Hatry, 2006; Mulgan, 2010; Orosz et al., 2003). An 
example of such borrowing is how public managers’ performance management practices 
that used outcomes-based strategies shaped foundations’ own evaluation processes 
(Hatry, 2006). The focus on results shifted funders’ attention away from grantmaking 
outputs (i.e., number of people served) to outcomes (i.e., how people benefited). 
From the proprietary sector, foundation managers have been influenced to 
prioritize quantitative data. An example is foundations’ adoption of performance 
“scorecards” to benchmark performance (Colby, Fishman, & Pickell, 2011; Kaplan & 
Norton, 2007). Another example is foundations’ borrowing of language from the 
financial industry to describe grants as investments and social impact as a return on 
investments. This linguistic shift reflects grantmakers’ emphasis on tangible social 
change (see, for example, Bean, 2007). 
The combination of these influences has led grantmakers to develop an outcomes-
focused and evidence-based grant decision-making lens. This scientifically influenced 
approach to solving social problems has been called “strategic grantmaking” and 
“outcome-oriented philanthropy” and is the basis of the concept of “effective altruism” 




charitable giving (i.e., responding to needs) to investing in impact (i.e., effecting a 
strategically determined social change), with the former entailing a modicum of basic 
grant reporting and the latter holding foundations accountable for proof of outcomes 
realized from their investments (Baum, Gluck, Smoot, & Wubbenhorst, 2010). 
The popularity of an investment-minded approach among the largest and most 
prominent funders has fueled a foundation effectiveness industry represented by national 
service organizations—the Center for Effective Philanthropy 
(www.effectivephilanthropy.org), which was founded in 2000 and Grantmakers for 
Effective Organizations (www.geofunders.org), which was founded in 2002—and dozens 
of strategy and evaluation consultancies (Salamon, 2002). Large foundations depend on 
external expertise 81% of the time when conducting evaluations (McGill, Henry-
Sanchez, Wolcheck, & Reibstein, 2015). 
For the most part, foundations’ efforts to prove the impact of their grantmaking 
have fallen largely on their grantees (Walker & Grossman, 1998). When funders move 
from charitable to strategic giving, foundations outsource the collection of impact data to 
grantee organizations that are direct providers of goods and services. The problem is that 
public charities lack the capacity, skills, and funding for involved evaluation work (Baum 
et al., 2010; Bearman, 2008; Benjamin, 2010; Brock, Buteau, & Herring, 2012; Buteau, 
2015; Thompson & Patrizi, n.d.). The quest to demonstrate impact has been frustrating to 
grantees who must bear this additional burden of proving the value of funders’ 
investments as well as to funders with their high expectations for demonstrating causal 




Despite much cost and effort in trying to capture the effectiveness of foundations’ 
grantmaking, there is still no conceptual framework or universally used instrument that 
helps foundations assess how their grants impact beneficiaries and, by extension, society 
(Flynn & Hodgkinson, 2001). Moreover, evaluation methods generally do not capture the 
effects of sophisticated, multi-party, complex social change activities (DiMaggio, 2001; 
Kania, Kramer, & Russell, 2014; Patrizi & Thompson, 2011; Preskill & Beer, 2012; 
Thompson & Patrizi, n.d.). As a consequence, there is skepticism of foundations’ social 
impact. 
I’m seeing a lot of fuss coming up around effectiveness that has to do with board 
satisfaction, grantee satisfaction, good decision making [and] strategic 
alignment…. I think the bottom line is—does anything change? Do things 
improve? (Patricia Patrizi interviewed in Orosz et al., 2003, p. 8) 
All in all, there is generally a lack of evidence that private, nonoperating foundations 
contribute to improving society (Prewitt, 2006). 
Gauging Effectiveness Using Economic Indicators 
Another approach to calculating private foundations’ impact is by describing their 
economic footprint. This lens, however, has rarely been applied, with only one research 
idea suggested and two studies that fit this category. Toepler (2004) suggested comparing 
how much foundations spent charitably against how much revenue the government, and 
thereby the public, lost due to foundations’ tax exemption. This treasury efficiency 
approach would use economic data to test foundations’ effectiveness (Toepler, 2004), but 




Another type of effort is to calculate the economic footprint of foundations’ 
grantmaking by describing the output of foundation spending. As an example, Toepler’s 
(2010) study of foundations’ impact in the arts described the amount and type of 
foundation spending (e.g., project, operating, or fellowship grants), but did not draw any 
conclusions about the impact of their spending on grantees. On the other hand, the 
Philanthropic Collaborative (an organization dedicated to promoting foundations’ social 
value) commissioned two research reports that likened foundation spending to having an 
impact. 
The Philanthropic Collaborative’s first report totaled private and community 
foundation sectors’ asset values and concluded that foundations’ assets are “equal in 
value to all of the fixed assets of the American agriculture, mining, and utility industries” 
(Shapiro & Mathur, 2008, p. 2). In other words, the aggregate wealth of foundations is 
substantial enough to make a difference to American society. To defend this claim, they 
calculated that for every foundation dollar spent in 2007, it returned $8.58 in economic 
welfare benefits, such as direct and indirect employment, improvement in household 
incomes, and increase in government revenues (Shapiro & Mathur, 2008). 
A follow-up report calculated that foundation grantmaking represented $63.58 
billion in GDP, or roughly 0.3% of GDP (Peterson & Fujii, 2012; Steele, 2015). Over the 
long term and with multiplier effects, this amount will eventually contribute 
approximately $570.56 billion in employment, activities, and production of goods and 
services representing approximately 3.9% of GDP (Peterson & Fujii, 2012, p. 6). (As a 




Intelligence Agency, 2012].) If that calculation holds true, the foundation sector will 
continue to become even more influential as it becomes a more sizable contributor not 
only to the charitable sector but also to the overall U. S. economy. 
Necessity of an Accountability Framework 
There are limitations to all three types of foundation evaluation approaches. 
Focusing on operations is easiest to accomplish as it attends to internal considerations, 
yet does not indicate a foundation’s impact in the field. Also, the inability to attribute 
causality is an obstacle to recognizing foundations’ social change impact and, this 
treatment, too, is difficult to apply widely given the uniqueness of each organization’s 
mission. Finally, gauging foundations’ economic footprint may be useful for placing a 
dollar value on the sector, but assuming that all money spent is beneficial is short sighted: 
Philanthropic spending cannot be equated automatically with bringing about positive 
social change. 
Other related attempts at positing theoretical frameworks have included efforts to 
explain their grantmaking behavior (Diaz, 1999) or their role relative to government as a 
complement, supplement, or adversary (Frumkin, 2006a; Sandfort, 2008; Young, 2006). 
The unsatisfactory result of all these attempts has led leading scholars of private 
foundations to conclude that there may be no universal way of creating a broadly 
encompassing theoretical framework as foundations’ diversity and complexity preclude 
generalizations (Anheier & Hammack, 2010, p. 5). To date, then, there does not exist a 
scientifically appropriate accountability framework that would facilitate understanding 




Assessing foundations’ effectiveness hinges on being able to identify to whom 
private foundations are accountable. Such an accountability framework is what allows for 
testing foundation’s legitimacy and value to society (Frumkin, 2006a). But foundations 
seem to operate without accountability: “As ownerless organizations, it is unclear to 
whom the accountability inherent in evaluation is due” (Hall, 2004, p. 28). Although 
foundations are privately governed, being tax subsidized means they should be held 
accountable. 
A popularly referenced quote by performance management expert H. James 
Harrington helps to understand why foundations have resisted scrutiny. 
Measurement is the first step that leads to control and eventually to improvement. 
If you can’t measure something, you can’t understand it. If you can’t understand 
it, you can’t control it. If you can’t control it, you can’t improve it. (as cited in 
Phillips, 2014, p. 49) 
If being understood leads to being controlled, foundations have good reasons for wanting 
to be accountable only to internal owners and not to external stakeholders. The former 
enables boards and staffs to retain control of foundation assets and decision making. The 
latter is a slippery slope that could allow others external to a foundation to have a claim 
on how resources should be deployed. 
There are, potentially, many parties to whom foundations should be accountable, 
and any one—the public, grantee organizations, government, foundation founders, 
foundation trustees—presents a different set of expectations, standards, and performance 




of holding foundations accountable has the concomitant right to assess the worthiness of 
foundations’ actions. Hence, the question of to whom foundations should be accountable 
has been a persistent source of unease as evidenced by the intensity of debates about the 
sufficiency or insufficiency of the required minimum distribution amount. Are 
foundations meant to serve a private interest or a public good? 
Payout Debate 
One of the clearest manifestations of the tension between holding private 
foundations accountable to private or public interest is the debate about how much a 
foundation should spend relative to its corpus. Called the payout debate, this difference 
of opinion pits those who believe that foundations should preserve and grow their 
endowment to ensure charitable spending into perpetuity against those who believe that 
foundations should spend more now to benefit society. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 mandated that foundations must participate in 
wealth redistribution by setting an annual minimum distribution amount relative to asset 
size (Steuerle, 1976). Originally set at distributions of 6% of net asset value (Steuerle, 
1976), this decision was made without “any systematic data about the consequences it 
would have on the operations of foundations” (Salamon, 1992, p. 119; see also Deep & 
Frumkin, 2001; Worthy, 1975). Ignoring how the rate of giving would affect the 
sustainability of private foundations, legislators seemed to favor a rate of distributions 
that was on par with foundations’ yields on investments (Steuerle, 1976). In other words, 
money gained would be distributed (Steuerle, 1976), thus adding weight to an 




perpetuity nor wanted private donors to benefit personally from accumulating wealth 
(Worthy, 1975). 
Only in the years following the Tax Reform Act of 1969 did foundation 
executives argue successfully for lowering the distribution threshold to protect the value 
of their financial assets (Steuerle, 1976; Worthy, 1975). Their argument was helped by 
the economic downturn of the early 1970s when yields on investments dropped below the 
mandated rate (Steuerle, 1976). Foundation leaders claimed “invasion of corpus” 
(Steuerle, 1976, p. 5; see also Worthy, 1975) and, as a result, the minimum distribution 
formula was changed to a 5% flat rate in 1981 (Cambridge Associates, 2000). 
Given how much money is at stake, the mandatory minimum payout rate 
continues to be hotly debated. For every 1% increase in foundations’ rate of distributions, 
this change results in approximately $4 billion in additional charitable spending (Deep & 
Frumkin, 2001, p. 3). Some debate the payout threshold on the basis of preserving the 
charitable sector over the long term: They argue that public good is achieved by 
protecting the value of corpus so that foundations can spend charitably for years to come 
(DeMarche Associates & Trotter, 1995). In other words, the importance of the foundation 
institution is such that their endowments should be preserved. Others argue that 
foundations should achieve the greatest public good even at the risk of liquidating their 
assets (Mehrling, 1999). In other words, foundations are only as important as the social 
impact that they achieve. 
Arguments for each side of the debate have been framed in different ways. On the 




corpus in order to hand down philanthropic opportunity to descendents, a concept called 
intergenerational equity (Irvin, 2007). Others argue on the basis of effectiveness that 
foundations that intentionally sunset have greater social impact (Waleson, 2011). The 
debate has also been framed as an issue of democracy. Some believe that a foundation is 
a vehicle for free expression by its founders and donors (Kristol, 1980). Others believe 
that foundations’ social intentions should reflect the voices of the public who are being 
impacted (Mehrling, 1999). In addition, the debate has been framed economically: A 
dollar that is saved today is worth more tomorrow (Klausner, 2003) versus a dollar spent 
today is more valuable than a dollar spent tomorrow (Bradley & Jansen, 2002). Even past 
financial market performance has not provided a clear answer. Some concluded from 
their own analysis of rates of returns that even the current 5% payout rate is too much and 
may eventually erode foundation corpus unless asset managers invest in riskier stocks or 
hybrid assets (Cambridge Associates, 2000; Collie, 2012; DeMarche Associates & 
Trotter, 1995). Others pointed out that the growth of foundations’ endowment values 
indicate that foundations can afford to give away more (Bradley & Jansen, 2002), even as 
much as 8% without compromising their sustainability (Mehrling, 1999). 
There is also the argument that setting any kind of distribution amount suppresses 
foundation giving (Deep & Frumkin, 2001). According to Deep and Frumkin (2001), 
foundations are distracted from spending at levels that would achieve social impact 
because they are overly fixated on meeting the minimum distribution amount. Deep and 
Frumkin (2001) argued for striking this bureaucratic requirement altogether in order to 




evidence that foundations actually spent more when governed by a strong regulatory 
environment (Desai & Yetman, 2005). This conclusion was substantiated by evidence 
that showed that foundations paid out less before the mandatory distribution requirement 
(Worthy, 1975, p. 239). 
Accountability to private interest. The payout debate will continue to be waged 
inconclusively as long as there is no clear direction on answering to whom foundations 
should be ultimately accountable. On one side of this accountability question are those 
who believe that foundations enact democracy by reflecting the individualism of their 
owners (Kristol, 1980). In other words, a foundation is meant to be an outward 
expression of a donor’s personal interests, worldviews, values, beliefs, passions, and 
practices. Fleishman (2009) opined that this kind of grantmaking, wherein “many 
foundations are less interested in achieving real impact than in showing the world that 
their hearts are in the right place,” is “hardly to be deprecated” (p. 159): Such 
philanthropy enacts American values of individualism, charity, and freedom of 
expression. Although private-interest grantmaking may not “move the needle” in solving 
social problems, what is accomplished instead is a perpetuation of U. S. charitable culture 
by the wealthy. 
For purposes of academic study, a private, internal accountability framework is 
not conducive for researching foundations as an industry and their social good impact. 
There are four components that comprise accountability relationships: Such a relationship 
is transparent to public scrutiny, allows for questioning and justifying actions, demands 




compliance (Ebrahim, 2010). Wanting foundations to be accountable only to their own 
owners (Brody, 2010; Brody & Tyler, 2012; Fleishman, 2009; Frumkin 2006b; Kristol, 
1980; Schramm, 2006) falls outside an accountability framework, because objectives that 
are privately set and reviewed internally cannot be questioned. Without an accountability 
framework, private foundations are sovereign from government or public interest in their 
decision making and answerable only to inside stakeholders (Brody, 1998; Brody, 2010; 
Brody & Tyler, 2012; Kristol, 1980). 
Accountability to public interest. The counter perspective is that foundations’ 
tax-subsidized status and public intentions mean that private foundations exist for public, 
not private, benefit and so should be accountable to external stakeholders (Porter & 
Kramer, 1999; Salamon, 2002). However, “public accountability is not discussed widely 
in the literature on philanthropy” (McIlnay, 1998, p. 80) as evidenced by a lack of 
theories and testable frameworks (Benjamin, 2010; Prewitt, 2006). There are pertinent 
reasons why the development of public accountability frameworks has been so 
challenging. First, attempting to assess foundations based on the concept of their public 
good is of no help because this term is highly contested, without uniform meaning, and 
can be claimed by both sides as their intention (Mansbridge, 1999). Second, suitable 
accountability frameworks are underdeveloped because they could undermine foundation 
owners’ freedom. Employing a Foucauldian lens, Ebrahim (2006) portrayed 
accountability as an issue of power: Answering to whom and for what foundations must 




The public accountability perspective is part of a larger narrative that enactment 
of a welfare state is no longer the sole responsibility of government but rather a shared 
responsibility with those in the private charitable and proprietary sectors (Salamon, 
1987a; see also Kettl, 2002). Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the United States 
Treasury in the 1960s, described federal tax exemptions as a subsidy for nonprofit 
activities that government wanted to encourage (Surrey and McDaniel’s 1953 treatise on 
tax expenditure as cited in Lerch, 2004, p. 3). Also, Congress has defended charitable tax 
exemptions as relieving government of being solely responsible for helping society 
(Simon, Dale, & Chisolm, 2006). According to this view, the United States is an 
“allocative welfare state [that] tied government and private enterprise together” (Hall, 
2000, p. 17). The country’s modern welfare state is “not simply the expansion of the state 
but also an extensive pattern of government reliance on private nonprofit groups to carry 
out public purpose” (Salamon, 1987b, p. 99). In short, the modern welfare state depends 
on foundations to serve the public good, not just to exist for private interests. 
Government distributes social welfare responsibility to the private nonprofit 
sector in two ways. Governments at all levels provide financial support to nonprofits, 
particularly social service organizations, to a degree that government funding is a 
substantial part of public charities’ income (Salamon, 1987b; Smith & Lipsky, 2009). 
Additionally, government provides tax subsidies and exemptions to promote 
complementary social welfare activities, which is how foundations came into existence 
(Salamon, 1987b). Government relinquishes tax revenues from foundations in return for 




government expectations, which is conducive to employing a public accountability 
framework. 
The notion of foundations being publicly accountable surfaces a tension about this 
entity that is uniquely American. Foundations came of age during a period of progressive 
intent but wariness about intrusions of the state. They complement government in 
pursuing social welfare aims, but do so through freedom of individual expression 
(Hammack & Anheier, 2013). This tension is reflected in what the Tax Reform Act of 
1969 does and does not regulate: It strictly prohibits private owners from benefiting 
financially but left open to interpretation how charitable spending should benefit the 
public good. Thus, one position is not more correct than the other, but rather, both 
perspectives have a valid historical basis and may intentionally, as with so many other 
ambiguously worded legislative compromises (Ellis, 2008), exist in constant tension. 
The premise of this dissertation is that private foundations’ mandated spending 
necessitates holding foundations’ charitable behavior accountable to public interest. 
Hence, the paradigmatic lens applied in this study is one of public accountability. What is 
needed then is a theory of foundations’ actions that is accountable to the impact on 
grantees. 
Theoretical Framework 
Having provided an overview of efforts to gauge foundations’ effectiveness, a 
rationale for why foundations should be effective, and background on competing interests 
and ideologies that have stymied efforts to develop knowledge on this topic, this section 




benefit impact using principal-agent theory with public charities’ need for financial 
health as explained by capital subsidy theory. Principal-agent theory positions 
foundations’ primary purpose as financially helping public charities. “The assets held by 
[foundations] are unusual in that public charities in the aggregate have a claim on the 
returns on the assets because the tax laws governing nonprofit organizations impose the 
nondistribution constraint [prohibiting foundation owners from benefiting]” (Sansing, 
2010, p. 42; see also Hansmann, 1980). In a sense, foundation assets belong to and should 
therefore serve public charities. 
Capital subsidy theory explains that public charities need charitable largess to the 
extent that they can realize financial surplus. Being able to accumulate savings is 
necessary to conducting mission-related activities. Combining the two theories—one on 
foundations, the other on public charities—enacts a research framework of their financial 
relationship in which foundation giving is explained as a means by which grantees 
accumulate surplus. 
Principal-Agent Theory 
The relationship between the federal government and private foundations can be 
described using principal-agent theory. Principal-agent theory has been applied to private 
foundations before, but always cast foundations in the role of principal and grantee 
organizations as their agents (Benjamin, 2010; Campbell, Lambright, & Bronstein, 2012; 
Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006; Steinberg, 2010; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Van 
Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jegers, 2012; Williams & Taylor, 2012). This research 




Arguably, principal-agent theory may offer a promising solution to the research problem 
of holding foundations accountable to public, versus their own private, interests. The 
theory relates principals and agents within a testable framework, and the mechanisms of 
control and resulting behaviors as variables. 
A principal relies on an agent to fulfill principal’s objectives, but a central tenet of 
this accountability relationship is that agents are self-interested to the extent that a 
principal feels compelled to impose rules to bring the agent in line with a principal’s 
objectives (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; see also Caers et al., 2006; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Gailmard, 2014; Speckbacher, 2003). This theory has been commonly used to explain 
corporate behavior as a consequence of a rift between shareholders and managers (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). It has also been popularly applied in political science as a way of 
holding elected officials accountable to electoral institutions (Gailmard, 2014). 
This principal-agent relationship dynamic bears an uncanny resemblance to the 
interdependent tension between the federal government and private foundations. 
Government and foundations inherently have different objectives—the former is 
interested in the public good while the latter has been shown to prioritize private interests 
in maintaining and increasing wealth (Deep & Frumkin, 2001). However, in today’s 
distributed governance system, the federal government depends on private foundations to 
realize public good aims. 
What government expects of foundations manifests in three ways. First, private, 
nonoperating foundations are required by law to participate in wealth distribution to 




requirement, which is 5% of the previous year’s noncharitable-use, investment assets 
(Yoder et al., 2011). Foundations that expend the minimum amount averaged over the 
previous five years are rewarded with a nominal1% excise tax rate on net investment 
assets (Yoder et al., 2011). 
Second, federal penalties for failing to distribute the annual minimum distribution 
amount are “sufficiently severe” to compel compliance (Cambridge Associates, 2000, p. 
8). A foundation that fails to distribute the required amount by the end of a fiscal year is 
subject to a doubling of its excise tax rate on net investment income from 1% to 2%, a 
30% excise tax on the undistributed amount, with a 100% excise tax on that amount if it 
remains undistributed by the end of the following year (Yoder et al., 2011). In short, 
government uses a carrot—dual-tiered excise-tax levels on net investment income—and 
stick—harsh penalties on undistributed income—to compel foundations to distribute 
wealth in ways that will benefit the public. 
Third, government encourages foundations to support public charities by 
discouraging them to give to anything other than United States-incorporated 501(c)(3) 
public charities. Private foundations that want to make grants to charitable entities 
domestically or abroad that do not have 501(c)(3) status are required to go the extra step 
of using an “expenditure responsibility” process (Wexler, 2010). Although expenditure 
responsibility is a legitimate mechanism for supporting non-501(c)(3) organizations, it 
requires additional knowledge and effort. Effectively, the expenditure responsibility 
process exerts a cooling effect on the funding of non-501(c)(3) organizations (Worthy, 




In sum, these impositions on private foundations are mechanisms for controlling 
foundations’ behavior in ways that redistribute private wealth for public-benefit purposes. 
These measures are meant to bring foundations in line with government’s objectives. Yet, 
despite regulations, incentives, and penalties to induce foundations to act on behalf of the 
public good, they are imperfect agents of principal’s objectives (Gailmard, 2014). 
Distrust in the government-foundation relationship. In describing the 
relationship between corporate managers and shareholders, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
characterized the principal-agent relationship as rooted in distrust because of an agent’s 
self-interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In other words, the relationship is top-down and 
hierarchical; in this case, private foundations are beholden to the public-good interests of 
the state. There is a body of evidence substantiating that an agency problem between the 
federal government and private foundations exists. 
Deep and Frumkin (2001) discovered that over a 25-year period, while 
foundations’ return on investments was 7.62% annually, foundations only distributed an 
average of 4.97% over that same period. In other words, foundation asset growth did not 
result in commensurate levels of charitable spending (Deep & Frumkin, 2001). Although 
they did not examine smaller foundations that were found to give at a higher rate (see 
also McGlaughon, 2013; Renz, 2012), multiple studies have confirmed that the largest 
foundations, which give away the majority of all distributions, conserved spending, 
especially if they experience a low rate of asset growth and no infusion of new capital 




Researchers found that foundations go as far as to misreport investment expenses 
as charitable spending in order to qualify for the lower excise tax rate, thereby 
contributing even less money to public charities (Yoder et al., 2011). In addition, Yoder 
and McAllister (2012) discovered that foundation managers prioritized preserving the 
value of their financial corpus by prioritizing stable and not fluctuating distributions no 
matter economic conditions or opportunities to have a greater social impact (e.g., during 
times of financial downturns). Furthermore, researchers found that foundation managers 
are so motivated to avoid incurring a higher excise tax rate, which would occur if their 
giving was reduced after a year of higher payout, that they smooth charitable spending no 
matter social needs (Sansing & Yetman, 2006). 
Another evidence of foundations’ self interest is that very few foundations devote 
the entirety of their resources to a charitable purpose. An Urban Institute survey of 
foundations found that only 8% of foundations intend to sunset in service to their 
missions (Ostrower, 2009). The vast majority of foundation executives avoid spending 
more than real rates of investment returns in order for their foundations to last into 
perpetuity (Cambridge Associates, 2000; Collie, 2012; DeMarche Associates & Trotter, 
1995). To whit, if charitable spending today can solve social and environmental 
problems, there would be no need to prolong charitable spending into the future. Hence, 
retaining wealth reflects founders’ or governing board members’ privately held interests. 
In addition, even though charitable institutions should be trustworthy, research 
has shown that nonprofit executives behave no differently than proprietary business 




with large endowments paid their executives larger salaries while spending less on 
charitable activities than nonprofits with smaller endowments. Just because a private 
foundation is a nonprofit, one cannot assume that their behaviors are always altruistic. 
These findings paint a problematic picture of the self-interested nature of 
endowed charitable organizations, particularly ones intent on perpetuity. Despite 
foundation executives’ commissioning of studies and production of annual reports that 
promote their beneficence, the evidence of their self interest was enough to prompt 
Hansmann (1990) to conclude: “It is a truism that many donors restrict their gifts for use 
as endowment, not to advance education and knowledge, but to purchase a bit of personal 
immortality” (p. 33). Empirical evidence affirms that there is an agency problem in the 
dynamic between government and foundations: Foundation owners prioritize institutional 
self-preservation over enacting social change, thereby necessitating outside intervention 
to compel them to behave for the public good. 
Government as an effective principal. Affirming the suitability of applying a 
principal-agent lens to the relationship between government and foundations, the 
presence of government oversight has been shown to be effective at curbing endowed 
institutions’ agency problems. Fisman and Hubbard (2005) discovered that in states with 
poor government oversight, endowed nonprofits have problems of excessive managerial 
compensation and low charitable spending. The severity of these problems was reduced 
in states with strong government oversight leading the researchers to conclude that strong 





Desai and Yetman (2005) arrived at a similar conclusion for private foundations. 
They correlated the amount of foundation charitable spending with the number of state 
laws that are meant to detect illegal activities, such as spending that benefits foundation 
insiders (Desai & Yetman, 2005). In those states with a greater number of detection laws, 
payout increased 8%, foundations paid out more quickly, and employee compensation 
was less than in states with fewer detection laws (Desai & Yetman, 2005) 
These findings demonstrate that government is an effective principal in improving 
foundations’ public-good behavior through regulations and oversight. In particular, 
government checks self-interested behavior by mandating that foundations spend their 
wealth on helping public charities. The following section describes why foundations’ 
distribution of wealth serves government’s (i.e., the principal) interest, which is a proxy 
of the public’s interest. 
Capital Subsidy Theory 
Economist Henry Hansmann advanced nonprofit studies with a “remarkable 
series of papers that sought to delineate a theoretical framework for the tax and regulatory 
treatment of tax-exempt entities” (Hall, 2000, p. 24). Hansmann’s writings continue to be 
popular for contract and market failure theories explaining the unique functioning and 
role of nonprofit organizations. Of his many theories though, his explanation of 
nonprofits’ capital subsidy is not as well known but warrants resurrecting here. 
Hansmann (1981) described nonprofits’ special structural need for sufficient financial 




Nonprofits’ tax exemption is meant to encourage the growth of nonprofits and, 
thereby, underpins the entirety of the nonprofit sector’s economy (Hansmann, 1981; see 
also Simon et al., 2006). The only way that nonprofits can survive and thrive is by 
allowing for retention of, and not taxation on, nonprofits’ earnings (Hansmann, 1981). 
They uniquely need tax exemption for products and services that cannot be sold 
profitably in the private commercial marketplace (Hansmann, 1981). Because public 
charities depend on contributed income, their enterprises are more risky to sustain 
(Hansmann, 1981). As a consequence, public charities need to retain and accumulate a 
financial surplus—profit—in order to overcome the volatility of financial markets and 
fickleness of donors in order to provide goods and services to beneficiaries consistently 
over time (Hansmann, 1981). This idea that nonprofits need to accumulate financial profit 
abetted by tax exemption was what Hansmann (1981) implied by the term capital 
subsidy. 
Nonprofits have structural issues warranting their unique need for accumulating a 
financial reserve. First, nonprofits operate in issue areas that reflect a failure of the 
capitalist marketplace. Hansmann (1981) called this contract failure to imply how those 
in the consumer marketplace are unwilling to pay for goods and services that benefit all, 
such as clean air and water. Without donative, charitable support, nonprofits would be 
unable to afford overcoming the tragedy of the commons in which there is not enough 
spending on services that benefit the masses. 
The second reason why nonprofits uniquely need tax-exempt support is that they 




charities’ financial model is one in which those with wealth (i.e., donors) pay for the 
things that direct consumers cannot afford. An example is a soup kitchen whose clients 
cannot afford to pay the cost of their meal. Another example is a museum that cannot 
charge visitors the full cost of what it took financially to acquire its collection. 
Third, nonprofits do not achieve productivity gains, which weakens their financial 
ability to realize cost savings (Baumol & Bowen, 1968; Kreidler, 2013). For example, a 
soup kitchen needs the same number of materials and people to provide a meal no matter 
if serving five meals a week or seven: Each meal costs the same (Kreidler, 2013). The 
soup kitchen must raise and spend the same amount of money to provide each and every 
meal no matter how many meals it serves over time. 
These inherent structural problems of sustaining nonprofits are why they need tax 
exemption. Because they cannot rely on market demand, paying clients, or productivity 
gains to drive down costs, tax exemption protects their financial resources from being 
eroded so that they can maximize their spending to help beneficiaries of their services. 
Furthermore, freedom from taxation enables nonprofits to accumulate savings, which 
help smooth provisions of goods and services, especially during financial downturns or 
increased demand. In short, a public charity needs to realize profit and accumulate 
reserves in order to achieve its mission (Wicker, Longley, & Beuer, 2015). Hence, given 
the vital role that private foundations play in supporting public charities, it is important to 





Evidence of benefits of accumulating surplus. Essentially, Hansmann’s (1981) 
theory of nonprofit capital subsidy is a matter of their financial health, which did not 
become a subject of empirical study until a decade later in Chang and Tuckman’s (1990) 
research on nonprofit survivability. Credited for their ground-breaking work on financial 
determinants of public charities’ failure, they also innovated studying the concept of 
profit, which they measured as residual surplus (Tuckman & Chang, 1991). They 
debunked the perception that the nondistribution constraint (i.e., restriction from 
distributing profits to owners) prohibited nonprofits from accumulating profits (Tuckman 
& Chang, 1991). Their review of 1983 tax returns led them to conclude that most public 
charities retained profit and actually accumulated this resource intentionally, not 
accidently (Chang & Tuckman, 1990; see also Tuckman & Chang, 1992). 
The notion that nonprofits retain profit raised concerns that charitable entities 
might save too much money. In 1992, Tuckman and Chang cautioned against excessive 
accumulation and, nearly two decades later, Ramirez (2011) questioned why public 
charities were holding $425 billion in noninterest-bearing cash. Frumkin and Keating 
(2001) found empirical evidence that excess surplus is related to excessive CEO 
compensation, which affirms the worry that profitable nonprofits would be self-serving. 
Indisputably, acquiring profit for profit’s sake undermines altruistic purpose, but the self-
interested motivations of some do not diminish Hansmann’s (1981) main point, which is 
that financial reserves are necessary to furthering charitable aims. 
Researchers and experts in the field have presented substantial evidence that 




(Calabrese, 2012; Handy & Webb, 2003; Thomas et al., 2011), enables the building of 
institutional infrastructure and organizational effectiveness (Hager et al., 2004; Taylor et 
al, 2013; Thomas et al., Christopher, & Sidford, 2011), helps in weathering economic or 
donor-caused downturns (Thomas et al., Christopher, & Sidford, 2011; Wicker et al., 
2015), serves as an investment toward affording future opportunities (Curtis, 2010; Curtis 
et al., 2010; NORI, 2010; Ramirez, 2011), and contributes to mission-related productivity 
(Grantmakers for Effective Organizations, 2011; Moyers, 2011; Ryan, 2001). According 
to one of the most prominent sector experts on nonprofits’ financial health, financial 
surplus is the most essential ingredient for ameliorating structural issues so as to pursue 
mission-related work effectively (Miller, 2003). Conversely, too little surplus predicts 
financially and organizationally unstable public charities (Bowman, Keating, & Hager, 
2005) and organizational demise among arts organizations (Hager, 2001). 
State of public charities’ surplus. Despite evidence of the benefits of 
accumulating surplus, public charities operate with very low levels of financial reserves. 
A study of the financial condition of Washington, D.C.’s nonprofit sector found that 57% 
of public charities had fewer than three months of reserves and 28% of them had no 
reserves whatsoever (Blackwood & Pollak, 2009). In short, more than half of the area’s 
public charities were unstable financially and a full quarter of them were at risk of 
demise, no matter the size of the organization (Blackwood & Pollak, 2009). In addition, 
between years 2000 to 2006, organizations that failed (i.e., no longer filed a tax return or 
filed a tax return indicating an inoperative charity) had a median operating reserve of 




extreme financial vulnerability (Blackwood & Pollak, 2009, p. 9). A more recent study of 
nonprofits in San Diego County found a similar, troubling pattern of financially unstable 
organizations: Nearly 62% of them had fewer than one month of operating reserve (Lam 
& McDougle, 2012). 
Unhealthy reserves may be due to a persistent misperception that nonprofit means 
no profit (NORI, 2010). Board members of public charities impose policies prohibiting 
the accumulation of profit, and private donors and public funders question an 
organization’s financial need when it shows a reserve (Calabrese, 2012; Curtis et al., 
2010). Foundations can undermine grantees’ pursuit of financial stability by not only 
withholding funding from organizations with a healthy reserve but also by restricting 
funding to a degree that an organization needs to pay for a foundation-supported program 
by dipping into its own reserve (Froelich, 1999). The mixed feelings about accumulating 
reserves are reflected in a poll that showed that only 37% of nonprofit employees strive 
for cash reserves and financial flexibility (Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, 
2011). 
Measures of public charities’ surplus. Nonprofits do not have a financial 
‘bottom line’ that can be found in their financial statements, which has resulted in various 
definitions and measures being used to approximate the proprietary sector’s concept of 
profit. Researchers have used end-of-year fund balances (Chang & Tuckman, 1990), 
savings (Handy & Webb, 2003), and cash position (Ramirez, 2011). The reason for the 
proliferation of different measures is that a public charity’s surplus is more complicated 




income that is left over after paying expenses is profit, which is therefore a good indicator 
of success. In the case of public charities, they adhere to generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, 1993) that 
divided assets into three categories: permanently restricted, temporarily restricted, and 
unrestricted. As a consequence, neither the amount of a nonprofit’s assets nor its cash 
balance can be equated with financial surplus as the nature of an asset’s restriction must 
also be taken into account. My comparable measure to commercial profit is public 
charity’s assets that are free from restrictions (i.e., unrestricted assets) and easily 
converted to cash (i.e., liquid). 
Unrestricted assets. Assets, such as cash and investments, can be temporarily 
restricted, which means that a donor can impose conditions restricting its use for a certain 
time (e.g., the next fiscal year) and for a specific purpose (e.g., for a scholarship 
program). Assets can also be permanently restricted, such as an endowment (Miller, 
2003). Unlike temporarily or permanently restricted assets, unrestricted assets have no 
conditions on its use. At any time, it can be saved, used for overhead, tapped for financial 
emergencies, or used to invest in new opportunities (Miller, 2003; Moyers, 2011). 
Therefore, an organization with a sizable endowment may look well off, but if it has little 
unrestricted net assets, it is actually ‘cash poor’ making it vulnerable to economic 
downturns and unexpected losses of income (Miller, 2010). 
Liquidity of assets. Another type of financial asset that a healthy nonprofit needs 
is liquid assets that can be converted quickly to cash. Money in savings accounts and 




2003). If an organization’s financial statement shows a sizable unrestricted net asset 
balance, it may be comprised of properties, plant, or equipment (PPE), which cannot be 
converted easily to cash. A public charity with a large endowment, a deed to its own 
building, or an abundance of donor-restricted grants and contracts can still be at risk of 
not meeting payroll. Hence, an organization can have sizable unrestricted assets, but if 
they are not easily converted to cash, it has a liquidity problem. The problem of 
illiquidity is one of the top issues plaguing public charities (Miller, 2010). 
Unrestricted, liquid assets “has the greatest relevance to [a public charity’s] cash 
flow and ability to respond to needs and manage its operations well” (Miller, 2003). In 
sum, unrestricted, liquid net assets may be the single most significant measure of a public 
charity’s ability to realize a charitable purpose. In this study, this type of asset is the most 
equivalent to commercial profit and serves as a measure of an organization’s ability to 
realize capital subsidy. 
Integration of Theories 
Applying principal-agent and capital subsidy theories together created a research 
framework for holding foundations’ mandated charitable spending accountable to 
government’s, and thereby the public’s, interest in helping grantee organizations realize 
the financial capacity to pursue their missions. To test the performance of foundations’ 
wealth distribution role, the conceptual framework was centered on the nature of the two 
entities’ financial relationship. The conceptual model tested pathways of relationships 
between foundations and grantees through the potential mediator of payout rate. Payout 




mechanism of control by a principal (i.e., federal government) to induce public good 
behavior. 
Variables of Study 
Outcome Variable: Grantee Organizations’ Financial Health 
Within the business management field, Bourgeois (1981) was seminal in laying 
the groundwork for exploring the nature of profit and advised studying surplus as a 
dependent variable in order to “[discover the methods of its] creation and sustenance” (p. 
38). This study applies Bourgeois’s suggestion to the nonprofit sector. The level of 
unrestricted, liquid net assets serves as the outcome variable operationalizing grantee 
organizations’ financial health. I borrowed NFF’s financial formula for calculating a 
public charity’s months of unrestricted, liquid net assets (MULNA) to measure financial 
capacity (G. Brinkerhoff, personal communication, January 15, 2013). Albeit a rather 
involved calculation that calculates net assets after taking out equity in fixed, illiquid 
assets, this formula results in a figure that is a close approximation to commercial profit. 
Like a proprietary business’s profit, MULNA affords flexibility: It can be used as 
operating capital to cover such ongoing costs as overhead and personnel, as risk capital 
for investing in new ventures and innovation, and as a rainy day fund for emergencies. 
MULNA also indicates survivability by calculating how much money an 
organization has on hand to continue paying expenses if all income stopped. Bowman 
(2011a, 2011b) referred to this concept as months of spending and described this type of 
asset as reflecting an organization’s short-term resiliency. An organization is resilient if it 




coming in (Bowman, 2011a, 2011b). Short-term resilience enables being able to weather 
economic bumps in the road without jeopardizing performance and mission. This type of 
resilience is distinguished from long-term measures of health that would require a larger 
amount of accumulated resources to not only remain operational but also to ensure that 
the value of assets do not erode over time from inflation (Bowman, 2011a, p. 94). 
A potential threat to validity is the question of MULNA (or any single formula) as 
a valid and reliable measure of a public charity’s financial capacity to fulfill its mission 
(Herman & Renz, 1999; Prentice 2013). According to Prentice (2013), nonprofit 
accounting ratios that supposedly measure constructs of liquidity, solvency, profitability, 
and operating margin have been commonly used by researchers but have remained 
underdeveloped as a research topic for two decades (p. 134). Ritchie and Kolodinsky 
(2003) used factor analysis to discover that nonprofits’ fundraising efficiency, public 
support, and fiscal performance can be identified from tax return-derived financial ratios. 
However, Prentice’s (2013) research was the first to test the factorial validity of measures 
of nonprofits’ financial vulnerability. Prentice (2013) found that nearly all of the 
popularly used accounting ratios were not valid indicators of theoretical constructs of a 
public charity’s financial condition. Regarding MULNA (he called it months of 
spending), this accounting ratio did not satisfactorily load onto the construct of liquidity 
and, therefore, does not reflect a public charity’s short-term resilience (Prentice, 2013). 
A research challenge is that formulas used to test the relationships between 
financial constructs against the larger construct of financial vulnerability fail to 




financial vulnerability was operationalized by such simplified measures as the amount of 
liabilities relative to total assets (insolvency risk), change in net assets from previous 
fiscal year (asset disruption risk), total revenues (funding disruption risk), and total 
expenditures (program disruption risk). These measures may not actually reflect how a 
public charity behaves. Possibly a better measure of financial vulnerability may be actual 
instances of organizational demise, even though this measure, too, eludes accuracy. 
According to Hager (2001), even nonprofits thought to be dead because of consistent 
nonfiling of tax returns turned out to have revived and were alive rendering all existing 
measures of financial vulnerability still somewhat unsatisfactory in predicting 
organizational death. Arguably, Hager’s dependent variable for predicting nonprofit 
failure (i.e., an organization’s dead or alive status) is more satisfactory than continuing to 
use reductive financial formulas of organizational failure that Prentice (2013) relied on to 
test various measures of financial constructs. 
Instead, there is considerable face validity to the MULNA measure of financial 
health. Although the measure of MULNA—of which Prentice’s (2013) research used a 
close approximation of the more detailed and precise NFF formula—was not found to 
load factorially onto the concept of liquidity, it is widely used by practitioners. Nonprofit 
finance professionals and accountants as well as funders use MULNA to gauge financial 
health (Blackwood & Pollak, 2009; Bowman, 2011a, 2011b; Lam & McDougle, 2012; 
Miller, 2003; Moyers, 2011). The calculation has also been used as a criterion in grant 
decision making (Nelson et al., 2009; Nelson & Koo, 2014; NORI, 2010; Ryan, 2001). 




Financial SCAN product to subscribed users of its nonprofit services, and its adoption by 
this leading nonprofit data industry provider indicates the widespread degree of the 
calculation acceptance and use. More recently, I saw this measure included as its own 
section of a public charity’s audited financial statement by one of New York City’s 
leading accounting firms. In addition, approximations of NFF’s MULNA formula have 
been used in research on public charities’ finances and in studies of factors that contribute 
to public charity’s financial state (Blackwood & Pollak, 2009; Bowman, 2011a, 2011b; 
Calabrese, 2012; Lam & McDougle, 2012; Nelson et al., 2009; Nelson & Koo, 2014; 
NORI, 2010).  
In short, there are good reasons why MULNA, as well as similarly elusive 
measures, may not load onto the construct of liquidity but has been accepted by 
practitioners and used by researchers. As a grantmaker, direct experience reviewing 
financial statements and working with always financially vulnerable public charities have 
taught me that public charities’ long-term survivability defies the ability of financial 
vulnerability measures to accurately predict organizational demise. On the other hand, 
because NFF’s calculation of MULNA has been used to influence funders’ giving and 
grantees’ management of resources, the MULNA formula is a practical measure of public 
charities’ financial health. 
Regarding the threshold level of MULNA that an organization should maintain, 
this amount depends on many factors, such as an organization’s size, expenses, cash 
flow, obligations, and fixed costs (NORI, 2010). But, nonprofit finance academics and 




afford at least three months of expenses (Blackwood & Pollak, 2009; Bowman, 2011b; 
Foley, n.d.; Konrad and Novak, 2000; Kurre, 2010; Lam & McDougle, 2012; Nelson & 
Koo, 2014; NORI, 2010). Hence, I also use three months of MULNA as a benchmark for 
indicating financial health. 
Influencer Variables: Aspects of Foundations’ Reach 
Prior research discerned that the type of financial stakeholder (individual, 
foundation, or government) a nonprofit depends on has a significant effect on a 
nonprofit’s behavior and mission-related activities (Moulton & Eckerd, 2012; O’Dwyer 
& Unerman, 2008). In other words, private foundations exert an influence on grantees. 
This study examines the mechanism of the relationship between these two nonprofit 
actors, with a focus on private, nonoperating foundations’ primary function as a 
distributor of wealth. 
I focus exclusively on foundations’ charitable spending as the primary mechanism 
mediating the relationship between foundations’ firm-level traits and grantee 
organizations’ financial health. But, private foundations’ charitable distributions may not 
be the sole determinant of MULNA. The firm-level measures that may estimate 
foundations’ influence are asset size, age, professionalization, and sector focus. These 
traits are indicators of the degree to which a foundation is large enough, experienced 
enough, dedicated enough, and sympathetic enough to be influential. I examined if these 
firm-level traits directly confer capacity to their grantees: A foundations’ size, tenure, 
skills, and interest areas may influence their grantees’ financial condition (see, for 




number of grants, average grant size, and level of compensation paid to trustees have not 
been shown to be important determinants of charitable spending behavior and are, 
therefore, excluded from this study (Boris, Renz, Barve, Hager, & Hobor, 2006, p. 28). 
Foundations’ size. Asset size is considered a better measure of organizational 
size than annual giving, although the two are highly correlated (Boris et al., 2008, p. 57). 
Hence, the value of a foundation’s assets is often used as a proxy of its size. Given that 
the largest foundations are responsible for the majority of all foundation giving, most 
research on grantmaking only include the nation’s largest nonoperating foundations 
(Anheier & Hammack, 2010). For example, a national study of the 10,000 largest 
foundations represented only 16% of the number of all independent, corporate, and 
community foundations, but this minority group represented more than three-quarters of 
all foundation giving and foundation assets (Boris et al., 2008, p. xii). 
For purposes of this research, I did not focus solely on large foundations: A 
foundation does not need to have sizable assets in order to have an influence on grantees. 
In fact, the larger the foundation, the more it tends to barely satisfy the minimum 
distribution requirement (Renz, 2012; Sansing, 2010; Sansing & Yetman, 2006). Unlike 
small foundations, large foundations afford professional tax planning and financial 
management services that help them avoid higher tax rates resulting in distributions that 
meet the bare minimum requirement (Yoder & McAllister, 2012). Also, large foundations 
that are not growing their endowments through infusions of new capital avoid elevating 
their payout rate, even in times of social crises such as Hurricane Katrina and the Haiti 




2012, p. 27; see also Renz, 2012). In short, large foundations are more likely than small 
foundations to retain assets, even by incurring the higher excise tax rate, in order to 
preserve the value of their investments in the interest of perpetuity (Yoder & McAllister, 
2012). 
The spending and savings behavior of large foundations is important because their 
spending accounts for the majority of the sector’s charitable distributions. But, small 
foundations with assets of less than $50 million are also important because they are the 
“supermajority” in number. These foundations are considerably smaller than the largest 
grantmaking institutions, but small foundations exhibit more generous behavior. Small 
foundations distributed 11.7% of the share of their net assets (according to 2012 figures, 
McGlaughon, 2013, p. 15) compared to 6.4% distributed by the largest foundations 
(according to 2009 figures, Renz, 2012, p. 7). This finding affirmed Renz’s (2012) 
research conclusion that endowment size was the best predictor of payout-to-net asset 
ratios, with small foundations giving at a higher payout rate than large foundations—11% 
median payout among foundations with assets of $10–$50 million versus 5%–6% median 
payout among foundations with assets of over $50 million (p. 9). In sum, small 
foundations give away a greater proportion of their wealth than large foundations 
(McGlaughon, 2013; Renz, 2012). (The exception is if they are small and “inert,” in 
which case, they are unlikely to meet the minimum distribution requirement according to 
Sansing and Yetman, 2006, p. 376.) 
Compared to all other size foundations, small foundations are unique in spending 




larger funders in effecting grantees’ financial health, especially if small foundations give 
to commensurately small charities. With this possibility in mind, I included private, 
nonoperating foundations of all sizes and made asset size a variable of interest. Studying 
only the largest foundations does not sufficiently capture the variability that is in the 
sector, particularly when attempting to discern foundations’ impact on beneficiary 
organizations that can occur with foundations of any size. 
Foundations’ experience. I included foundation’s age as a proxy for its 
experience. Dowie (2001) described the life cycle of a private foundation as occurring in 
three successive stages: founder, next generations of friends and family members, and 
nonfamily members. He characterized the giving of the first two stages as internally 
focused on family members’ interests and of the final stage as externally focused on the 
needs of the community (Dowie, 2001). 
The age of a grantmaking institution has not been studied for its effect on grantee 
organizations, but it has been shown to be a determinant of foundation behavior (Boris et 
al., 2008; McAllister, 2005). Age was associated with community foundations’ charitable 
administration expenses, and with younger institutions expending more during their early 
years of start up than when more established (Boris et al., 2008, p. 41). This finding is 
particularly true of family foundations. “The payout philosophy of a foundation could be 
a function of whether or not the originating founder is still alive or a function of the 
influence of the founder’s heirs on foundation payouts” (Desai & Yetman, 2005, p. 28). 
Family foundations that were young and large that had the active participation of their 




longer had the participation of their founders (McAllister, 2005). Recently established 
family foundations may give away more than the minimum required amount because of 
founders’ active participation, an interest in establishing their importance in the nonprofit 
sector, and not yet retaining the services of investment managers who are concerned with 
conserving spending (McAllister, 2005; Yoder & McAllister, 2012). 
Conversely, older foundations are more interested in protecting their asset values 
to the degree that they preferred to pay a higher excise tax rate than increase their 
charitable distributions, even if their asset values increased (Sansing & Yetman, 2006; 
Yoder & McAllister, 2012). Already-established foundations tend to focus more on 
perpetuity than younger foundations that are establishing themselves and incurring costs 
associated with starting up their enterprises (McAllister, 2005; Yoder & McAllister, 
2012; Sansing & Yetman, 2006). 
Generational characteristics also affect giving behavior. Most foundations were 
founded less than a generation ago, with 60% of all foundations established since 1998 
(McGlaughon, 2013). It is only now that the philanthropic field is beginning to 
experience a generational transition as descendents of those founding donors are exerting 
their more youthful leadership on foundation boards (Schervish, 2005). The differences 
of these younger generations of philanthropists are likely to be reflected in their unique 
giving behavior. The research report #NextGenDonors concluded that up-and-coming 
philanthropists prioritize different values, are more strategic than charitable, and are more 
interested in being directly involved in bringing about impact (Johnson Center for 




studies on generational differences among philanthropists, there has not been a study of 
how such differences affect beneficiary organizations. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to discern if a foundation is 
governed by its original founders or by their descendants, I included the variable age 
based on a foundation’s year of incorporation. For the many reasons cited here, age 
merits inclusion as a potential contributing factor in determining charitable behavior or as 
a direct influencer of grantees’ financial state. 
Foundations’ professionalization. Charitable administrative expenses are the 
costs of conducting mission-related, versus investment-related, activities, which includes 
employment of grantmaking staff, legal and accounting fees, travel, printing and 
publications, rent, and utilities (Boris et al., 2008). In short, these costs reflect how much 
a foundation spends to operate charitably. Of these charitable administrative expenses, 
the largest expense was compensation (Boris et al., 2008). For the purposes of this study, 
compensation was a proxy of how much a foundation prioritizes professionalizing the 
conducting of its charitable activities. Compensation expenses include salaries to trustees, 
officers, or employees, and includes the costs of their benefits and pensions. Although 
compensation of employees was the largest administrative expense, not all foundations 
professionalize. In a study of the largest 10,000 foundations, only about 30% reported 
paying staff, thus indicating that most foundations rely on voluntary labor (Boris et al., 
2008, pp. xii, 51). 
Compensation expenses were found to have the most effect on the ratio of 




other words, as the amount of compensation increased, the portion of administrative 
expenses as a share of payout rate also increased. Also, foundations that expended 
beyond the minimum distribution requirement were positively correlated with having 
professional staffing (Sansing, 2010; Sansing & Yetman, 2006), which raises the 
possibility that professionalization may influence grantees’ financial health. 
There are several reasons why paid staffing may be related to the degree to which 
a foundation meets payout obligations and, thus, may impact grantees. Family 
foundations that compensated trustees seemed to pay more attention toward meeting 
charitable obligations than those operating with all-voluntary labor (McAllister, 2005). In 
other words, compensation suggests a commitment to conducting charitable activities. 
Hence, professionalization levels may reflect the degree to which a foundation dedicates 
resources to its charitable function. As such, foundations’ staffing may be a contributing 
factor of how well their grantee organizations are supported. 
There is a possibility that foundation’s spending on professionalization may be 
somewhat exaggerated in order to meet the minimum distribution requirement so as to 
avoid triggering a higher excise tax rate, but compensation amounts have not been shown 
to be falsified (Yoder et al., 2011). As such, I examined both the presence and levels of 
paid staffing. 
Reliance on arts foundations’ support. There were two reasons for why I 
examined foundations’ sector focus, particularly those that are committed to giving to 
arts and culture causes. First, arts funders behave differently than grantmakers serving 




reduce funding when a public charity receives government support (Kim & Van Ryzin, 
2014). In addition, arts grantmakers have been the first to lead a concerted national 
campaign, spearheaded by their membership association Grantmakers in the Arts, to 
deliberately improve the financial reserves of public charities (Curtis, 2010; Nelson et al., 
2009; Thomas et al., Christopher, & Sidford, 2011). 
Second, arts-focused public charities rely more on private philanthropy, of which 
foundations are a key part, than their counterparts serving other issue areas. “Arts and 
recreation” public charities receive a little more than one-third of their income from 
private philanthropy and only about 10% from government sources of support (Salamon, 
2012, p. 41). Contrast this with other sectors wherein government funding is dominant, 
such as “social services” organizations that depend on public support for more than one-
third of their budget and only 10% from private philanthropy, and “health care” public 
charities that generally rely on government for half of their income and only 3% from 
philanthropy (Salamon, 2012, p. 41). (The other major category of revenues is fees, 
which is not included in this study.) Because public charities working in the arts have 
been more dependent on private than on public sources of support, I singled out arts-
focused private foundations to explore how grantees that depend inordinately on this 
source of funding are affected financially. 
Mediating Variable: Foundations’ Charitable Spending Behavior 
As noted earlier, private foundations’ payout rate has been the subject of much 
debate. Critics have concluded that foundations’ charitable spending has been too low 




2002; Mehrling, 1999; Waleson, 2011), while others have countered that payout rates are 
too high thus risking the potential for future spending (Cambridge Associates, 2000; 
Collie, 2012; DeMarche Associates & Trotter, 1995; Irvin, 2007; Klausner, 2003). 
Financial analyses can retrospectively answer whether distributions were too high or too 
low relative to rates of return on investment (Cambridge Associates, 2000; Collie, 2012; 
DeMarche Associates & Trotter, 1995), but there has been no connection made to how 
payout affects grantees. As far as could be found in reviewing the literature, none has 
researched the effectiveness of payout in helping public charities accomplish their work. 
Given that a mandated function of private foundations is wealth redistribution to public 
charities, payout rate emerged as a meaningful data point for my research inquiry into 
foundations’ effectiveness in impacting their grantees’ financial capacity. 
Conclusion 
There is substantial evidence to suggest that foundations’ redistribution of wealth 
is neither their primary motivation nor their most important contribution to society but 
rather that they act in ways to guard and accumulate elite wealth. Given that foundation 
wealth is tax-subsidized with legislative mandates for charitable spending, questions 
arise: Are foundations trustworthy? Is their spending worth their tax exemption? And, are 
foundations an effective vehicle for conferring public benefit? Unfortunately, responses 
to such questions have been laden with competing normative beliefs of what foundations 
should prioritize and too little on developing theoretical frameworks that would enable 




developed, they either skirted external impacts by focusing on internal operational 
efficiencies or have been unsatisfactory attempts at gauging social change. 
There remains a considerably large gap in knowledge about foundations’ value to 
society as able to be gauged empirically. This study uniquely contributes to the topic of 
foundations’ effectiveness by attributing impact to a primary mechanism for distributing 
foundation wealth—payout: After all, the primary relationship between private, 
nonoperating foundations and public charities is the exchange of money. It is possible 
that as much as foundations are focused on conserving assets than on spending charitably, 
the amount that is expended may still have a significant effect on grantees. 
In order to test the pathways and significance of these relationships between 
foundations’ characteristics and grantee organizations’ MULNA, I applied principal-
agent theory to position foundations as accountable to government, and thereby public, 
interests. In applying this theoretical framework of foundation’s accountability, I 
responded to the inevitable question of to what end by incorporating Hansmann’s (1981) 
theory of capital subsidy. Hansmann’s theory rationalizes public charities’ accumulation 
of financial surplus as essential to affording the costs of pursuing charitable aims. The 
integration of these two theories comprises the conceptual framework exploring how 
private, nonoperating foundations’ firm-level characteristics and spending behavior may 





Chapter 3: Research Method 
Overview 
The intent of this research was to describe how private, nonoperating foundations 
affect their grantee organizations’ financial capacity to achieve social purpose. This 
exploration was motivated by the larger socially relevant question about impact and value 
of foundations: Do foundations legitimately help public charities pursue their missions? 
To that end, I investigated possible pathways by which foundations may affect grantee 
organizations’ financial health. In this chapter, I describe the research design, 
methodology, conceptual model, operationalization of constructs, hypotheses and 
corresponding statistical approaches, data sources and frame, as well as address the 
reliability and validity of my study. 
Research Design and Approach 
This dissertation is a quantitative study that used the ex post facto research design 
to explore pathways of relationships among its variables. There was no test or 
intervention, which would have been more appropriate for identifying causality than for 
discerning relationships. Because there was a lack of precedent studies on foundations’ 
impact on public charities’ financial condition, multiple regressions of associations 
between variables was an appropriate method for generating knowledge, particularly with 
a theory-backed hypothesis but a lack of already-tested theories in the field (Grimm & 
Yarnold, 2010; Hughes, 2006). 
To develop a model of relationships, a researcher relies on theory, previous 




foundation-related, principal-agent and nonprofit-related capital subsidy theories was 
based on field experts and nonprofit researchers who have described various agent 
problems of foundations and the need for capital by public charities. Furthermore, my 
direct experience as a foundation grantmaker helped in designing a conceptual approach 
appropriate to this inquiry. 
The design of the study was a series of path analyses in order to identify the 
foundation characteristics that influence charitable behavior and their grantees’ financial 
capacity as well as to discern the mediating role of payout rate. As this was an 
exploratory investigation without the benefit of precedent studies, I examined whole and 
segmented variables. I conducted analyses using ordinary least squares regressions of 
these proposed relationships amongst the influencer variables (foundations’ asset size, 
age, staffing ratio, and sector focus), the mediator variable (foundations’ payout rate), and 
the outcome variable (MULNA). I used the indirect effects approach to identify how 
foundations’ payout rates may add to the prediction of grantees’ financial health after the 
effects of foundation influencers—size, age, staffing, and sector focus—were eliminated. 
The combined effort of these approaches tested the importance of payout as a mechanism 
by which foundations realize their redistributive social purpose. This study was approved 
(06-04-14-0260254) by the Institutional Review Board of Walden University. 
Path Analysis for Mediation 
Path analysis is a method for exploring the order, magnitude, and significance of 
relationships amongst variables; in other words, it enables exploring how or why 




modeling was used to predict genetic inheritance (Jose, 2013). By using a path analysis 
approach, this research moves beyond simply correlating private foundations’ 
characteristics and grantees’ financial health to instead identifying the pathways by which 
foundations’ characteristics and behavior impact public charities. Hence, path analysis 
enabled testing the theoretical proposition that foundations fulfill a public good role 
through their mandated charitable spending. 
There are two main types of path analysis: mediation and moderation. Mediation 
and moderation are often confused (Hayes, 2013). Mediation is used to understand how 
the effects of a variable are carried through another variable (“Moderation and 
Mediation,” n.d.) Mediation was derived from correlation and regression statistical 
approaches and “is a hypothesis about a causal network” (Kenny, 2014, “Specification 
Error”). On the other hand, moderation is based on identifying mean group differences 
and was derived from statistical ANOVA procedures (Jose, 2013, p. 17); it is relevant to 
understanding the degree to which a variable exerts an interactive influence on another 
(“Moderation and Mediation,” n.d.). 
Given that the relationship between foundations and their grantees’ financial 
condition had not been examined before, mediation analysis was an appropriate initial 
approach to learning if and how certain foundation traits and behavior affect public 
charities’ MULNA. If payout could be shown to be a statistically significant mediator of 
the relationship between private foundation characteristics and grantees’ MULNA, such a 
finding would open the door to further research on the moderating degree to which 




knowledge that would greatly inform the payout debate but was beyond the scope of this 
study. 
In order to understand the pathways of relationships amongst these variables, I 
used the indirect effect approach of mediation analyses rather than Baron and Kenny’s 
(1986) steps for identifying mediation. Unlike the indirect effect approach that estimates 
the size and presence of the mediation pathway, Baron and Kenny’s approach relies on 
the total effect (i.e., the relationship between influencer and outcome variables) to be 
reduced when the mediator variable is introduced (Jose, 2013, p. 50). Of the two 
methods, the indirect effect approach has become the preferred method for identifying 
mediation (Field, 2013; Hayes, 2013). 
Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model, as illustrated in Figure 1, posits that private, nonoperating 
foundations’ payout rate mediates the relationship between foundations’ operating 
characteristics—size, age, professional staffing, and sector focus—and their grantee 
organizations’ MULNA. In other words, differences in foundation’s charitable spending 
may predict how many months of financial reserves grantee organizations are able to 






Figure 1. Mediation model of relationship pathways between foundations and grantee 
organizations’ financial health. 
This conceptual framework was the basis for statistical analyses. I examined 
which foundation traits accounted for differences in their payout rate in order to identify 
the most relevant characteristics for mediation analyses. I also examined which, and to 
what degree, their firm-level traits directly influenced grantees’ financial condition. Any 
significant relationships have implications for the conceptual model of determinants of 
MULNA. In addition, given the exploratory nature of this research, I segmented the data 
into subgroups in order to identify nuances of these three pathways of relationships: firm-
level traits on payout (pathway A), firm-level traits on MULNA (pathway C), and an 





The data were from a representative sample of United States-incorporated, 
private, nonoperating foundations and their 501(c)(3) grantee organizations. The two 
sources of archived data used herein were the completed tax returns of private 
foundations (Form 990-PF) and those of public charities (Form 990). I used Urban 
Institute’s (2006b) National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) 2006 Private 
Foundation Core File to identify the population of private foundations that filed a tax 
return for that year. NCCS is a program of the Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, 
which conducts research on the role and impact of the nonprofit and philanthropic sectors 
(www.urban.org/center/cnp/index.cfm). The Core Files are produced annually and 
combine descriptive information found on foundations’ original federal registration forms 
and a set of financial variables gathered from their tax returns (Urban Institute, 2006a). 
The Core Files are of all charitable entities that are mandated to file a tax return and are 
considered population databases of private foundations and public charities (Urban 
Institute, 2006c). 
The 2006 Foundation Core File is a selection of approximately 60 variables, 
which I used to calculate private foundations’ age and to identify their asset size (Urban 
Institute, 2006b, 2006c). However, the Core File neither provides sufficient data 
necessary for calculating the ratio of paid professional staffing relative to foundations’ 
asset sizes nor payout rates. To generate these variables as well as grantees’ MULNA, I 
used completed tax returns, which are free and publicly available through Guidestar 




recent nonprofit tax returns freely and publicly; earlier returns are available without cost 
to academic researchers. 
Although nonprofits’ audited financial statements are an ideal source of data 
because they are prepared professionally, I did not rely on this resource to generate data 
for this study. First, audited financial statements are not uniformly available and would 
need to be procured by individual requests to private foundations and public charities. 
Certain types of foundations, such as family foundations, are likely to be disinclined to 
agree to such a request as audited statements can contain personal and sensitive 
information. Second, not all public charities afford professional audits of their finances, 
particularly small-budget organizations. 
Given the limited availability of and access to audited financial statements, all 
data for calculating study variables were generated from completed IRS tax returns, 
including the NCCS Core Files that are based on tax return data. Nonprofits’ tax returns 
remain the most comprehensive data source on nonprofit organizations (Grønbjerg & 
Clerkin, 2005). Tax return data have been used for research on nonprofits’ finances, 
including seminal studies on nonprofits’ financial vulnerability (Carroll & Stater, 2009; 
Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Hager, 2001; Trussel, 2002; Tuckman & Chang, 1991) and the 
nature of nonprofits’ surplus (Bowman, Tuckman, & Young, 2012; Calabrese, 2012). 
Researchers have questioned tax return data as possibly not reflecting nonprofits’ 
finances due to lack of IRS oversight and varying levels of competency in filling out the 
tax return form (Skelly & Steuerle, 1992). However, studies that compared tax return data 




demonstrated that Form 990 data are generally reliable, particularly for financial and age 
information (Froelich & Knoepfle, 1996; Froelich, Knoepfle, & Pollak, 2000; Grønbjerg 
& Clerkin, 2005). The shortcoming of IRS data is that it does not adequately reflect types 
of nonprofits that do not need to file a tax return, such as religious organizations 
(Grønbjerg & Clerkin, 2005). However, this weakness was not a concern of this study, 
because all private foundations are required to file a tax return and are, therefore, well 
represented by IRS data. 
Less is known about the error rates and reliability of 990-PF data, but these 
returns are probably as, if not more, reliable. Unlike public charities, private foundations 
can afford competent accounting and financial management services, are pressured by 
industry organizations Guidestar and Foundation Sector to make their returns transparent 
publicly, and must adhere to stricter rules on governance and financial abuses as defined 
under Internal Revenue Code sections 4940–4945. According to private foundation 
researchers, the 990-PF data are the most comprehensive, complete, and organized of all 
nonprofit data, and are the baseline against which to assess the accuracy of other private 
foundation databases (Ludlum, 2004; Renz, 1991). 
Regarding ethical treatment of data, the only data set that this concerns is the 
NCCS 2006 Core File, which was developed and published by the Urban Institute. Core 
Files are produced for research use, and researchers pay a nominal fee and agree not to 
share the proprietary records. I purchased the 2006 NCCS Foundation Core File, which I 
will keep password-protected on a personal computer, will not distribute, and will delete 




and, hence, the data are neither confidential nor anonymous. Data that are accessible via 
Guidestar do not warrant special treatment for security, which is the case with all of the 
data used for this study. 
Temporal Scope of Study: 2006 and 2007 Tax Years 
The unit of analysis was private, nonoperating foundations registered in the 
United States that filed a tax return. Unlike certain types of nonprofits, such as religious 
congregations, all private foundations must file a tax return annually. Hence, this study 
does not reflect non-filers (i.e., foundations that did not submit a tax return), which may 
indicate no longer operating or being otherwise inactive. 
I used private foundations’ returns from the 2006 tax year. Figures were not 
inflation adjusted and reflect constant, not current, dollars. Compared to years affected by 
the volatility of the Great Recession of 2007–2009, the preceding year 2006 was a strong 
year economically. In 2006, the Dow Jones Industrial Average hit the 12,000-level for the 
first time indicating the financial strength of the stock market (Balakrishnan & Seager, 
2006). Benefiting from the stock market’s success, which is where most foundations’ 
assets are invested, foundation assets grew 12% in 2006 compared to the prior year, from 
$455.6 billion to $509.1 billion (Lawrence & Mukai, 2008). 
The increase in asset values contributed to an unprecedented rise in foundation 
giving compared to prior years. In 2006, the giving rate was close to 6.1% of 
foundations’ assets, which is slightly more than the 6% distributed in 2005. Although this 
incremental change seems small, it was enough to make 2006 giving “among the highest 




a larger portion of their wealth than before. Another indication of the financial robustness 
of private foundations was in how much they gave away: Independent foundations spent 
$27.5 billion in 2006, 9% over the previous year spending of $25.2 billion (Lawrence & 
Mukai, 2008, p. 9). In short, foundations gave away more of their share of wealth and 
more in real dollars than in previous years. 
Returns of the 2006 tax year reflect foundation spending at an all-time high 
making this moment more appropriate for trying to detect a relationship between 
foundation spending and public charities’ financial state than during an economic 
downturn when foundations conserve spending. Hence, foundation variables of asset size, 
age, ratio of professional staffing, sector focus, and payout rate reflect the 2006 tax year. 
Although I make no claim for a causal relationship between the two entities—
foundations and public charities—I used data on grantee organizations’ 2007, not 2006, 
tax year. Public charities’ 2007 tax returns may either reflect already benefiting from a 
foundation grant or the promise of receiving one. Whether or not a 2006 grant is reflected 
in a grantee organization’s 2007 tax return depends on several factors. A principal 
consideration is nonprofits’ different bases of accounting. Organizations using the 
recommended accrual basis of accounting will record grants when promised, not when 
received, unlike cash basis accounting that recognizes a grant only after receipt. As a 
result, a grant made by a foundation in its 2006 tax year may be reflected in their 
grantee’s 2006 or 2007 tax return, depending on timing and both the foundation’s and 
public charity’s choice of accounting methods. I relied on grantee organizations’ 2007 tax 




conferred from either securing a grant or already using the grant in the prior or 2007 tax 
year. As with foundations’ figures, grantees’ financial data were not inflation adjusted. 
Sampling Procedure 
Population Frame 
According to the IRS (2006b), there were 64,468 grantmaking, nonoperating 
foundations that filed a 2006 tax return. The NCCS 2006 Core File includes many more 
and other types of foundations—88,223 in total (Urban Institute, 2006b). For private 
foundations that, for whatever reason, did not file a tax return for that year, the Urban 
Institute (2009) included the prior year’s return, thus making the number of observations 
in the Core Files a more accurate reflection of the entire population than the number of 
tax filers in any given year. 
Domestic, grantmaking, private foundations that filed a 990-PF tax return for their 
2006 tax year (IRS, 2006a) comprised the target population. I excluded foreign entities 
that adhere to different grantmaking rules. Pass-through foundations wherein assets 
received are fully distributed were also not included as their payout rates are unusually 
large as they do not spend from an endowment. Similarly excluded were support 
organizations that funnel funding to particular charities. Also, I left out nonexempt 
charitable and split interest trusts that filed a 990-PF but are a different type of entity, as 
well as operating foundations that primarily fund their own charitable programs in lieu of 
needing to meet a minimum payout. Last, I excluded foundations that did not complete 




three or more grantee organizations (e.g., they may have supported only a couple 
charities or their primary grantmaking was to individuals). 
Sampling for the outcome variable. For the outcome variable, I selected the 
three grantee organizations that received the largest grant amounts as reported in the 2006 
990-PF of each sampled foundation. I identified these organizations from foundations’ 
990-PF grants list section, which lists all grantee organizations and their grant amounts 
for that tax year. I excluded foreign nongovernmental organizations; nonprofits that are 
not subject to IRS regulations for filing a 990 tax return, such as churches or unions; 
entities that are fiscally sponsored or receiving a grant through a foundation’s expenditure 
responsibility process; and organizations with gross receipts of less than $25,000 as they 
may not have completed a tax return or may have completed the abbreviated tax return 
Form 990-EZ that lacks sufficient information for calculating MULNA. Once I selected 
the top three grantee organizations that received the largest total grant amounts, I 
calculated their organizational MULNA using their Form 990 from the 2007 tax year. 
Sample Size 
In describing the process of conducting mediation analysis, Jose (2013) advised 
using power analysis tools, such as G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) 
that is readily accessible online. Jose (2013) recommended, based on earlier work 
established by Cohen (1992), setting the four interrelated power variables: (1) the 
significance criterion (α) to .05), (2) power level at .80, (3) effect size, and (4) sample 
size. A study of power in mediation studies (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & 




shortcoming, Jose (2013) recommended increasing the sample size in calculating the 
mediating effect beyond what is suggested by power analysis software (p. 87). 
Regarding effect size, I anticipated that it would likely be small considering that 
so many other factors contribute to a public charity’s financial condition (Herman & 
Renz, 1999). Other variables that fall outside the focus of this study include more 
dominant sources of financial support: Earned revenues, government support, and 
individual charitable giving are the largest sources of funding, not private foundations 
(Salamon, 2012). Private foundations’ funding contributed only approximately 16% of all 
charitable giving in the United States (Foundation Center, 2014) and accounted for only 
3% of the nonprofit sector’s revenues (Foster & Ditkoff, 2011, p. 143). Furthermore, a 
public charity’s internal factors play an important role in contributing to its financial 
condition, such as the financial competence of its personnel, management decisions and 
development of resources, and trustee-imposed policies on accumulating reserves. 
I used G*Power version 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 2009) to estimate the sample size. I 
set the significance criterion (α) at .05 (Grimm & Yarnold, 2010). Taking into account 
that previous mediation studies were underpowered and that so many other factors affect 
a public charities’ financial condition (Jose, 2013; MacKinnon et al., 2002), I set the 
power level to .95, which increased the sample size. Effect size, which should be small, 
was set to .1. Using these parameters, G*Power analysis indicated that I needed a sample 
size of 204 to meet standards for rejecting correctly the null hypothesis while being able 
to detect actual relationships. In addition, I ran analyses using robust bootstrap methods 




With 204 observations, the number of cases of the outcome variable was three 
times that amount (i.e., three grantees per foundation) for a total of 612 cases. The 
decision to limit the selection of grantees to three was made with a practical consideration 
for what can be accomplished in a dissertation. Also, because the study was meant to 
identify pathways of relationships and not causal explanations, three was a sufficiently 
large enough sample of each foundation’s grantees to constitute an average picture of 
foundations’ top grantees’ MULNA. 
Disproportionate Stratified Random Sampling 
I used disproportionate stratified random sampling by small, medium, and large 
foundation asset sizes. Adapting asset size categories referenced by McGlaughon (2013) 
and Renz (2012), I categorized small foundations as those holding $50,000,000 or less; 
medium foundations as those holding between $50,000,001 and $499,999,999; and large 
foundations as those with $500,000,000 or more. After stratifying the population of only 
those foundations relevant for inclusion, I sampled from each stratum using a random 
number generator in Excel to evenly reflect each asset size category. 
Disproportionate stratified sampling was appropriate for this study given the 
imbalance between the number of foundations of each size and their relative grantmaking 
footprint (Daniel, 2012). Although 98% of all foundations are small (less than $50 
million in assets), only 1% of the largest foundations gave away roughly half of all grant 
funds (Foundation Center, 2014). In other words, the vast majority of foundations are 
small but only the top 1% gives away most of the money. Hence, disproportionate 




are usually excluded from research because their giving impact is relatively small 
(McGlaughon, 2013), and (b) it counterbalanced overrepresenting large foundations to 
the exclusion of small foundations if sampling had been based on grantmaking size. 
Because this research was not about the impact of grantmaking on an issue or geographic 
area (in which case, the study should attend only to large grantmakers) but rather on the 
relationship between funders and grantees, it was appropriate to proportion the sample 
equally. Therefore, each sample stratum was equally represented (i.e., 68 foundations per 
stratum) so that the characteristics of the smallest or the largest grantmakers neither 
dominated nor distorted the findings. Disproportionate sampling of asset size categories 
also allowed for between-strata analyses (Daniel, 2012, p. 136), which was appropriate 
given that asset size has been shown to be related to payout rate (McGlaugon, 2013; 
Renz, 2012). 
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs 
This research was based on a number of constructs that needed to be 
operationalized for study. The concept of foundation effectiveness was tested by looking 
for significance of the mediating path of charitable spending linking foundations’ 
influence to grantees’ financial well-being. This section provides an explanation of how 
the variables were operationalized to indicate key concepts of foundations’ influence and 
charitable behavior and grantees’ financial capacity to realize social purpose. 
Outcome Variable: Grantees’ MULNA 
The calculation of a public charity’s MULNA—months of a public charity’s 




organization’s short-term resilience if stress-tested by how long it could operate if all 
income stopped. The following is a clear and thorough explication of NFF’s MULNA 
formula: 
The underlying metric used to calculate MULNA is―unrestricted liquid net 
assets (ULNA) and is defined as―net assets minus positive equity in property and 
equipment. Positive equity is calculated by taking the sum of―land, building, and 
equipment (LBE) and―investment in land, building, and equipment 
(Invest_LBE) and subtracting property and equipment related debt (e.g., the sum 
of mortgage, loans, and tax exempt bonds). The result is total property & 
equipment equity. Property & equipment equity, however, may take on negative 
values, as the sum of related debt may be greater than the value of land building 
and equipment. Thus, in calculating unrestricted, liquid net assets, only values 
greater than zero is [sic] considered. Subtracting negative property & equipment 
equity will result in erroneously overstating unrestricted liquid net assets, thus 
P&E equity will only take on values of zero or greater. P&E equity is then 
subtracted from unrestricted net assets to arrive at unrestricted liquid net assets 
(ULNA). Once ULNA is calculated, determining MULNA is a simple procedure. 
ULNA is divided by pre-depreciation expenses (functional expenses minus annual 
depreciation) and multiplied by 12. (Lam & McDougle, 2012, pp. 3–4) 
To put it simply, the formula first calculates an organization’s unrestricted, liquid net 
assets and then is divided by 12 months to generate the number of months a public 




Brinkerhoff of NFF shared their MULNA formula, personal communication, January 15, 
2013) for calculating the outcome variable of this study (see Table 1). 
Influencer Variable: Foundations’ Asset Size 
The fair market value of a foundation’s total assets is considered a proxy of a 
foundation’s size (Boris et al., 2008). Able to be calculated using data in the 2006 Core 
File, this information also can be found in two places on the publicly accessible IRS 
Form 990-PF from tax year 2006 (IRS, 2006a). A foundation’s total asset size is found on 
Part II, line 16c and on the first page of the form, Introduction, line I (see Table 1). 
Influencer Variable: Foundations’ Age 
I used foundation’s age to indicate its experience and maturity and to suggest its 
generational life cycle (i.e., still tied to founders’ interests or possibly reflecting a non-
family foundation board). I calculated age using the 2006 Core File on private 
foundations, which provides the ruling date of when the IRS authorized tax-exempt status 
(Urban Institute, 2006c). This date is not necessarily when a foundation began to operate 
as a foundation may have begun operating informally before seeking official federal 
recognition or may have been formally incorporated first at the state level (Urban 
Institute, 2006a). Although ruling dates may not reflect the actual moment when a 
nonprofit began operating, ruling dates were found to reflect reliably the age of an 
organization, with the exception of entities established before 1970 (Urban Institute, n.d.; 
see also Grønbjerg & Clerkin, 2005). IRS files were computerized during the 1960s and, 
hence, entities established up to that period may not have accurate or complete ruling 




researchers, a missing ruling date should be filled in by examining the foundation’s other 
tax year returns, by searching on its websites, and, if all else fails, by “bottom coding” 
missing data with the year 1970 (Urban Institute, n.d., “Two Approaches,” para. 3). 
NCCS researchers examined the 2004 NCCS Core Public Charity File and found that 
92% of all public charities had ruling dates of 1970 or later (Urban Institute, n.d., para. 7) 
indicating that age data are generally complete and reliable. Furthermore, most 
foundations were established after 1969 when the federal government officially 
recognized private foundations as a distinct charitable entity, so most foundations’ years 
should not be missing or need bottom coding. 
The 2006 Core File provided foundations’ year and month of IRS ruling (Urban 
Institute, 2006b). In order to calculate foundations’ age, I converted this number into its 
age at the time of its studied tax year by dropping the last two digits (month) and 
subtracting its rule date from the year 2007. This calculation generated the age of a 
foundation by how old it was in number of years when it completed its 2006 tax return in 
the year 2007 (see Table 1). 
Influencer Variable: Foundations’ Staffing Ratio 
The presence and level of professional staffing of a foundation may be a 
contributing factor to how well grantees are supported. A meaningful figure of a 
foundation’s professionalization is not how much was expended on staffing but rather the 
proportion of staff expenses—compensation and benefits—relative to its size. Hence, I 




relative to the fair market value of a foundation’s total assets to generate this study 
variable. 
For this calculation, I relied on data from completed 2006 IRS Form 990-PFs. 
Paid staff is identified on part I, lines 13–15, columns D. Column D singles out expenses 
incurred for charitable purposes. Line 14 reflects amounts paid to professional staff. If a 
foundation does not employ staff, it may choose to compensate board trustees, which is 
reflected in line 13. A foundation may have senior-level staff also serving as officers or 
trustees, and so their compensation may be reflected in either line 13 or line 14. 
Foundations that do not show any staffing expenses—zero expenses in lines 13 and 14 
and no employee benefits or pension costs in line 15—are operating with an all-volunteer 
board, which is not unusual at family foundations (Boris et al., 2008). (See Table 1 for 
the 990-PF calculation.) 
Influencer Variable: Foundations’ Sector Focus 
To identify arts-focused private foundations, I began by examining how 
foundations categorized their primary activities for inclusion in the National Taxonomy 
of Exempt Organizations (NTEE). Unfortunately, this resource was not useful for 
identifying private foundations’ grantmaking focus areas as most foundations selected the 
category “T-philanthropy, voluntarism & grantmaking foundation,” which simply (and 
unhelpfully) indicates that the foundation focuses on philanthropy. In addition to 
examining the major subgroup category (NTEEGRP), I also examined the subgroup 
classification, NTEE-5, which categorizes nonprofit entities by five major subgroups of 




services; and other. In this case, most foundations selected “Other,” perhaps because they 
either wanted to indicate that they are a grantmaking entity and not a direct service 
provider in their field of interest or because they are a generalist or multi-sector funder 
(there is no option to select multiple subcategories). A manual examination of these 
categories revealed that not a single foundation used the NTEE categories to identify 
which sector they prioritized. 
Because the NTEE codes were not useful in identifying arts-specific foundations, 
I identified arts funders using an alternative two-step process. First, I identified arts 
foundations based on personal expert knowledge of the field (I was vice-chair of and am 
a member of the national arts grantmaking membership association Grantmakers in the 
Arts). Second, I reviewed the list of funders’ top three grantees to identify which 
foundations supported the arts. If any of the grantees was an arts organization, I then 
researched that foundation’s giving to see if the arts funding was atypical or indicated a 
pattern of supporting the arts. For cases that I identified as a potential arts funder using 
these two methods, I also manually examined these foundations’ tax returns, reviewed 
their websites, and conducted a general online search to see to what degree they invested 
in the arts. I coded a foundation as an arts funder if they exhibited a pattern of supporting 
arts-focused public charities, even if the arts was not their only focus. 
Mediator Variable: Foundations’ Payout Rate 
There is a mistaken impression that the IRS calculates a foundation’s payout 
based on its total asset size (Renz, 2012), but doing so would not distinguish between 




calculation for payout rate is based on a foundation’s net value of noncharitable-use 
assets, which are assets held for investment purposes such as endowment as well as 
investments in real estate, art, and other items that may yield returns of greater value 
(Ludlum, 2005). This type of asset is different from charitable-use assets that are used to 
conduct mission-related activities including costs for personnel, meeting expenses, real 
estate, equipment, and computers (Ludlum, 2005). 
The IRS calculates a foundation’s payout rate by dividing the amount of 
qualifying distributions (i.e., expenses incurred in carrying out charitable, not investment, 
purposes that include grantmaking, operational, and administrative costs)—which is 
adjusted to account for taxes, allowable deductions, and previous excess distributions—
by the net value of its noncharitable-use assets (Renz, 2012, p. 2), as shown in Table 1. I 
calculated payout rate using data from the 990-PF, because not enough of the data 
necessary to make this calculation were included in the 2006 Core File. I used the IRS 





Operationalization, Calculation, and Measurement of Study Variables 







net assets (MULNA) 
All line items are for end-of-year 
amounts on the 990: 
MULNA = [(Unrestricted Net 
Assets line 67B -MAX (0, Land 
Buildings Equipment line 57cB + 
Investments in LBE 55c -(Tax 
Exempt Bond Liability 64aB + 
Mortgage line 64bB)] / (Total 
Functional Expenses line 44A – 
















Year of foundation’s 
IRS tax determination 
minus 2007 












market value of total 
assets 
Ratio of professional staff = (990 
PF, Part I, Compensation of 
Officers Directors Trustees Line 
13D + Other Employee Salaries 
and Wages Line 14D + Pension 
Plans or Employee Benefits Line 
15D) / Fair Market Value of Total 
















focus on the arts, 
which is the nonprofit 
sector that depends 
most on their funding 
Manual review of foundations’ 
grants lists (990 PF, Part XV, 3a) 
and online search for information 
on foundations’ giving 
Dummy 







Payout rate Payout rate = Qualifying 
Distributions Part XII, line 4 + 
Taxes Part XI, line 2c + Deduction 
from Distributable Amount Part 
XI, line 6, + Excess Distributions 
Applied to Current Year Part XIII, 
line 5, column c) – Recoveries of 
Amounts Treated as Qualifying 
Distributions Part XI, line 4 / Net 
Value of Noncharitable-Use Assets 
Part X, line 5 
Percentage of 
foundations’ 











I conducted exploratory data analyses and tested for null and alternative 
hypotheses using IBM’s Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21. In 
addition, I used Hayes’s (2014) PROCESS v2.13, which is a SPSS macro, to test for 
indirect effects of the influence of a mediator. Befitting exploratory research of a little 
understood phenomenon of the pathways by which foundations affect grantees, I 
analyzed whole and segmented models of the data. 
Preliminary Treatment of Data 
I began with univariate analyses to look for missing or nonrepresentational data, 
to identify outliers, and to assess outliers’ influence on the shape of univariate 
distributions using SPSS frequencies and explore functions (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). 
Based on these results, I treated influential residuals and winsorized data that were 
nonnormally distributed. I reported the range, mean, median, and standard deviations of 
both the untreated and then of the winsorized data. I also examined and reported on the 
bivariate relationships between the outcome (i.e., MULNA) and influencer variables (i.e., 
foundations’ asset size, age, staffing ratio, sector focus, and payout rate) to describe their 
associations. 
In order to meet assumptions for conducting multiple regression analyses, I 
evaluated linearity and homoscedasticity by generating scatterplots of standardized 
residuals versus predicted values (Field, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Histograms 
of residuals also revealed problems of nonnormal distributions. For independence of 




statistics to identify potential violations of collinearity. Results of multivariate analyses 
revealed that the distribution of residuals was not normal; but assumptions of linearity, 
homoscedasticity, independence of errors, and collinearity were met. Having already 
treated nonnormally distributed variables through winsorization to mitigate influential 
outliers, as indicated by Cook’s and Mahalanobis Distance statistics, I conducted data 
analyses using the robust method of bootstrapping. I chose not to further winsorize data, 
which yielded diminishing returns on improving normality of residuals, and chose not to 
transform data, which changes the construct being examined from arithmetic means to 
geometric means and is not preferable when using interpretable, meaningful data (Field, 
2013, p. 202). 
Hypotheses Testing 
I used multiple linear regression to test the first hypothesis that foundations’ firm-
level traits (i.e., size, age, staffing level, and sector focus) predict their payout rate. I used 
multiple regression analysis to also test the second hypothesis that foundations’ traits and 
spending behavior influence their grantees’ financial condition. To test the third 
hypothesis that foundation’s payout-to-net asset ratios mediates the relationship between 
their firm-level traits and their grantees’ financial health, I used the indirect effects 
approach for identifying mediation (Field, 2013; Hayes, 2013). 
Calculating the Indirect Effect 
I used Hayes’s PROCESS v2.13, a SPSS add-on macro for statistical mediation 
analysis. PROCESS uses an ordinary least squares regression-based path analytic 




tool calculates and reports the unstandardized regression coefficients of the indirect, 
direct, and total effects using bias-corrected analysis of bootstrapped samples with 
replacement (Hayes, 2013). As shown in Figure 1, the indirect effect is the mediation 
pathway (A x B), the direct effect controls for payout (C’), and the total effect (C) is the 
simple relationship between X and Y. Using PROCESS, I explored the pathways of 
relationships and looked for an indirect effect, with each model distinguished by 
examining separately the influencer variables of foundations’ size, age, staffing, and 
sector focus. Because of its use of bootstrapping, PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) applies a 
robust, nonparametric method that does not depend on meeting assumptions of normality 
in order to identify mediation (Field, 2013, p. 352; see also Lambert, Negash, Stillman, 
Olmstead, Fincham, 2012). 
I reported the unstandardized regression coefficients and confidence intervals of 
the direct and indirect effects (Field, 2013) based on 1,000 bootstrapped samples. 
Significant relationships exist if the confidence intervals do not include zero (Field, 
2013). If the presence of a significant indirect effect was detected, I reported the size of 
the indirect effect using Preacher and Kelley’s (2011) kappa-squared value (k2), which is 
the maximum possible size of the indirect effect (Field, 2013, p. 413). Although the result 
of the Sobel z test (1982) continues to be popularly reported (Jose, 2013; Tabachnick & 






There are a few limitations that may affect the interpretation and replicability of 
this study. Without the benefit of preceding studies on how foundations’ characteristics 
and spending behavior impact beneficiaries of the charitable sector at large, the choice of 
variables that could help explain how funders influence grantees was based on an 
educated guess from direct, anecdotal professional experience and on complementary, 
albeit indirectly associated, research (Boris et al., 2008; Kim & Van Ryzin, 2014; 
McAllister, 2005; McGlaughon, 2013; Renz, 2012; Sansing, 2010; Sansing & Yetman, 
2006; Yoder & McAllister, 2012). To that end, the use of mediating regression was 
meant to detect only the pathways of relationships between the two entities and, if the 
mediating path was found to be significant, to account for how much foundation payout 
rate contributed to grantees’ financial condition in a moment of economic strength. If no 
significant relationships were found, other variables should be explored to explain how 
and to what extent foundations contribute to their grantees’ capacity. In other words, the 
results of this study should not be interpreted as a conclusion on whether or not 
foundations affect grantees, but rather as an exploration of the possible ways that 
foundations might exert an influence. 
Another consideration is that the conceptual framework precludes drawing any 
conclusions on how foundations affect grantee organizations generally. Because data 
were gathered on only three of however many organizations that received top-dollar grant 
amounts, the findings reflect only the relationships between funders and their most 




amounts). Hence, the this study is limited to understanding the relationship between 
funders and their favored beneficiaries and not between foundations and public charities 
generally. 
Threats to Validity 
Because of the relatively underdeveloped nature of private foundation research, 
this study was not able to benefit from already-established and tested theoretical or 
conceptual frameworks. As such, this study suffers from problems that typically arise 
from such situations. The validity of adapting a public accountability framework for this 
subject matter cannot be corroborated or defended by preceding studies from within the 
field. Moreover, the use of this theoretical premise may be easily dismissed by those who 
opine that the only valid theoretical framework is foundations’ accountability to owners’ 
interests. 
Another validity concern is that the error rate and reliability of 990-PF data 
remain unknown. Froelich and Knoepfle (1996) found that public charities’ 990 data 
were generally reliable, but there have not been similar studies testing if 990-PF data 
provide an accurate account of foundations’ finances and grantmaking activities. In 
addition, Yoder et al. (2011) suggested that foundations distort their investment expenses 
as charitable activities in order to spend less, but such uncharitable behavior is mitigated 
by oversight and regulations (Desai & Yetman, 2005; Fisman & Hubbard, 2005). In 
general though, private foundations, unlike public charities, afford tax preparation 




not more so, as public charities. Given that 990 data were found to be generally reliable, 
990-PF data may be even more accurate in representing foundations. 
Summary 
In order to identify pathways of relationships and mediating effects, I used 





Chapter 4: Results of Analysis 
The purpose of this research was to describe the pathways of relationships by 
which foundations’ traits and charitable spending behavior may affect their grantee 
organizations’ financial health. Models were created of whole and segmented variables to 
test which firm-level traits—size, age, staffing level, or sector focus—influenced their 
payout behavior; which, if any, of these firm-level traits directly affected grantees’ 
MULNA; and which firm-level traits were associated with MULNA through the mediator 
of payout rate. This chapter provides an overview of the process for determining the 
composition of the sampling frame and the sample. I report the results of testing for 
goodness of fit of the data and for biases, which include exploratory univariate analyses 
of the variables and multivariate analyses of residuals. I also provide descriptive statistics 
describing the variables and bivariate relationships of treated data. Finally, I present the 
findings of hypotheses testing. 
Sample Selection 
Observations were collected from the NCCS 2006 Core File, which included 
88,223 foundations. Based on the sample selection process described in the previous 
chapter and summarized in Table 2, this number was reduced to 33,621 unique 





Sampling Frame Selection 





Foundations that filed 990-PF in tax year 2006 as reflected 
in the 2006 Core File provided by Urban Institute’s 
National Center for Charitable Statistics. 
88,223 88,223 
Require only private foundations. (LEVEL1: Selected 
“PF”) 
<25,668> 62,555 
Require only in-scope domestic foundations. (outnccs: 
Selected “IN”) 
<212> 62,343 
Require only private nonoperating foundations. 
(P7POFCLM: Selected “N”) 
<1,479> 60,864 
Require only entities with a private nonoperating purpose 
as stated reason for 501(c)(3) status. (FNDNCD: 
Selected “4”) 
<370> 60,494 
Eliminate mutual benefit organizations. (ntmaj10 & 
ntmaj12: Custom Filter “Does not contain ‘MU’”) 
<24> 60,470 
Require net investment income greater than or equal to 
$10,000 to ensure inclusion of endowed foundations 
(per Yoder & McAllister, 2012). (P1NETINV: 
Custom Filter for “greater than or equal to 10000”) 
<24,182> 36,288 
Eliminate “pass-through” foundations with assets of less 
than $100,000 (per Boris et al., 2008). (P2TASFMV: 
Custom Filter for Total Assets that is “greater than or 
equal to 100000”) 
<1,365> 34,923 
Require charitable spending. (P1TEXMEX: Custom Filter 
for Total Charitable Spending that is “greater than or 
equal to $1,000”) 
<969> 33,954 
Eliminate foundations without ruling date which is 
necessary in calculating age (per Yoder & McAllister, 
2012). (RULEDATE: Greater than 0) 
<333> 33,621 
Unique foundations included in sampling frame  33,621 
 
Based on this sampling frame, I then stratified the 33,621 foundations by 
organizational asset size (small, medium, and large foundations). Based on the 




needing a sample size of 204 foundations, so I selected randomly 68 foundations from 
each stratum using Microsoft Excel’s random number generator for a total sample size of 
612 cases (see Table 3). Looking up each sampled foundation’s tax return, I manually 
data-entered the information necessary for calculating study variables and identified the 
top three grantees by awarded total dollar amounts. For those foundations that did not list 
enough public charities as grantees or did not complete their tax returns in such a way as 
to calculate study variables, I skipped to the next foundation identified through the Excel 
random number generator. 
Table 3 







% of total in each 
stratum Sample size 
Sampling 
fraction 
Small ($50 million 
or less) 32,527 97 68 1/478.3 
Medium (more than 
$50 million, less 
than $500 million) 
999 3 68 1/14.7 
Large ($500 million 
or more) 95 0.3 68 1/1.4 
Total foundations 33,621 100 204 1/164.8 
Total grantee 
organizations   
x 3 grantees 
= 612 cases  
 
Exploratory Data Analyses 
I used SPSS to conduct exploratory, univariate analysis for missing, 




multivariate analysis of residuals using hierarchical multiple regression to check for 
potential violations of assumptions. 
Nonrepresentational Data 
I did not have any missing data. I identified, however, two cases of 
nonrepresentative data identified by their extremely high standardized values. Both cases 
had the highest MULNA values with z-scores of 14.3 and 6.8. The unusually high 
MULNA value was likely due to close relationships between the grantees and their 
funders. In both cases, the foundations and grantee organizations shared the same names 
of their founders, which likely explains the unusually large grant amounts distributed to 
these two grantees. Because the focus of study was on public charities that receive 
external foundation support and not on insider or pass-through relationships, I replaced 
these two cases with public charities that received the next-highest award amounts. 
Influential Residuals and Univariate Normality 
During exploratory analysis, a visual review of the histograms and statistical 
measures of skewness and kurtosis revealed that the variables of foundations’ size, 
staffing ratio, sector focus, payout rate, and grantees’ MULNA were nonnormally 
distributed with problems of influential cases. 
In order to avoid problems of interpretation and avoid deleting cases that 
legitimately reflected the population, I winsorized outliers until all cases did not exceed 
standardized values of 3.29 (Field, 2013). I chose winsorizing over trimming: Trimming 
would have removed extreme cases of large foundations, staffing ratios, payout rate, and 




data transformation because each variable’s raw values are meaningful and data 
transforming would have changed the construct being measured (Field, 2013, pp. 198–
202). 
Improving the shape of univariate distributions through winsorization may not 
have been necessary, but it was undertaken as a conservative measure to ensure that 
outliers did not exert too much of an influence. This study used a large enough sample 
size (greater than 40) that distributions should approximate normal (Ghasemi & 
Zahediasl, 2012). Furthermore, some statisticians have argued that normality of 
univariate variable distributions is not required; instead residuals must be normally 
distributed (Chen, Ender, Mitchell, & Wells, 2014). However, correcting for influential 
residuals through winsorization should improve the generalizability of statistical findings 
to the overall population by avoiding having extreme values skew the results. The 
following describes pre- and post-winsorized treatment of data. 
In the case of foundations’ asset size, visual examination of the histogram 
suggested nonnormal distribution, which statistical analysis confirmed. The value of 
skewness was 4.84, indicating a positive skew and kurtosis was 28.24, indicating the 
shape was considerably leptokurtic. There were 33 cases with z-score values greater than 
3.29, indicating a problem with univariate outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013, p. 73). I 
winsorized these extreme cases until none exceeded a z-score of 3.29. As a result, the 
data became more normally distributed with skewness near normal at 1.81 and a normal 




Looking at the histogram of foundations’ age suggested that the data were 
normally distributed. Skewness (.58) and kurtosis (-.86) values confirmed normal 
distribution, and none of the standardized values exceeded a z-score of 3.29. Therefore, 
the raw values of age were used in statistical analysis. 
Foundations’ staffing ratio was nonnormally distributed. A visual examination of 
the histogram indicated nonnormal distribution, which statistical measures confirmed. 
Skewness was 1.78 and kurtosis was 3.57 indicating that the distribution was somewhat 
positively skewed and nearly normally peaked. Some z-scores exceeded 3.29, and so a 
total of 15 cases were winsorized to fall within the z-score threshold of 3.29. As a result 
of winsorization, skewness slightly improved to 1.28 and kurtosis improved to within 
normal range of .79. 
A visual review of the histogram for foundations’ payout rate indicated that the 
data were right skewed and leptokurtic, which statistical analysis confirmed. Skewness 
was 4.65 and kurtosis was 23.7, indicating a sharp leptokurtic peak. Standardized values 
were also extreme, indicating a problem with outliers. A total of 33 cases were 
winsorized so that none exceeded a standardized value of 3.29. As a result of this 
treatment, skewness improved to 2.29 and kurtosis was much improved to a value of 
4.74, indicating a moderate peak. 
The outcome variable of grantee organizations’ MULNA was also nonnormally 
distributed according to the histogram. Nonnormal distribution was confirmed by 
statistical analysis. Skewness was 3.14 and kurtosis was 12.84 indicating the variable was 




upon reviewing standardized values, which were very high. A total of 21 cases of 
MULNA were winsorized to not exceed a z-score value of 3.29. As a result of 
winsorization, distribution was nearly normal: Skewness was reduced to 1.94 and 
kurtosis was greatly reduced to within a near-normal range of 3.89. 
Having treated outliers through winsorization, I then examined Cook’s and 
Mahalanobis Distance values to identify residuals that might exert an influence on the 
data. The largest Cook’s Distance value was .07, indicating that none of the cases exerted 
an inordinate influence (Field, 2013, p. 306). Given that the study had five influencer 
variables and a sample size greater than 500, any case with a Mahalanobis Distance 
greater than 25 would have indicated a problem with influencers (Fields, 2013, p. 307). 
After treating extreme values, the largest Mahalanobis Distance value was 22.47, 
indicating no problem with residuals. Winsorization greatly improved the Mahalanobis 
Distance, which was originally 67.14 when using only raw, nonwinsorized values. 
Overall, I winsorized 33 foundation size cases, 15 foundation staffing ratio cases, 
33 foundation payout cases, and 21 grantee MULNA cases that, in total, accounted for 
16.7% of the sample size. I did not winsorize or treat in any other way the variables 
foundation age or sector. All data, analyses, and findings reported in the narrative and 
displayed in tables and figures reflect winsorized values of size, staffing, payout, and 
MULNA, and original values of age and sector, unless otherwise noted. Because none of 
the variables were transformed, all numerical values reflect arithmetic means, meaning 
that they are interpretable, meaningful data reflecting dollars, age in years, ratios of 




Multivariate Analysis of Residuals 
Regression tests require that the data must meet assumptions of normality, 
linearity, homoscedasticity, independence of errors, and collinearity (Field, 2013). 
Multivariate analyses of residuals were performed using hierarchical linear regression, 
with winsorized size, age, winsorized staffing, and sector focus entered in the first block 
and winsorized payout rate entered in the second block regressed onto the outcome 
variable of winsorized MULNA. 
The histogram for residuals showed a nonnormal distribution that was positively 
skewed and peaked. A visual examination was also used to identify linearity: The plot of 
standardized residuals versus predicted values revealed a linear relationship without any 
curvature of the line. A review of the same scatterplot indicated heteroscedasticity with 
the shape of the scatter resembling a rectangular pattern. In addition, the Durbin-Watson 
value of 1.92 indicated that the assumption of independence of errors was met. Regarding 
multicollinearity, the tolerance statistic was .97 and VIF was 1.03, indicating that there 
was no violation of collinearity. 
In conclusion, assumptions of linearity, homoscedasticity, independence of errors, 
and collinearity were met, while the distribution of residuals was not normal. These 
results indicated the need to use a robust method that does not require normality (Field, 
2013, p. 352). I used the robust method of bootstrapping when conducting multiple 





This section describes the sample based on univariate and bivariate statistical 
analyses. 
Univariate Analysis 
Table 4 describes the characteristics of the variables in their original, 
unwinsorized, state. Table 5 displays the characteristics of the sample once winsorized. 
All analyses, hereafter, reflect winsorized values. As evident in Table 5, foundation 
characteristics varied greatly based on asset size and age, yet were rather homogenous in 
terms of their professionalization, support outside of the arts, and payout rate. Regarding 
foundation size, they ranged from those with less than $250,000 to very large funders 
with over $2 billion. There was also a range of ages, although most have been operating 
for approximately a generation (i.e., roughly 25 years; see Seppanen & Gualtieri, 2012). 
Foundations spent little on professional staffing relative to the asset size of the 
organization, from all volunteer-run operations and up to 1.2% of assets spent on staffing. 
In addition, most of the foundations in this sample met or exceeded slightly the federally 
legislated 5% minimum payout requirement. 
Sampled grantee organizations’ months of unrestricted, liquid net assets varied 
greatly. The average level of reserves would keep an organization afloat for 
approximately 1.5 years, but the outsized amount of MULNA by the best-supported 
organizations skewed this picture. A more accurate measure of the financial health of this 
pool is most likely reflected by the median of seven months of MULNA. The smallest 




nearly 246 months (or 20 ½ years) of liquid, unrestricted assets. The MULNA sizes of 
this sample were much healthier than the vulnerable MULNA averages in the field 
(Blackwood & Pollak, 2009; Lam & McDougle, 2012), because what is reflected here 
were the best-supported grantees of sampled foundations. 
Table 4 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Sampled Foundations and Grantees’ Characteristics Using 
Original Values 
Variable Range Mean Median SD 
Foundations’ total 
asset size 
(n = 612) 
$214,560–
$12,252,645,528 $601,535,269 $84,060,306 $1,444,662,647 
Foundations’ age 
in years as of 2007 
(n = 612) 
1–79 28 22 20 
Foundations’ ratio 
of staffing 
expenses to total 
assets (n = 612) 





assets (n = 612) 
1%–56% 7% 5% 7% 
Grantees’ 







Descriptive Statistics of Sampled Foundations and Grantees’ Characteristics Using 
Winsorized Values 




(n = 612) 
$214,560–
$2,213,867,840 $415,216,619 $84,060,306 $626,086,948 
Foundations’ age 
in years as of 2007 
(n = 612) 
1–79 28 22 20 
Winsorized 
foundations’ ratio 
of staffing  
expenses to total 
assets (n = 612) 






assets (n = 612) 
0.5%–17% 6% 5% 3% 
Winsorized 
grantees’ MULNA 
(n = 612) 
-73–107 18 7 27 
Note. Foundations’ age was not winsorized because it was normally distributed. 
 
Regarding the dummy variable of foundations’ sector focus, I manually identified 
28 foundations that supported considerably arts and culture organizations, that described 
a focus on the arts through conducting online research, or are known in the philanthropic 
field as an arts funder. Arts-focused foundations were identified in order to operationalize 
grantee organizations that are more dependent on private foundation than on public 
sources of support. This variable was tested for its association with payout and MULNA 




Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for each category of arts and non-arts 
foundations. Arts foundations were larger, older, and conserved more of their charitable 
spending than non-arts foundations. In addition, grantee organizations of arts-dedicated 
foundations fared slightly better financially than grantees supported by non-arts 
foundations (20 versus 17 months of reserves). 
Table 6 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Foundations’ and Grantees’ Characteristics Varied by Sector 
Focus 
Arts focused (n = 84) Non-arts focused (n = 528) Variable M SD M SD 
Winsorized 
foundation size $944,992,712 $836,505,358 $330,934,059 $540,745,657 








5% 1% 6% 4% 
Winsorized 
grantee MULNA 20 33 17 26 
 
I also segmented data into categories for subgroup analyses. Table 7 displays 
descriptive information about each variable treated categorically. (The winsorization of 





Foundation and Grantee Variables Segmented Categorically 
Categorical variable n % Categorical variable n % 
Foundation size   Foundation focus   
 Large 204 33.3  Non-arts 528 86.3 
 Medium 204 33.3  Arts 84 13.7 
 Small 204 33.3 Foundation payout   
Foundation age in years    Aggressive >7% 102 16.7 
 > 50 111 18.1  Average 4–6.9% 441 72.1 
 26–49 156 25.5  Conserve <3.9% 69 11.3 
 < 25 345 56.4 Grantees’ MULNA   
Foundation staffing    Strong >24 mo. 137 22.4 
 No expenses 243 39.7  Stable 3–23.9 mo. 289 47.2 
 Any expenses 369 60.3  Vulnerable <2.9 mo. 132 21.6 
     Failure risk =deficit 54 8.8 
 
Subgroups for each category were created in the following ways. 
• Foundations’ size was segmented equally through disproportionate stratified 
sampling into three main asset size types (large > $500 million, medium = 
$499,999,999–$50,000,001, small < $50 million). 
• Foundations’ age was divided by 25 years, which roughly spans one 
generation (see Seppanen & Gualtieri, 2012). Dividing this continuous 




young (< 25 years of age). Only 18% of them were older than 50 years, which 
predates federal recognition of private foundations through the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969. This distribution by age reflects the trend of rapid acceleration in 
the number of foundations established since the 1980s (Foundation Center, 
2012a). 
• Foundations’ ratio of professional staffing was split into those with staffing 
costs and those that expended nothing on staffing. This variable was 
segmented in this way because there is little variation in the proportion of total 
assets a foundation expends on staffing. Most reported expending some 
amount on staffing (60%), but even they expended little as evident in Tables 4 
and 5. Hence, this segmentation dichotomizes all-voluntary and staffed 
institutions. 
• Foundations’ sector was a dummy category (non-arts was coded “0,” arts-
focused was coded “1”) to distinguish between those that focus on giving to 
arts and culture and those that do not, thus operationalizing grantees of arts 
funders who depend largely on private foundations’ support and those in 
sectors that depend mostly on other sources of income. Most foundations were 
categorized as non-arts with only 13.7 % deemed to be arts-specific in focus. 
However, the proportion of foundations that prioritized the arts was likely an 
undercount as this number was manually generated based on a review of their 
grantee list from a single tax year, an online search of foundations’ websites, 




• Foundations’ payout rate was categorized into three subgroups—expending at 
7% or more of noncharitable-use assets that may result in sunsetting 
(Cambridge, 2000; Ostrower, 2011), expending between 4–6.9% that is 
roughly the average payout rate affirmed by other studies (Cambridge, 2000; 
Renz, 2012), and expending at less than 3.9% in order to conserve assets for 
future spending (Cambridge, 2000). 
• Grantee organizations’ MULNA was segmented into four categories. Most 
studies of MULNA make fewer categorical distinctions, typically only noting 
weak (fewer than three months) and stable (three or more months) financial 
conditions (Blackwood & Pollak, 2009; Bowman, 2011b; Foley, n.d.; Konrad 
and Novak, 2000; Kurre, 2010; Lam & McDougle, 2012; Nelson & Koo, 
2014; NORI, 2010). I wanted a more nuanced look at MULNA, and so I 
categorized MULNA by those that are strong (retaining two or more years), 
stable (three months to nearly two years), weak (under three months), and 
failure risk (deficit). Weak and failure risk types of grantees are both 
vulnerable to closure, but any deficit MULNA position indicates that the 
organization is at imminent risk of failing to operate and was, therefore, called 
out separately. This study sampled the most-supported grantees and, 
unsurprisingly, most grantee organizations were stable or strong (n = 426 or 





I conducted bivariate analyses using Pearson’s correlation coefficients with and 
without 1,000 bootstrapped samples to examine relationships between foundations’ 
influencer variables and their giving behavior and grantee organizations’ MULNA. The 
relationship of the dichotomous variable, sector focus, was examined using point-biserial 
correlations (Field, 2013, p. 279). Because bootstrapping made no difference to the 
output, I only reported the results of the nonbootstrapped analysis so as to include 
significance levels. 
Table 8 
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0.235 (.000) 0.208 (.000)    
Foundation sector 
focus 




-0.121 (.003) -0.131 (.001) -0.087 (.032) -0.123 (.002)  
Winsorized grantee 
MULNA 
0.040 (.320) -0.018 (.663) .0025 (.533) 0.030 (.462) 0.012 (.772) 




As shown in Table 8, there was no significant bivariate association between any 
of the foundation characteristics and the outcome variable of MULNA. On the other 
hand, there were significant relationships between foundations’ firm-level 
characteristics—size, age, staffing, and sector focus—and the mediator variable of 
payout. Foundations’ payout rate was significantly and inversely related to all firm-level 
characteristics. The larger, older, and more professionally staffed a foundation, the less 
those foundations expended charitably. In addition, sector and payout were negatively 
correlated, indicating that arts-focused foundations charitably spent less as a ratio of their 
investment assets than did non-arts funders. The connection between size and staffing 
with payout rate was in line with prior research that concluded that large, professionally 
managed foundations expended close to the legal minimum in order to preserve their 
financial corpus (Yoder & McAllister, 2012). 
In addition, there were significant correlations amongst foundations’ firm-level 
characteristics of size, age, staffing, and sector focus. All these relationships were 
positively related: The greater a foundation’s size, the older the foundation, the more it 
spends on professional staffing, and the more likely it supports the arts. Despite 
relationships amongst the influencer variables, tolerance and VIF statistics were all 
within range (Field, 2013, p. 342), indicating that multicollinearity was not an issue. 
Results from Multivariate Analyses 
Through a series of bootstrapped ordinary least squares linear regressions using 
SPSS, I explored the determinants of payout rate and the pathways of relationships 




used the PROCESS macro to identify indirect effects that would indicate the mediating 
role of the payout rate in the association between foundations and beneficiaries. I 
conducted analyses on whole and segmented variables in testing each hypothesis. I 
reported statistics on the predictive value of the overall model as well as the model 
parameters according to standards described by Vesey, Vesey, Stroter, and Middleton 
(2011). In addition, I provided both unstandardized (b) and standardized (β) regression 
coefficients because the former are understandable real-world units of measurement (i.e., 
dollars and time) and the latter allows for comparisons among the coefficients. 
Testing Hypothesis 1: Pathway A 
I explored the answer to Research Question 1: Do private, nonoperating 
foundations’ firm-level characteristics of asset size, age, staffing ratio, or sector focus 
influence their charitable behavior? This question tested the hypothesis that foundations’ 
firm-level traits are determinants of payout rate. This line of inquiry enabled an 
exploration of the influencers of payout rate in order to isolate the firm-level factors that 
may comprise a mediation pathway. 
Using SPSS, the outcome variable of winsorized payout rate was regressed on 
influencer variables of winsorized size, age, winsorized staffing ratio, and sector focus. 
The influencer variables were entered simultaneously. The results of the regression 
analysis are shown in Table 9. Both unstandardized (b) and standardized (β) regression 
coefficients are reported, and unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, significance 
levels, and 95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals (reported in 




Using the enter method, this model was found to be significant, F(4, 607) = 4.828, 
p = .001, R2 = .031, R2adjusted = .024. This model did not identify any significant 
associations between foundations’ size and payout rate (b = 0.000 [0.000, 0.000]) or 
between staffing and payout ratios (b = -0.784 [-2.154, 0.489], p = .288). In both cases, 
confidence intervals included zero, indicating that size and staffing did not predict 
charitable giving behavior (Field, 2013). On the other hand, there were conflicting results 
regarding the relationship between age and payout. When foundations age by one year, 
their payout rate decreases slightly (-0.000138 [-0.000273, -0.000007], p = .051). The 
confidence interval did not include zero, but the probability value of .051 was not 
significant. This result suggests a reason to investigate further the relationship between 
age and payout, which was also tested in models of indirect effects. 
Of the firm-level traits, only foundations’ sector was identified as significantly 
associated with payout. The payout rate of arts foundations was only 0.008% less than 





Linear Model of Predictors of Foundation Payout Rate 









0.000 -.051 .133 









0.741 -.046 .288 
Foundation sector focus 
-0.008 
(-0.011, -0.004) 
0.002 -.079 .001 
Note. Age reported in the ten thousandths in order to show its small regression value. 
R2 = .031 (p = .001) 
 
Subgroup analyses. Age was not significantly associated with payout, but its 
confidence interval suggested a significant relationship. Hence, I conducted subgroup 
analyses to identify the types of foundation characteristics that may explain a possible 
association between age and payout rate. I used SPSS to conduct bootstrapped linear 
regressions with 1,000 samples, generating 95% bias corrected and accelerated 
confidence intervals. 
Subgroup analyses revealed that age and payout rate were significantly associated 
only among foundations with certain characteristics. 
• Large foundations’ age was significantly related to payout rate (b = -0.000219 
[-0.000387, -0.000065], p = .024. As large foundations age by one year, their 




entered simultaneously and filtered by size levels, accounted for 6.5% of their 
payout rate, F(4, 199) = 3.45, p = .009, R2 = .065, R2adjusted = .046. 
• Average-distributing private foundations’ age was a determinant of payout 
rate (b = -0.000046 [-0.000073, -0.000015], p = .002). In other words, among 
foundations that distributed close to the legal requirement of 5% payout, their 
payout rate can be predicted by age, but only marginally so. This model, with 
size, age, sector, and staffing entered simultaneously and filtered by levels of 
payout rate, only explained 3.6% of average-distributing funders’ payout rate, 
F(4, 436) = 4.117, p = .003, R2 = .036, R2adjusted = .028. 
• Professionally staffed foundations’ age impacted payout rate (b = -0.000231  
[-0.000365, -0.000116], p = .001). As professionally staffed foundations age 
each year, their payout rate declines by 0.00023%. This model, with size, age, 
staffing, and sector entered simultaneously and filtered by staffing status, 
accounted for 6% of professionally staffed foundations’ payout rate, F(4, 364) 
= 5.829, p = .000, R2 = .06, R2adjusted = .05. 
• Arts-focused foundations’ age significantly predicted payout (b = -0.000099  
[-0.000178, -0.000016], p = .018). As arts-focused institutions age, their 
payout rate declines by 0.0001%. The model, with size, age, and staffing held 
constant and filtered by sector, explained 15% of arts foundations’ payout 




In sum, foundations’ age influenced payout rate in cases of large, professionally 
managed, arts-focused foundations that conserved charitable distributions to the legal 
minimum. 
Further subgroup analysis of age, with foundations’ size, age, staffing, and sector 
entered simultaneously and filtered by age levels, revealed that oldest foundations’ size 
and staffing characteristics were significantly associated with payout rate, F(4, 106) = 
8.567, p = .000, R2 = .244, R2adjusted = .216. This result is shown in Table 10, which 
displays unstandardized coefficients (b), standard errors, significance levels, and 95% 
bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals (reported in parentheses) based on 
1,000 bootstrapped samples. As the asset sizes of the sector’s oldest foundations 
increased by $1 billion, their payout rate declined by 0.013%. Also, for every unit 
increase in staffing, mature foundations reduced payout by 5.6%. This model of the most 





Linear Model of Oldest Foundations’ Characteristics that Influenced Payout Rate 




0.024 - .001 




0.000 -.275 .008 









1.440 -.338 .006 
Foundation sector focus 
-0.005 
(-0.013, 0.004) 
0.004 -.061 .173 
R2 = .244 (p = .000) 
Overall, the findings of subgroup analyses by age revealed that the association 
between age and payout was significant only among the largest and oldest foundations, 
foundations dedicated to the arts, professionally staffed institutions, and those that 
distributed close to the minimum payout requirement. Their regression coefficients were 
negative values, indicating that wealth, maturity, dedication to the arts, and 
professionalization have a cooling effect on the proportion of wealth distributed 
charitably. 
Beyond testing subgroups by age, additional models were tested by subgroups of 
foundations’ winsorized size, winsorized staffing, and sector focus on winsorized payout 
rate. I used SPSS to run bootstrapped multiple linear regressions with 1,000 samples 




When analyzed by the subgroup of size, large foundations’ (F(4, 199) = 3.45, p = 
.009, R2 = .065, R2adjusted = .046) and small foundations’ (F(4, 199) = 2.456, p = .047, R2 = 
.047, R2adjusted = .028) models were able to significantly predict the relationship between 
asset size and payout. Large foundations’ size was significantly associated with payout 
rate (b = 4.363E-012 [1.211E-012, 8.308E-012], p = .017). For every $1 billion increase 
in a large foundation’s asset size, payout rate increased by 0.004%. Conversely, for every 
$1 billion increase in a small foundation’s asset size, payout rate decreased by 1.216%  
(b = -1.216E-009, with 998 samples generating 95% bias corrected and accelerated 
confidence intervals of -1.735E-009, -8.189E-010). This finding suggests that already-
large foundations with holdings of over $500 million can afford a modicum increase in 
payout without risking perpetuity. On the other hand, small foundations of $214,000 to 
$50 million seemed to conserve spending as they grew larger in order to afford long-term 
or perpetual existence. 
This finding may seem to conflict with Renz’s (2012) conclusion that small 
foundations distributed at a higher rate than any other size foundation—11% median 
payout ratio versus around 5% for all other size foundations—but a direct comparison 
cannot be made. Whereas this study referred to small foundations as those with asset 
sizes under $50 million, Renz (2012) defined small as having between $10 million and 
$50 million, which was more selective. Hence, the findings of this research cannot be 
compared with that of Renz, except that both Renz’s and my efforts revealed that 




In addition, using the same models of foundations’ size, large and small 
foundations’ sector focus was also a predictor of payout. Large foundations with a 
specific focus on the arts distributed 0.005% less than large foundations outside of the 
arts (b = -.005 [-0.009, -0.002], p = .021). Similarly, small foundations with a dedicated 
arts focus distributed 0.02% less than small, non-arts foundations (b = -.024  
[-0.036, -0.014, p = .001], with the p-value and lower confidence interval based on 998 
samples and the upper confidence interval based on 998 jacknife samples computed by 
the percentile, versus BCa, method). In short, large and small arts-focused foundations 
were less generous in giving away a portion of their wealth charitably. (This finding 
complements the other finding that as arts-focused foundations age, they also tend to 
decrease spending over time.) 
When analyzed by the presence (F(4, 364) = 5.829, p = .000, R2= .06, R2adjusted = 
.05) or lack of presence (F(3, 239) = 2.685, p = .047, R2 = .033, R2adjusted = .02) of paid 
staffing, both models were significant predictors of payout rate. Among staffed 
foundations, their sector focus (b = -0.007 [-0.011, -0.005], p = .001) was significantly 
associated with payout rate. Age was already shown to influence payout rate among 
professionally staffed foundations, b =-0.000232 [-0.000365, -0.000116], p = .001, with 
staffed foundations decreasing spending as a portion of assets as they aged. Hence, in 
sum, professionally staffed arts foundations’ payout rate was 0.007% less than that of 
staffed non-arts funders, and staffed foundations’ payout decreases at a rate of 0.0002% 
for every year of operation. Among foundations without any staffing expenses, only size 




As volunteer-based funders’ total assets increased by $1 billion, their payout ratio 
decreased by 0.052%. 
When analyzed by differences in sector focus, only arts-focused foundations’ 
professionalization was a significant predictor of payout rate (b = -1.302 [-2.557, -0.223], 
p = .05). As arts foundations spent 1% more of their assets on staffing, they expended 
1.3% less of their noncharitable-use assets on charitable giving. In other words, arts 
funders’ direct provision of charitable programmatic and operational activities competed 
against their charitable spending. This model, in which size, age, and staffing were 
entered simultaneously and filtered by sector focus, was significant, F(3, 80) = 4.701, p = 
.004, R2 = .15, R2adjusted = .118. 
Subgroup analysis by the dependent variable of payout rate revealed that 
aggressive spenders who distributed at or more than 7%, (F(4, 97) = 4.533, p = .002, R2 = 
.157, R2adjusted = .123), and average spenders who paid out at 4–6.9%, (F(4, 436) = 4.117, 
p = .003, R2 = .036, R2adjusted = .028) had characteristics associated with payout rate. Those 
relationships that were found to be significant are shown in Table 11, which displays 
unstandardized coefficients (b), standard errors, significance levels, and 95% bias 
corrected and accelerated confidence intervals (reported in parentheses) based on 1,000 
bootstrapped samples unless otherwise noted. Foundations that distributed less than 4% 






Linear Models of Significant Predictors of Payout Rate Segmented by Types of 
Charitable Spenders 





* -.217 .064 Aggressive >7% 
payout rate 
(R2 = .157, p = .002) Sector focus 
-0.051 
(-0.060a b, -0.042a) 











0.000014 -.157 .002 
Average 4–6.9% 
payout rate 





0.141 -.095 .037 
a Based on 955 samples 
b Confidence interval computed by percentile method rather than BCa method 
 
Among foundations that were charitably spending aggressively at rates at or 
above 7% of noncharitable-use asset values, sector focus made a difference: Arts-
focused, aggressive expenders conserved more of their wealth. Foundations with average 
payout rates increased their payout rate when their asset sizes grew: For every $1 billion 
in corpus gain, there was a 0.0015% increase in payout rate. On the other hand, as these 
average-expending foundations’ aged and became more professionalized, their payout 
rate decreased: For every year in operation, payout rate was reduced by 0.00005%, and 
for every percentage increase in staffing expenses, payout rate decreased by 0.29%. 
In conclusion, my hypothesis that foundations’ firm-level traits influence payout 
rate was only partly confirmed. Whole group regression models showed that payout rate 
can be predicted only by sector focus. Size and staffing were not significantly associated 




detailed explanations of the kinds of foundation characteristics that influenced payout 
rate. In particular, the largest and smallest, oldest, volunteer-run and professionally 
staffed, aggressive and average expenders, and arts-focused foundations had firm-level 
characteristics that were significantly associated with payout rate. 
Testing Hypothesis 2: Total Effect Pathway 
With SPSS, I conducted linear multiple regression analysis with 1,000 
bootstrapped samples that generated 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence 
intervals. Using this statistical method, I explored the research question: By what 
pathway do foundations’ firm-level traits and charitable spending behavior affect grantee 
organizations’ MULNA? I began exploring the answer to this question by testing the 
hypothesis that foundations’ traits and payout behavior directly affect MULNA. This is 
the unmediated model (C), referred to as the “total effect” (Kenny, 2014, para. 1), which 
does not control for the mediator and reflects a simple relationship between independent 
and dependent variables (Field, 2013). 
Using the enter method, there was no significant relationship between any 
influencer variable—winsorized size, age, winsorized staffing, sector focus, or 
winsorized payout rate—and the outcome variable of winsorized MULNA, F(5, 606) = 
0.491, p = .783, R2 = .004, R2adjusted = -.004. Statistical result are shown in Table 12, 
which displays unstandardized coefficients (b), standard errors, significance levels, and 
95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals (reported in parentheses) of 
1,000 bootstrapped samples. Moreover, the model was a poor predictor (R2 = .004, p = 




grantees’ MULNA, mediation may still exist through the pathway of payout rate (Field, 
2013; Hayes, 2013), which was tested by the third hypothesis. 
Table 12 
Linear Model of Predictors of Grantee Organizations’ Financial Health 



















593.640 .022 .613 
Foundation sector focus 
1.833 
(-5.439, 9.373) 





33.537 .016 .688 
R2 = .004 (p = .783) 
Subgroup analyses. Although no relationship was detected between whole group 
foundation variables and grantees’ MULNA, I conducted further analyses of segmented 
variables using bootstrapped linear regressions in SPSS to identify the types of 
foundations that may determine differences in MULNA. Bootstrapped linear regressions 
of 1,000 samples with replacement generated 95% bias corrected and accelerated 
confidence intervals. Analyses segmented by age, staffing ratio, and payout rate 
continued to yield no significant results, but subgroup analysis by size yielded a 
significant relationship between foundations’ payout rate and grantees’ MULNA. 




entered simultaneously revealed that the payout rate of large foundations (n = 68) had a 
small, but significant, influence on grantees’ financial condition, F(5, 198) = 2.421,  
p = .037, R2 = .058, R2adjusted = .034. A 1% increase in large funders’ payout rate, which 
would be an unusually and considerably large jump in spending, would result in grantees 
having 246 more months (or nearly more 20 years) of reserves (b = 246.048 [27.682, 
551.536]). 
Further exploration of large foundations revealed that the relationship between 
their payout rate and MULNA was strengthened when further segmented by financially 
well-off grantees, F(5, 39) = 3.402, p = .012, R2 = .304, R2adjusted = .214. Large 
foundations that increased their payout rate by 1% more annually would boost already 
financially strong grantees’ reserves by over 48 years (b = 584.767 [228.507, 1946.422]). 
This model, with all other variables held constant, was a significant predictor of the 
outcome with large foundations’ payout rate accounting for 30% of financially strong 
grantees’ months of reserves. 
Additional sets of models by subgroups yielded only two more noteworthy 
results, but in both cases, the regression coefficients were significant but the models were 
not. I share them here to suggest possible directions for further research. Subgroup 
analysis by sector focus (with predictors of size, age, staffing, and payout entered 
simultaneously) indicated that arts foundations’ size may predict grantees’ MULNA (b = 
1.036E-008 [4.579E-010, 2.044E-008], with the confidence interval not passing through 
zero. In other words, for every $1 billion increase in an arts foundations’ asset size, 




significant in predicting the outcome, F(4, 79) = 1.379, p = .249, R2 = .065, R2adjusted = 
.018. Despite the lack of generalizability of this model, the significant regression 
coefficient should be considered alongside arts grantmakers’ advocacy within the field to 
deliberately improve the financial reserves of public charities (Curtis, 2010; Nelson et al., 
2009; Thomas et al., 2011). Moreover, researchers have discerned that arts grantmakers 
behave differently than their counterparts in other sectors by not reducing funding when a 
public charity successfully receives government support (Kim & Van Ryzin, 2014). 
Hence, this finding is shared to encourage further exploration of arts funders’ impact on 
grantees’ MULNA, particularly as the tenuous statistical connection reported herein may 
have some basis in the capitalization practices of arts and culture grantmakers. 
Also, subgroup analysis by grantees’ reserves indicated that staffed foundations 
may help grantees suffering from deficit MULNA balances (b = 1393.399 [214.458, 
2824.121]. The model, with influencers size, age, staffing, sector, and payout held 
constant, showed that when foundations increased their staffing expenses by 1%—which 
would be a tremendous jump given that all foundations sampled in this study expended 
an average of 0.16% of total assets on professional services (see Tables 4 and 5)—the 
financial reserves of the most financially unstable charities would increase by over 100 
years. Another way to understand this result is that grantees that are most at-risk of 
closing may be most helped by foundations with professional staffing. Such a finding 
makes intuitive sense given how much foundation program staff connect grantees to other 
funders; support capacity building; award grants that afford financial, operational, and 




suggests a direction for more exploration as this model was not a significant predictor of 
the outcome, F(5, 48) = 1.919, p = .109, R2 = .167, R2adjusted = .08. 
Testing Hypothesis 3: Indirect Effect Pathway 
In exploring the research question about pathways of relationships between 
foundations and their grantees, I tested the third hypothesis that posited that payout rate 
mediates the relationship between foundations’ firm-level traits and grantee 
organizations’ MULNA. Payout rate is a federally mandated mechanism by which 
foundations must perform a public good, and conducting path analysis enables isolating 
and identifying any influence that payout rate may have on public charities. 
I used PROCESS to conduct bias-corrected analysis of 1,000 bootstrapped 
samples with replacement. Bootstrapped unstandardized (b) regression coefficients and 
confidence intervals are reported. Due to the small sizes of the values, results are reported 
in the ten thousandths where appropriate. The indirect effect regression coefficient 
represents the change in MULNA when holding the firm-level trait constant but changing 
the payout rate by one unit (Pearl, 2001). The regression coefficient only reflects a 
genuine, indirect effect if its confidence interval does not include zero, in which case, I 
reported the k2 value of the effect size. 
For mediation to be present, the relationship between the influencer and outcome 
variables must go through another variable. This pathway is the indirect effect (A x B). If 
any part of the mediation pathway (A or B) is significant, then this finding suggests the 
possibility of an indirect effect (Hayes, n.d., #25; Jose, 2013). In answering Research 




rate, so I subjected these two influencer variables to mediation analyses, the results of 
which are reported here. I also tested models of the other two influencer variables—size 
and staffing ratio—for an indirect effect, but these were not found to be significant. 
I ran two separate models of foundations’ age and foundations’ sector focus. 
Although the assumption of collinearity was met, these two influencer variables were 
significantly correlated; therefore, bootstrapped regressions were run for each influencer 
variable separately rather than simultaneously (Hayes, 2013, p. 195). I used the original 
values of age and sector focus, and the winsorized values of payout rate and MULNA. 
As shown in Figure 2, the model of foundations’ age did not detect the presence 
of mediation (b = -0.002, 95% BCa CI [-0.021, 0.012], and its indirect effect size (k2 = 
.001, 95% BCa CI [.000, .004]) was small. Confidence intervals included zero, thereby 
indicating a nonsignificant result. 
 
Figure 2. Model of foundations’ age as a predictor of MULNA not mediated by payout. 
Likewise, as shown in Figure 3, the model of foundations’ sector focus did not 




indirect effect size was small (k2 = .002, 95% BCa CI [.000, .007]). Both confidence 
intervals included zero, indicating there was no significant result. 
 
Figure 3. Model of foundations’ sector focus as a predictor of MULNA not mediated by 
payout. 
In both models of foundations’ age and sector focus, statistical analyses displayed 
in the form of a path diagram (as shown in Figures 2 and 3) and table of statistical indices 
(see Tables 13 and 14) revealed that there was no significant indirect effect whereby 
payout rate acted as a mediator of age or sector focus in predicting grantees’ MULNA. 
Regarding the predictive value of pathway A of both age and sector models, both were 
significant but revealed that age was but a small factor in determining payout rate (F(1, 
610) = 10.634, p = .001, R2 = .017), and that sector focus similarly exerted a minor 
influence in effecting payout rate (F(1, 610) = 9.316, p = .002, R2 = .015). Pathway B of 





Mediation Model Coefficients for Foundations’ Age 
  Outcomes 
  M (payout rate)  Y (MULNA) 
Influencer Path b SE p Path b SE p 
Age A -0.0002 0.0001 .001 C’ -0.0219 0.0545 .6882 
     B 7.7027 32.8342 .8146 
  R2 = .017 
F(1, 610) = 10.634, p = .001 
 R2 = .0004 
F(2, 609) = 0.123, p = .885 
 
Table 14 
Mediation Model Coefficients for Foundations’ Sector 
  Outcomes 
  M (payout rate)  Y (MULNA) 
Influencer Path b SE p Path b SE p 
Sector A -0.0120 0.0039 .002 C’ 2.4873 3.2011 .437 
     B 12.5527 32.7874 .702 
  R2 = .0150 
F(1, 610) = 9.316, p = .002 
 R2 = .0011 
F(2, 609) = 0.344, p = .709 
 
Subgroup mediation analyses. Results of subgroup analyses from testing the 
first two hypotheses suggested the possibility of an indirect effect among certain types of 
foundations and grantees—foundations that are large or small, the most mature, 




expenders, as well as financially strong grantee organizations. Hence, additional sets of 
models were tested of categorical differences by size, maturity level, staffing status, 
sector focus, payout rate, and grantees’ level of reserves (see Table 7). I used PROCESS 
to conduct bias-corrected analyses of 1,000 bootstrapped samples with replacement to 
detect the presence of mediation. Ultimately, only size and age subcategories influenced 
MULNA through the indirect path of payout rate. No other subgroup analyses yielded 
significant results. 
Only among large foundations with assets over $500 million did payout rate 
mediate the association between foundations’ age and MULNA (see Figure 4). The 
confidence interval for the indirect effect was 95% BCa CI based on 1,000 bootstrapped 
samples of 204 cases. First, regarding pathway A, large foundations’ age was negatively 
related to payout, b = -0.0002, t (202) = -3.107, p = .002, and this model was significant 
(F(1, 202) = 9.65, p = .002, R2 = .046). Second, regarding pathway B, payout rate was 
positively related to grantees’ MULNA, b = 239.43, t (201) = 2.745, p = .007, and this 
model, too, was significant (F(2, 201) = 3.77, p = .025, R2 = .036). Finally, there was an 
indirect effect of large foundations’ age on MULNA through payout rate (b = -0.052, 
95% BCa CI [-0.148, -0.006]), which represents a relatively small, but significant, effect 
size (k2 = .041, 95% BCa CI [.005, .112]). Regarding the direct effect pathway whereby 
large foundations’ age affects MULNA when controlled for payout rate, results indicated 
that this C’ pathway was not significant, b = 0.045, t (202) = .512, p = .61, although the 




suggest that the payout rate of the largest foundations mediates the relationship between 
their age and grantee organizations’ financial health. 
 
Figure 4. Model of large foundations’ age as a predictor of MULNA significantly 
mediated by payout. 
Besides a foundations’ size, there was also a significant indirect effect when 
segmented by age. Among the oldest foundations that were established 50 or more years 
ago as of 2007, their sector focus was significantly associated with grantees’ MULNA 
through the mediator of payout rate (see Figure 5). The confidence interval for the 
indirect effect was 95% BCa CI based on 1,000 bootstrapped samples of 111 cases. 
Pathway A was significant: The sector focus of the oldest foundations was negatively 
related to payout rate (b = -0.016, t (109) = -2.203, p = .03) indicating that mature, non-
arts funders paid out at a greater rate than their counterparts funding the arts. The model 
of pathway A was significant (F(1, 109) = 4.854, p = .03, R2 = .043). On the other hand, 
pathway B was not significant: Oldest foundations’ payout rate was not significantly 




model was not predictive (F(2, 108) = 1.206, p = .304, R2 = .023). Although pathway B 
was not significant, individual pathways of the A x B route do not need to be significant 
in order for mediation to be present (Hayes, n.d., #25), which departs from the now-
outdated mediation approach described by Baron and Kenny in 1986 (Field, 2013; Hayes, 
2013). Such was the case here: The indirect effect was significant (b = 1.889, 95% BCa 
CI [0.080, 4.640]), with a small, but significant, effect size (k2 = .03, 95% BCa CI [.004, 
.075]). The direct effect path (C’) of foundations’ sector focus on MULNA when 
controlling for payout rate was not significant, b = 0.709, t (109) = .116, p = .908, and the 
model was not a significant predictor as well (F(2, 108) = 1.206, p = .304, R2 = .023). 
This combination of statistical results suggests that the relationship between sector focus 
and grantees’ MULNA was mediated by payout rate among the longest established 
foundations. 
 
Figure 5. Model of the oldest foundations’ sector focus as a predictor of MULNA 




To summarize, the hypothesis that foundations’ payout rate mediates the 
relationship between their firm-level characteristics and grantees’ financial health was not 
supported by whole group variables. Instead, there was an indirect effect with small 
effect sizes in models segmented by asset size and age. Payout rate mediated the 
association between age and MULNA among the largest foundations (b = -0.052, 95% 
BCa CI [-0.148, -0.006]) and between sector focus and MULNA among the oldest 
foundations (b = 1.889, 95% BCa CI [0.080, 4.640]). 
Conclusion 
The first hypothesis that foundations’ firm-level traits influence payout rate was 
only partially supported. Only the whole group variable of sector focus was found to play 
a small, but significant, role in contributing to payout rate. Foundations’ firm-level traits 
were more influential in determining payout behavior when examined by subgroups of 
foundations’ characteristics than by whole group variables. In summary, payout rate was 
influenced by (organized from largest to smallest effect sizes): 
• oldest foundations’ size (for every $1 billion gain, payout decreases by 0.013%, 
R2 = .244, p = .000), 
• oldest foundations’ staffing ratio (as they increase staffing, payout decreases by 
5.6%, R2 = .244, p = .000), 
• aggressive-expending foundations’ sector focus (these arts funders paid out at a 
0.051% rate less than non-arts funders, R2 = .157, p = .002), 
• arts-focused foundations’ age (as they age each year, payout decreases by 




• arts-focused staffing ratio (as they increase staffing, payout decreases by 1.302%, 
R2 = .15, p = .004), 
• large foundations’ asset size (for every $1 billion gain, payout increases by 
0.004%, R2 = .065, p = .009), 
• large foundations’ age (as they age, payout decreases by 0.00022%, R2 = .065, p = 
.009), 
• large foundations’ sector focus (large arts funders paid out at a 0.005% rate less 
than non-arts funders, R2 = .065, p = .009), 
• professionally staffed foundations’ age (as they age each year, payout decreases 
by 0.00023%, R2 = .06, p = .000), 
• professionally staffed foundations’ sector focus (staffed arts funders paid out at a 
0.007% rate less than non-arts funders, R2 = .06, p = .000), 
• small foundations’ asset size (for every $1 billion gain, payout decreases by 
1.216%, R2 = .047, p = .047), 
• small foundations’ sector focus (small arts funders paid out at a 0.024% rate less 
than non-arts funders, R2 = .047, p = .047), 
• average-expending foundations’ asset size (for every $1 billion gain, payout 
increases by 0.0015%, R2 = .036, p = .003), 
• average-expending foundations’ age (as they age each year, payout decreases by 
0.000046%, R2 = .036, p = .003), and 
• average-expending foundations’ staffing ratio (as they increase staffing, payout 




• nonprofessionally staffed foundations’ asset size (for every $1 billion gain, payout 
decreases by 0.052%, R2 = .033, p = .047). 
These findings indicate that payout rate can be better understood when examining 
specific types of foundations. 
Regarding the second hypothesis regarding the simple relationship between 
foundations’ characteristics or behavior and grantees’ MULNA, the null hypothesis was 
supported when examined by whole group variables: No foundation variable—size, age, 
staffing level, sector focus, or payout rate—directly affected grantee organizations’ 
MULNA. However, there was a significant relationship between payout rate and 
MULNA when segmented by large foundations, particularly among large foundations 
that supported already financially strong grantees. Hence, a total effect path relationship 
existed only among the largest foundations. 
Finally, the findings from testing the third hypothesis indicate that an indirect 
effect pathway existed only among certain types of foundations. First, foundations’ age 
related to grantees’ MULNA through payout rate only among the largest foundations. 
Second, foundations’ sector focus related to grantees’ MULNA through payout rate only 
among the oldest foundations. The final chapter will discuss the implications of these 





Chapter 5: Discussion, Recommendations, Conclusion 
In the absence of empirical evidence of the effect that private, nonoperating 
foundations’ payout rate has on grantees’ financial capacity, I conducted exploratory 
regressions of whole and segmented variables to understand the pathways of relationships 
amongst foundations’ firm-level traits, charitable behavior, and grantee organizations’ 
financial condition. Foundations’ firm-level traits were examined for how they contribute 
to differences in payout rates. In addition, foundations’ asset size, age, staffing ratio, 
sector focus, and payout-to-net asset ratio were examined to understand how these 
variables influence the amount of grantees’ MULNA via total effect and indirect effect 
pathways. Statistical analyses using the indirect effect approach enabled me to isolate the 
mediating role of payout in contributing to public charities’ financial capacity. 
This investigation yielded several findings. Foundations’ sector focus and the 
traits of certain types of foundations (i.e., oldest, largest, smallest, volunteer-based and 
professionally staffed, aggressive and average charitable spenders, and arts-focused 
foundations) affected funders’ payout rate. In addition, only among large foundations was 
there a total effect, with a larger effect size when large foundations support already 
financially strong grantees. Finally, payout rate acted as a mediator between foundations’ 
age and MULNA among the largest foundations, and between sector and MULNA 




Interpretation of the Findings 
Pathway A 
Regarding pathway A analysis, only foundations’ sector focus played a small part 
(R2 = .031, p = .001) in influencing payout rate, with arts-focused foundations expending 
slightly less charitably as a ratio of investment assets (.008%) than other types of 
foundations. However, when segmented by differences in foundation characteristics, 
there were numerous associations between foundations’ subgroup types and payout rate, 
with oldest foundations’ size and staffing accounting for as much as 24% of their payout 
rate. Firm-level traits among certain types of foundations (i.e., oldest, largest, smallest, 
volunteer-run, professionally staffed, aggressive spenders, average spenders, and arts-
focused foundations) were determinants of payout rate. 
The finding that certain foundation traits influenced charitable spending behavior 
is consistent with earlier research. Renz (2012) discerned that endowment size was the 
best predictor of payout ratios. Boris et al. (2008) identified foundation firm-level traits 
that were drivers of charitable administrative expenses, which count toward payout 
calculations. Boris et al. (2008) examined a broader range of foundations’ characteristics 
and expenses, such as staff size, geographic focus, operating activities, programs for 
individual giving, maintaining a website, and program-related investment activities, and 
identified paid staffing as the most important factor influencing independent foundations’ 
charitable administrative expenses, with asset size having a small effect on how 




complements their findings in identifying asset size and staffing status as characteristics 
that make a difference in charitable spending as a proportion of noncharitable-use assets. 
Total Effect 
After an extensive scan of extant literature on foundations’ effects, little research 
surfaced on the simple relationship between foundations’ charitable spending and their 
grantees’ capacity to afford mission-related work. To address that deficit, I conducted 
exploratory regression analyses of both whole and segmented data to better understand 
the connection between foundations’ traits and charitable behavior and grantees’ 
MULNA. I found that there was no direct relationship between any whole group 
foundation variables and MULNA, but there was a significant association between 
payout rate and MULNA among the sector’s largest foundations. This finding was 
particularly true for large foundations that support already financially strong public 
charities, with the model accounting for 30% of the differences in these grantees’ 
financial capacity. 
Without the benefit of an already existing theory about the unique impact that 
large foundations have on public charities, this result cannot be interpreted without an 
applicable framework and more knowledge. To that end, finding a significant relationship 
between large funders and grantees is grounds for more investigation about the unique 
impact that the nation’s largest private foundations have on grantees’ financial capacity. 
For example, perhaps this relationship can be explained by potential differences in the 
size of large funders’ grant amounts compared to mid-size and small foundations. There 




nonfinancial reasons, such as their influence as an imprimatur helping grantees secure 
more income. 
Also, the sizable impact of large foundations’ payout on already financially strong 
grantees merits further attention. Lines of inquiry include whether or not large 
foundations reward already financially well-off public charities, if financially strong 
charities share unique qualities that resulted in this level of large foundations’ support, or 
the possibility that these well-off public charities may be operational entities of 
foundation-initiated efforts. This finding may have some bearing on a body of research 
that has discerned that revenue concentration (versus revenue diversification) improves 
the financial health of nonprofits (Chikoto & Neely, 2014; Foster & Fine, 2007). Foster 
and Fine (2007) demonstrated that nearly all (90%) of the large-asset nonprofits in their 
study with over $50 million in annual revenues attained financial growth by relying on a 
single source of income rather than by diversifying funding sources. As such, my 
findings could point to deeper possibilities in illuminating the nature of relationships 
amongst large private foundations, financially strong nonprofits, and revenue 
concentration. 
Indirect Effect 
Tests for an indirect effect among whole variables did not yield significant results. 
However, exploratory analyses of subgroups identified an indirect effect, albeit with 
small effect sizes, in models segmented by asset size and age. Payout rate mediated the 




BCa CI [-0.148, -0.006]), and between sector focus and MULNA among the oldest 
foundations (b = 1.889, 95% BCa CI [0.080, 4.640]). 
These findings indicate that the hypothesized relationship, that a foundations’ 
payout rate is an effective vehicle in supporting public charities, does not hold for whole-
group foundation characteristics of asset size, age, staffing status, and sector focus. To 
account for payout rate’s lack of a mediating role among whole-group variables, I return 
to a commonly used refrain in the foundation field: “If you’ve seen one foundation, 
you’ve seen one foundation.” The sheer diversity of foundations not only has thwarted 
the development of conceptual frameworks explaining their role, behavior, and impact, 
but also the ability to identify patterns of whole-group behavior that can be captured 
statistically. “Even among foundations of the same type, differences in assets, giving 
levels, work styles, geographic reach, and program type vary dramatically and produce 
very different . . . patterns” (Boris et al., 2008, p. xii). My findings affirm that patterns of 
significant associations are better revealed when studying certain types of foundations. 
To that end, this research makes a contribution by revealing the specific types of 
foundations’ characteristics to explore. 
Findings of segmented mediation analyses revealed that payout rate affected 
grantees’ financial capacity, but only among the largest and oldest foundations. These 
results suggest that payout rate is limited to being a measure of the largest and oldest 
foundations’ performance in fulfilling government’s expectations for their public good. 
Given that the largest 1,000 foundations give away roughly half of all grant funds 




research underscores the importance of the largest and most established foundations’ 
charitable spending on their grantees, and by extension, on the financial capacity of the 
nonprofit sector. 
Limitations of the Study 
Although the reliability of 990-PFs has not been tested scientifically, these 
documents seemed to be a generally reliable source of information about the state of 
private foundations’ finances and operations. Anecdotally, having completed a manual 
review of all sampled foundations’ 990-PFs, and drawing from personal experience in 
which I reviewed professionally many 990-PFs, it was clear that 990-PFs had the 
advantage of being completed with expert tax preparation. However, until 990-PFs are 
tested for reliability, the trustworthiness of these data has not been proven to accurately 
depict foundations. Moreover, the least reliable data point may be foundations’ sector as 
it was surely an undercount of the number of foundations that are dedicated to arts and 
culture funding. 
Additionally, I was concerned that small public charities, which were not legally 
required to file a tax return due having gross receipts under $25,000, would be 
overlooked in this study. In actuality, small public charities were not present in this study 
because they were not among the grantees that received foundations’ three largest grant 
amounts. Hence, the study had sampling validity in examining the relationship between 
foundations and their top-three grantees, but the findings of this research does not reflect 




Another limitation of this study is that I used only one measure of grantee 
organizations’ financial health capturing data from only one moment in time. I made the 
case for why I chose MULNA, as it has been most popularly used in the nonprofit 
industry having been promoted by NFF and adopted by funders in their grant decision 
making (Nelson et al., 2009; Nelson & Koo, 2014; NORI, 2010; Ryan, 2001); however, 
Prentice (2013) demonstrated that accounting ratios may not be good measures of 
theoretical constructs of financial conditions used in research studies. In theory, I agree 
with his conclusion, which is why I used an indicator of financial capacity that is widely 
used among practitioners in the field. Hopefully, this research will encourage further 
exploration using more and different types of dependent variables to reflect grantees’ 
capacity to pursue mission, including using time-series data to more accurately capture 
the financial condition of grantees over time (as suggested by Kingma, 1993, p.112). 
Another concern is the threat to validity due to segmented analyses. One potential 
concern is that significance was more often found in subgroup analyses with reduced 
sample sizes than in whole-variable analyses. For example, the significant relationship 
between large foundations’ payout and MULNA was based on a bootstrap of 68 
foundations, and the relationship found between the oldest foundations’ size and staffing 
with MULNA was based on a bootstrapped sample size of 111 foundations. However, 
because I used the robust method of boostrapping, I did not incur a Type II error. On the 
other hand, by testing the sample multiple times, the possibility of having incurred a 
familywise error rate, which is a Type I error, was raised (Vesey et al., 2011, p. 17). The 




et al., 2011). A more conservative approach to avoiding Type I error would be to 
replicate this study and apply the Bonferroni correction to avoid the problem of repeated 
testing effects (Mundfrom, Perrett, Schaffer, Piccone, & Roozeboom, 2006; Vesey et al., 
2011). 
Another limitation of the interpretability of my findings was the small effect sizes. 
I anticipated that if foundations’ payout rate had any effect on MULNA, the effect would 
be small. Too many other factors should determine differences in sizes of MULNA, such 
as public charities’ management skills and their support by other sources of, particularly 
government, funding. Consequently, any significant total or indirect effect was 
interesting in establishing preliminary knowledge of the kinds of foundations and giving 
behavior that may affect grantees’ financial condition. On the other hand, some of the 
effect sizes were small enough to question the impact that changing foundations’ 
behavior may have on a grantee organization. Ideally, the next step of these findings 
would be to identify other complementary foundation factors that contribute more greatly 
to mediating (or moderating) the impact on grantees’ financial reserves. 
Implications and Recommendations 
As this research was exploratory in nature, it would be premature to draw any 
conclusions without further studies to replicate these findings in more robust ways. Yet 
there are three contributions that this research makes to extant knowledge and the still 
nascent state of scientific study on private foundations: (1) The findings provide new 
information on how foundations’ mandated charitable spending behavior relates to 




value of measuring the effects on beneficiaries of regulated foundation activities, and (3) 
my adaptation of principal-agent theory introduces a novel approach to holding 
foundations’ behaviors accountable to the public good. 
Nuancing the Payout Debate 
Up to this point, opposing sides of the still-contentious payout debate have 
advocated for changes to foundations’ charitable distributions generally; however, my 
findings demonstrate the value of parsing different types of foundations and their payout 
rates in a more nuanced way. The results of this research show that certain types of 
foundations and their payout make more of a difference on grantees than other types of 
funders. This kind of information can help policymakers consider potential changes in 
payout regulations based on types of underperforming foundations rather than make 
sweeping changes as occurred with the tax reform acts in 1969 and 1981. 
Along these lines, the findings suggest specific directions for further study, 
namely the relationship between charitable spending and MULNA among the sector’s 
largest and oldest foundations. The results of total and indirect effect analyses indicated 
that the payout of these foundations makes a difference to grantees and has a particularly 
sizable effect on financially strong public charities. Such knowledge has practical 
implications in informing these foundations’ decision making about the types of public 
charities to support and how much to provide. This knowledge also has implications for 
researchers interested in identifying the unique characteristics that financially successful 





Research Value of Variables of Regulated Activities 
This research demonstrates that, despite the individuality of foundations, the 
variable payout rate was conducive to research. One of the more commonly cited reasons 
why foundations have not received academic scrutiny is that the sheer diversity of 
foundations hinders understanding them as a field (Anheier & Hammack, 2010; Harris et 
al., 2006; Orosz et al., 2003; Prewitt, 2006). Yet the payout variable is among a handful 
of quantitative variables universally applicable to all nonoperating foundations uniformly 
reported on publicly accessible tax returns. Other researchers have recognized the value 
of such variables by examining foundations’ distributions, excise tax responses, amount 
of undistributed income, and set-aside amounts (Sansing & Yetman, 2006; Yoder et al., 
2011; Yoder & McAllister, 2012). This study extends their research, which focused on 
industry-wide foundation responses to regulations, by examining the external impacts of 
regulated foundation behavior on beneficiaries. By using universally applicable variables 
governed by federal regulations, there are many more possibilities for understanding the 
relationships amongst foundations’ characteristics, behaviors, and effects using the 
conceptual model introduced in this study. 
Accountability Framework of Foundations’ Activities 
Principal-agent theory is an accountability framework for testing an agent’s 
responsiveness to a principal’s goals (Gailmard, 2014, abstract). This theory offers a 
flexible framework for modeling countless relationship variations (Gailmard, 2014). As 
such, applying this theoretical framework to foundations enabled holding foundations’ 




The implication is that philanthropic accountability can become a more robust line of 
research inquiry, which benefits the public who subsidize foundations’ tax-exempt status. 
For example, this research complements efforts to develop private foundation-specific 
corporate governance accountability theories that are in service to foundations’ social 
purpose (Coule, 2015). The opportunities for testing foundations’ social impacts using 
this theoretical lens is exciting and limited only by the challenge of finding suitable 
indicators of social change. 
Conclusion 
I was motivated to undertake this research by several ambitions. I have been 
interested in exploring a social problem that questions how and if foundations contribute 
to the public good in measurable ways. In addition, I wanted to understand the 
effectiveness of mandated charitable spending on grantee organizations’ financial 
capacity. And, ultimately, I wanted to contribute in ways that would catalyze more 
research on private foundations. 
To those ends, this research contributes in several ways. My findings generated 
new and practical knowledge that the payout rates of the sector’s large and oldest 
foundations have a mediating role in helping grantees afford their charitable endeavors. 
Consequently, this new information should shift the prevailing discourse from a fixation 
on a formulaic payout rate to a more strategic consideration of the kinds of measurable 
impacts that certain types of foundations have on grantees. In addition, I introduced an 
accountability framework for understanding and assessing foundations’ performance in 




on beneficiaries. The development of these theoretical and conceptual models should 
encourage more accountability-based research on private foundations, the proliferation of 
which has the power to shift foundations’ actions to effect greater positive social change 
over time. As with any exploratory endeavor, this effort should be improved by the 
contributions of others, which I hope will be the case. There is much more work to be 
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